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Summary  
Russia is not only one of the world’s major sources of carbon based energy – coal, oil and gas 
– but is also one the most intensive users of energy. Furthermore, Russia accounts for a 
disproportionately large share of global carbon dioxide emissions – some 5% to 6% of global 
carbon dioxide emissions (EIA, 2011a). It has been estimated (World Bank, 2008) that Russia 
could reduce its use of primary energy use by 45% with consequent economic and 
environmental benefits. High energy and carbon intensity of the Russia economy is, inter alia, 
explained by low energy prices due to high export taxes as well as administrative regulation 
of domestic prices of gas and electricity and low environmental taxes. 
Carbon taxes are one such Pigouvian tax and they would address concerns on several fronts 
simultaneously. In the short to medium term they would, inter alia, lead to lower GHG 
emissions and encourage the diffusion of more energy efficient technologies. In the longer 
term, the increased cost of energy inputs is expected to induce technological progress.    
In this analysis, the macroeconomic and sectoral effects of carbon taxes on the Russia 
economy are examined. This analysis addresses the following objectives: i) to test the double 
dividend hypothesis under perfect and imperfect competition in output markets, to analyse ii) 
the incidence of carbon taxes, iii) impacts on sectoral competitiveness, iv) effects on income 
equity, and v) interactions of carbon taxes with other taxes. A computable single-country 
multi-sector comparative static CGE model is employed. To increase the credibility of the 
quantitative results, the standard version of the model has been modified by i) incorporating 
energy substitution by industries and the household sector, ii) disaggregating the electricity 
sector into four power generation technologies, iii) incorporating a Cournot oligopoly in some 
output markets, iv) incorporating a labour supply function, and v) modelling Russia as a large 
country with respect to the natural gas market.   
Three experiments are run: i) an introduction of carbon taxes compensated by an increase in 
lump-sum transfers, ii) an introduction of carbon taxes compensated by a reduction in taxes 
on labour income under perfect competition, and iii) an introduction of carbon taxes 
compensated by a reduction in taxes on labour income under a Cournot oligopoly in some 
output markets. The magnitude of carbon taxation aims at a targeted reduction of carbon 
dioxide emissions by 10% through a proportional increase in carbon tax rates. Carbon taxes 
are levied on crude oil, coal, petroleum products, natural gas, and gas manufacture. The 
experiments are accompanied by sensitivity analyses to ensure the robustness of the results.  
  16 
Simulation results show that introducing carbon taxes compensated by an increase in lump-
sum transfers leads to welfare losses. The economy is adversely affected by carbon taxes via 
increased energy costs so that there are reductions in domestic consumption as well as 
production in almost all sectors. In contrast, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes can 
lead to welfare gains. Other macroeconomic and sectoral effects resulting from substituting 
carbon taxes for labour taxes are summarized as follows: 
1) There are increases in the supply of unskilled and skilled labour. This indicates the 
occurrence of an employment double dividend. High labour supply leads to reductions 
in net wages, implying lower labour costs for industries. Moreover, supply of land is 
increased associated with higher production of agricultural products. 
2) Returns to capital and natural resources are reduced because of lower demand for 
these factors so that the burden of carbon taxes is not fully passed on to final 
consumers, yet is partially absorbed by lower factor prices. This indicates the tax-
shifting effect between labour, capital and natural resources.  
3) Substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes results in higher revenues from export taxes 
because of both a depreciation of the currency and higher export supplies of energy 
commodities as well as non-energy intensive commodities. In particular, the increase 
in revenues from export taxes on crude oil, natural gas, and petroleum products is 
strongly pronounced. Export taxes lower the domestic price level of energy so that 
there is oversupply of energy in the domestic market. Therefore, introducing carbon 
taxes has also a corrective effect since this leads to an increase in export supply and a 
reduction in domestic demand for energy. Increases in export supply of energy are 
associated with higher revenues from export taxes, which reduce the cost of the 
environmental tax reform. Moreover, there is an increase in the revenue from land 
taxes. Intuitively, high revenues from other taxes allow a larger reduction in labour 
taxes, furthermore alleviating the tax distortion in the labour market.   
4) In contrast, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes leads to reductions in the 
revenues from labour taxes because of both lower tax rates and wages. Revenues from 
capital taxes and mineral resource extraction taxes are also reduced due to lower 
returns to these factors. Furthermore, revenues from consumption taxes decrease due 
to a lower value of total consumption.      
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5) Total domestic production of energy commodities is reduced, driven by lower 
domestic demand. Nevertheless, domestic producers of energy become more 
competitive in domestic and export markets because of lower production costs and a 
depreciation of the currency. As a result, there are increases in the export supply of 
crude oil, coal, petroleum products, and natural gas. 
6) Energy intensive commodities such as electricity, wood products, chemical products, 
and metals are affected most adversely by the introduction of carbon taxes. Due to 
high energy costs, domestic producers of energy intensive commodities become less 
competitive compared to foreign firms. As a result, there are increases in import 
demand for some energy intensive commodities, whereas export and domestic demand 
for all domestically produced energy intensive commodities is reduced.  
7) In contrast, domestic producers of non-energy intensive commodities such as textiles, 
agriculture, and food products become more competitive in domestic and export 
markets compared to foreign rivals. As a result, substituting carbon taxes for labour 
taxes leads to increases in export supplies of all non-energy intensive commodities. 
Moreover, domestic demand for most domestically produced non-energy intensive 
commodities is also increased because of increased household income, while import 
demand for non-energy intensive commodities is reduced via a substitution effect. 
8) Carbon taxes have a strong regressive impact on income distribution since the 
expenditure shares on coal, gas and electricity are especially high by poor households 
compared to those by rich households, while the expenditure share on petroleum 
products is larger by rich households. Despite a regressive impact of carbon taxes, the 
environmental tax reform tends to be quite progressive, if revenues from carbon taxes 
are refunded through a reduction in labour taxes or as lump-sum transfers in favour of 
poor household groups. Hence, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes cannot only 
improve the national welfare, but also this can reduce income inequality in Russia. 
To examine the stability of the results under different model parameterization, several 
sensitivity analyses were carried out. The sensitivity analyses indicate that the 
macroeconomic and sectoral effects of carbon taxes strongly depend on i) the labour supply 
elasticity, ii) elasticities of substitution between labour and the capital-energy aggregate, iii) 
elasticities of substitution between capital and energy, and iv) international capital mobility. 
For instance, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes results in higher welfare gains under a 
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high labour supply elasticity as well as high elasticities of substitution between labour and the 
capital-energy aggregate and low elasticities of substitution between capital and energy. 
Intuitively, the more elastic demand and supply of labour, the larger welfare losses arising 
from labour taxation. Therefore, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes tends to be a more 
preferable revenue recycling strategy under elastic demand and supply of labour. Another 
crucial aspect is the tax-shifting effect between labour and capital. Under the assumption of 
international capital immobility, capital bears some burden of carbon taxation. The higher 
elasticities of substitution between labour and the capital-energy aggregate as well as the 
lower elasticities of substitution between capital and energy, the more pronounced the tax-
shifting effect. The magnitude of the tax-shifting effect between capital and labour is 
indicated by reductions in the return to capital. In contrast, given the assumption of perfect 
capital mobility across borders, introducing carbon taxes under both revenue recycling 
schemes – an increase in lump-sum transfers to households and a reduction in tax rates on 
labour income – leads to substantial welfare losses compared to those in the central case 
simulation.  
In the central policy simulation, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes improves the 
national welfare. Nevertheless, non-tax distortions such as imperfect competition should not 
be neglected. In the presence of a Cournot oligopoly in the market for natural gas, petroleum 
products, chemical products, metals, and minerals, the cost of carbon taxation in terms of 
welfare is higher compared to perfect competition being assumed. The reason for this is that 
carbon taxes exacerbate pre-existing distortions arising from imperfect competition as well as 
induce losses in economies of scale. As a result, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes  
Zusammenfassung 
Russland verfügt  nicht nur über einen der größten Vorräte an kohlenstoffbasierter Energie 
wie Kohle, Rohöl und Gas, sondern ist auch einer der größten Energieverbraucher. Darüber 
hinaus ist Russland für einen überproportional großen Anteil von Kohlendioxid-Emission - 
etwa 5% bis 6% – der weltweiten Kohlendioxidemission verantwortlich.  
Mit der Einführung einer Kohlendioxidsteuer könnten gleichzeitig unterschiedliche 
Wirkungen erzielt werden. Kurz- und mittelfristig würden Kohlenstoffsteuern sowohl zu einer 
Reduzierung von Treibhausgasemissionen als auch zur Einführung von energieeffizienteren 
Technologien führen. Langfristig wird erwartet, dass hohe Energiekosten den Anreiz zur 
Entwicklung und zur Investition in energiesparenden technischen Fortschritt erhöhen. 
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Die vorliegende Arbeit analysiert und bewertet die makroökonomischen und sektoralen 
Auswirkungen einer Einführung von Kohlenstoffsteuern auf die russische Wirtschaft. Die 
Ziele der Arbeit bestehen darin, die Hypothese der doppelten Dividende für den Fall des 
vollkommenen  und des unvollkommenen Wettbewerbs auf Gütermärkten zu überprüfen und 
die Inzidenz einer Kohlenstoffsteuer, ihre Auswirkungen auf die sektorale 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, ihre Auswirkungen auf die Einkommensverteilung und die Interaktion 
von Kohlenstoffsteuern mit anderen Steuern zu analysieren und zu bewerten.  
Als methodischer Ansatz wurde ein Single-Country und Multi-Sektor Model  gewählt. Dabei 
handelt es sich um ein komparativ statisches Model. Zur Verbesserung der Glaubwürdigkeit 
der Simulationsergebnissen wurde die Standardversion des Modells modifiziert, indem die 
Substituierbarkeit des Energieverbrauches bei Industrien und Hausehalten eingeführt, der 
Stromsektor in vier Subsektoren untergliedert, ein Cournot-Oligopol in Gütermärkten 
eingebaut, eine Arbeitsangebotsfunktion eingeführt und Russland als ein großes Land in 
Bezug auf den Markt für Gas dargestellt wurde. 
Drei Experimente werden durchgeführt: 
1) Die Einführung einer Kohlenstoffsteuer, deren Steuererträge durch eine Erhöhung von 
Pauschalbeträgen zurückerstattet werden. 
2) Die Einführung einer Kohlenstoffsteuer, deren Steuererträge über die Senkung von 
Steuern auf das Arbeitseinkommen bei vollkommenem Wettbewerb auf Gütermärkten 
kompensiert werden. 
3) Die Einführung einer Kohlenstoffsteuer, deren Steuererträge durch eine Senkung von 
Steuern auf das Arbeitskommen für den Fall des Vorliegens eines Cournot-Oligopols 
auf Gütermärkten zurückerstattet werden.  
Durch die Einführung der Kohlenstoffsteuer wird eine Reduzierung von 
Kohlendioxidemissionen um 10% erreicht. Die Steuern fallen beim Verbrauch von Rohöl, 
Kohle, Erdölprodukte, Erdgas und Industriegas an. Die Experimente werden von 
Sensitivitätsanalysen begleitet, um die Robustheit der Ergebnisse zu gewährleisten.  
Die Ergebnisse der durchgeführten Simulationen zeigen, dass die Einführung einer 
Kohlenstoffsteuer, deren Steuererträge durch eine Erhöhung von Pauschalbeträgen 
zurückerstattet werden, zu Wohlfahrtsverlusten führt. Im Gegensatz dazu ergeben sich 
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Wohlfahrtsgewinne, wenn ein teilweiser Ersatz der Arbeitseinkommensteuern durch 
Kohlenstoffsteuern erfolgt.  
Bei der Analyse konnten weiterhin folgende makroökonomische und sektorale Effekte 
festgestellt werden:  
1) Es erfolgt ein Anstieg des Arbeitsangebots, der auch als 
Beschäftigungsdoppeldividende bezeichnet wird. Die Beschäftigungserhöhung hat 
eine Senkung der Nettolöhne zur Folge. Damit sinken die Lohnkosten für die 
Industrien. 
2) Die Renditen für das Kapital und die natürliche Ressourcen sinken aufgrund fallender 
Nachfrage nach diesen Produktionsfaktoren. Infolgedessen fällt die Last der 
Kohlenstoffbesteuerung nicht vollständig auf die Endverbraucher in Form von hohen 
Konsumentenpreisen, sondern wird teilweise durch niedrigere Faktorpreise gedämpft. 
3) Die Einführung einer Kohlenstoffsteuer mit einer kompensierenden Senkung der 
Arbeitseinkommensteuern hat eine Erhöhung der Steuereinnahmen von Exportsteuern 
aufgrund einer Geldabwertung und steigenden Exporten von Energieprodukten und 
nicht energieintensiven Produkten zur Folge. Insbesondere, der Anstieg der 
Steuereinnahmen von Exportsteuern auf Rohöl, Erdgas und Erdölprodukte ist stark 
ausgeprägt. Hohe Steuereinnahmen gewährleisten eine weitere Senkung der 
Arbeitseinkommensteuern, dadurch werden die Wohlfahrtskosten der ökologischen 
Steuerreform reduziert. 
4) Die Steuereinnahmen aus Arbeitseinkommen sinken als Folge einer Reduzierung der 
Steuersätzen und sinkender Nettolöhne. Die fallenden Renditen für Kapital und 
natürliche Ressourcen führen zur niedrigeren Einnahmen bei 
Kapitaleinkommensteuern und Steuern auf die Gewinnung von natürlichen 
Ressourcen. Außerdem sinken die Steuereinnahmen bei Verbrauchersteuern aufgrund 
des niedrigeren Gesamtverbrauchs. 
5) Die Gesamtproduktion an Energieprodukten schrumpft infolge der sinkenden 
Nachfrage. Nichtsdestotrotz werden die inländischen Produzenten von 
Energieprodukten konkurrenzfähiger auf Binnen- und Auslandsmärkten. Gründe dafür 
sind eine Geldabwertung und fallende Produktionskosten. Infolgedessen steigen die 
Exporte von Rohöl, Erdölprodukten und Erdgas. 
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6) Energieintensive Industrien wie Stromerzeugung und chemische Industrie sind stark 
von hohen Energiekosten betroffen. Daher werden die inländischen Produzenten 
weniger konkurrenzfähig im Vergleich zu ausländische Firmen sein. In Folge dessen 
steigt die Nachfrage nach importierten energieintensiven Produkten, während Export- 
und Binnennachfrage nach inländisch produzierten energieintensiven Produkten sinkt. 
7) In Gegensatz dazu gewinnen die inländischen Produzenten von nicht energieintensiven 
Produkten – wie zum Beispiel Nahrungsmittel, Textilprodukte und Agrarprodukte – an 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gegen die ausländischen Konkurrenten. Der Grund dafür sind 
sinkende Arbeits- und Kapitalkosten. Damit steigt durch die zu erwartenden 
Substitutionseffekte nicht nur das Exportangebot, sondern auch die Inlandsnachfrage 
nach vielen inländisch produzierten, nicht energieintensiven Produkten. 
8) Die Kohlenstoffsteuer hat Auswirkungen auf die Einkommensverteilung in den 
Haushalten, da die Ausgabenanteile für Kohle, Gas und Elektroenergie in armen höher 
sind als in reichen Haushalten. Trotz eines regressiven Charakters der 
Kohlenstoffsteuer ist die ökologische Steuerreform im Falle einer kompensierenden 
Senkung der Arbeitseinkommensteuern progressiv. Deshalb kann ein teilweiser Ersatz 
der Arbeitseinkommensteuern durch Kohlenstoffsteuern nicht nur die Wohlfahrt 
erhöhen, sondern auch die Einkommensungleichheit reduzieren. 
Verschiedene Sensitivitätsanalysen wurden durchgeführt, um die Robustheit der Ergebnisse 
nachzuweisen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass makroökonomische und sektorale Effekte der 
Kohlstoffbesteuerung stark abhängig sind von der Elastizität des Arbeitskräfteangebots, den 
Substitutionselastizitäten zwischen Arbeit und dem Kapital-Energie-Aggregat, den 
Substitutionselastizitäten zwischen Kapital und Energie, und der internationalen 
Kapitalmobilität. Die Einführung einer Kohlenstoffsteuer mit kompensierender Senkung der 
Arbeitseinkommensteuern führt zu hohem Wohlfahrtsgewinn, wenn die Elastizität des 
Arbeitskräfteangebots sowie auch Substitutionselastizitäten zwischen Arbeit und dem 
Kapital-Energie-Aggregat hoch sind und Substitutionselastizitäten zwischen Kapital und 
Energie niedrig sind. Ein anderer wichtiger Aspekt ist die Steuerüberwälzung zwischen 
Kapital und Arbeit. Je höher Substitutionselastizitäten zwischen Arbeit und dem Kapital-
Energie-Aggregat und je niedriger Substitutionselastizitäten zwischen Kapital und Energie 
sind, desto stärker ist der Steuerüberwälzungseffekt ausgeprägt. 
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Unter der Annahme eines Oligopols in den Märkten für Erdgas, Erdölprodukte, chemische 
Erzeugnisse, Metalle und Minerale sind die Wohlfahrtkosten der Kohlenstoffbesteuerung 
höher als im Falle des vollkommenen Wettbewerbs. Der Grund dafür ist, dass 
Kohlenstoffsteuern die sich durch einen unvollkommenen Wettbewerb ergebenden 
Verzerrungen verschärfen und zu Verlusten von Skaleneffekten führen.  
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1 Introduction 
Russia is not only one of the world’s major sources of carbon based energy – coal, oil and gas 
– but is also one the most intensive users of energy. For example, to produce one dollar of 
GDP, Russia requires by 28% more energy than Canada, a country with similar climatic 
conditions, and twice more than European countries on average (EIA, 2011a). It has been 
estimated (World Bank, 2008) that Russia could reduce its use of primary energy use by some 
45%, with consequent economic and environmental benefits. Furthermore, Russia accounts 
for a disproportionately large share of global carbon dioxide emissions – some 5% to 6% of 
global carbon dioxide emissions (EIA, 2011a); even after making allowance for climatic 
conditions. The carbon intensity in Russia accounted for 1.816 metric tons of CO2 per 
thousand USD in 2009, whereas the world average was 0.620 (EIA, 2011a). Approximately 
by 2035, Russia would have the highest level of carbon dioxide emissions per capita among 
non-OECD countries (EIA, 2011b). In large part, the high carbon dioxide emission rates are a 
consequence of outdated and inefficient technologies, a legacy of the Soviet era, reinforced by 
the low cost of energy. The major source of these emissions is the power generation sector, 
which has the greatest technical energy saving potential, but the residential building, 
manufacturing, and transport sectors also have substantial scope for improvement energy 
efficiency (Bashmakov, 2009).  
Much attention has been given to the issue of energy efficiency in Russia. Improvement of 
energy efficiency is one of the most important aspects of the Russian energy policy (Ministry 
of Energy, 2009). However, energy using technologies are typically embedded in capital 
equipment, e.g., power stations, smelters, etc., and buildings which have long productive 
lives, and hence the pace of technological change is inevitably a costly and long process. It 
raises concern that there is underinvestment in energy efficiency in Russia, i.e., an energy 
efficiency gap exists between the current and the social optimal energy use (Kozuchowski, 
2008). There are different reasons which can slow down technical modernization. The 
replacement of technologies in Russia is particularly slow due to a combination of non-market 
failures – underestimation of adoption costs, high discount rates, and heterogeneity of energy 
users – and market failures – lack of information, principle-agent problems, and low energy 
prices because of inefficient price regulation and non-internalized environmental externalities 
(World Bank, 2008). On grounds of economic efficiency, only the existence of market failure 
can provide justifications for government intervention (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994a, 1994b). 
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This analyses focuses on non-internalized negative externalities considered as one of the 
reasons for the high energy/carbon intensity in Russia. Environmental taxes are small in 
Russia: for example, environmental payments paid by thermal power generation companies 
account for less than 0.1% of their total production costs, being considerably lower compared 
to many developed countries (EFA, 2009a). 
Carbon taxes are one such Pigouvian tax and in Russia they would, potentially, address 
concerns on several fronts simultaneously. In the short to medium term they would, inter alia, 
i) reduce CO2 and other emissions stemming from the use of energy commodities, ii) induce 
energy users to optimize the energy efficiency of existing plants, iii) substitute lower emission 
energy sources for higher emission sources and iv) induce the adoption of passive energy 
saving technologies, e.g., improved insulation. In the longer term, the increased cost of 
primary energy products should both accelerate the rate of technological replacement and 
induce technological progress (Ruttan, 1997; Newell et al., 1999; Popp, 2002).  
Carbon taxation is not high on the political agenda in Russia. Nevertheless, recently there has 
been a political discourse in Russia regarding increases of environmental payments 
(Kozuchowski, 2008; MNRERF, 2011). Although Russia has signed the Kyoto protocol and 
is subject to limits on its total carbon dioxide emissions, Russia currently is substantially 
below its limit and there would be no urgent need for a reduction of actual CO2 emissions 
(UNFCCC, 2010a). According to Article 17 of the Kyoto protocol, Russia may sell part of its 
rights to emit CO2 to other countries as part of the international carbon trade (UNFCCC, 
2006). This may constitute an additional benefit from increasing carbon taxes in Russia which 
is politically discussed (RT, 2010).  
Furthermore, according to the environmental taxation literature, an introduction of 
environmental taxes is often related to the concept of a strong double dividend, where 
substituting environmental taxes for other distortionary taxes can improve not only the 
environment, but also can reduce efficiency costs of the tax system (Goulder, 1995). The 
occurrence of a strong double dividend is ambiguous and depends, inter alia, on the tax 
system, economic structure, household preferences, and revenue recycling strategies 
(Goulder, 2002). 
In case of environmental taxes, the revenue recycling policy becomes an important aspect. 
Compared to other possible revenue-recycling strategies, a reduction in labour taxes via 
revenues from environmental taxes is often considered as desirable, especially for Western 
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economies, since it also addresses unemployment concerns (Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 
1994). In addition, some European countries have already implemented such environmental 
tax reforms, where an introduction of various environmental taxes (carbon dioxide or sulphur 
dioxide) is compensated by reduction in personal income taxes or social security contributions 
(Bosquet, 2000). The motivation for such a policy would be valid for Russia, too, since the 
level of unemployment in Russia accounted for 7.5% of the total labour force in 2010 (FSSS, 
2012a). Moreover, distortions from labour taxation may be substantial in Russia: both taxes 
on labour income and social security contributions accounted for 27% of total government 
revenues in 2010 (FSSS, 2012b). Furthermore, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes 
explicitly addresses the issue of income inequality, which is of high relevance for Russia. For 
example, the Gini coefficient for Russia was 0.42 in 2009 (FSSS, 2011). 
The theoretical literature on environmental taxation is mainly focused on pre-existing 
distortionary taxes in the labour and capital markets (Goulder et al., 1997; de Mooij and 
Bovenberg, 1998), whereas interactions with other taxes such as export and import taxes, 
valued added taxes, excise taxes, and mineral resource extraction taxes are often neglected. 
Introducing environmental taxes, however, can indirectly affect the efficiency of the tax 
system through changes in tax bases. As a result, carbon taxes can either alleviate or 
exacerbate pre-existing distortions. Moreover, taxes other than labour and capital taxes can be 
a large source of government revenues. For example, revenues from export and import taxes, 
especially export taxes on crude oil, petroleum products, and natural gas, account for 
approximately 21% of total government revenues in Russia (FSSS, 2012b; Roskazna, 2010).    
Apart from tax distortions on factor and commodity markets, another important aspect which 
is often neglected in empirical studies is distortions arising from imperfect competition. In 
any real economy, many markets can be characterized as being imperfectly competitive. For 
example, many resource-based sectors require high investments in plants and equipment and 
therefore exhibit decreasing average costs (Devarajan and Rodrik, 1991). According to 
analytical work on this issue, market structure can significantly affect the outcome of 
environmental tax reform. Therefore, imperfect competition is considered in some output 
markets in this analysis. 
This analysis addresses the following objectives: i) to test the double dividend hypothesis 
under perfect and imperfect competition in output markets, to analyse ii) the incidence of 
carbon taxes, iii) impacts on sectoral competitiveness, iv) effects on income equity, and v) 
interactions of carbon taxes with other taxes. Two revenue recycling schemes are considered. 
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First, carbon taxes are introduced, where revenues from carbon taxes returned to households 
in lump-sum form. This experiment is considered as a reference experiment. Second, carbon 
taxes are introduced, where revenues from carbon taxes are refunded through a reduction in 
taxes on labour income. The results under the second experiment are compared to those under 
the first one.  
The analytical models used by Parry (2001) and Stern (1987) are employed to provide a 
theoretical background for environmental taxation under perfect and imperfect competition. 
Moreover, the analytical model developed by Parry (2001) is extended by incorporating 
export taxes on polluting goods since the Russian economy strongly depends on revenues 
from export taxes. The numerical analysis is based on a computable comparative static single-
country multi-sector general equilibrium model – an energy/environment adaptation of the 
STAGE model (McDonald, 2007). For the purpose of this analysis purpose, the core model is 
extended by the following modifications:  
1) Incorporating factor-fuel as well as inter-fuel substitution for non-energy producing 
sectors.  
2) Incorporating a two level nested linear expenditure system for households, where the 
first level consists of energy and non-energy composites. 
3) Disaggregating the electricity sector into four technologies: coal-fired, gas-fired, 
nuclear, and hydro, using a technology bundle approach. 
4) Incorporating imperfect competition and internal economies of scale into markets for 
natural gas, metals, minerals, chemical products, and petroleum products. 
5) Incorporating a labour supply function. 
6) Modelling Russia as a large country with respect to the natural gas market. 
7) Incorporating the account of CO2 emissions into the model.  
To our knowledge this is the first such study for Russia, addressing the issue of a double 
dividend under perfect and imperfect competition in output markets. Moreover, despite 
comprehensive analytical work on environmental taxation under imperfect competition, there 
are few studies which treat this issue in complex numerical CGE models, which are able to 
reflect real-world complexities (e.g. Böhringer et al., 2008). 
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The study is organized as follows. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 provides a brief 
overview of energy efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions in Russia. In Chapter 3, the 
theoretical concept of energy efficiency as well as the concept of environmental taxation in 
the presence of pre-existing distortions is discussed. Chapter 4 presents the Russian tax 
system, especially taxes applied on production, consumption and trade of energy. Chapter 5 
gives an overview of Russian energy markets, providing the basis of the modifications of the 
numerical model design. Chapter 6 provides a description of the database as well as this gives 
a detailed description the core model and its modifications. The results of simulations are 
presented in Chapter 7. The final chapter provides the conclusions together with comments on 
how the analysis could be further developed. 
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2 Energy Efficiency and GHG Emissions 
Chapter 2 deals with energy efficiency of the Russia economy and GHG emissions. The 
chapter aims at raising the problem statement and is divided into three parts. The first part 
gives information about energy intensity of the Russian economy in comparison to other 
countries and provides the reasons for high energy intensity in Russia. The second part 
provides quantitative data on GHG emissions in Russia. This part defines the role of Russia 
with respect to global GHG emissions. The third part gives some estimation of energy saving 
potential in Russia and defines benefits, barriers and possible solutions to energy efficiency 
improvement.  
2.1 Energy Intensity 
Russia is highly energy intensive, more energy intensive compared to countries with similar 
GDP per capita. For example to produce one dollar of GDP, Russia requires by 28% more 
energy resources than Canada, a country with similar climatic conditions and economic 
structure, and twice more than European countries on average (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1: Total Primary Energy Consumption per Dollar of GDP in 2008 (British 
thermal units per USD)  
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Source: EIA (2011a). 
In general, the main reasons for high energy intensity in Russia are low domestic prices of 
energy, climatic conditions, economic structure and outdated equipment (Kulagin, 2008). 
From 1998 to 2008, the GDP energy intensity in Russia has been reduced by 42% because of 
structural change since the service sector has grown faster than industries (Bashmakov, 2011; 
Bashmakov and Mishack, 2012). Apart from structural change in favour of non-energy 
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intensive sectors, a large scale technical modernization of the whole economy covers a large 
potential for further reductions in energy intensity in Russia.   
2.2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions  
Greenhouse gases (GHG) include direct greenhouse gases such as CO2 (carbon dioxide), CH4 
(methane), N2O (nitrous oxide), PFCs (perfluorocarbons), HFCs (hydro fluorocarbons), and 
SF6 (sulphur hexafluoride) (UNFCCC, 2012). GHG can be conditionally divided into energy 
and non-energy related emissions. Energy related emission – mainly CO2 – come from 
industries and the power generation sector, whereas non-energy related – mainly CH4 and 
N2O – emissions stem from the agricultural sector, waste, and land use (Stern, 2007).  
High domestic demand for energy resources as well as low energy efficiency results in high 
GHG emissions. Russia is one of the largest contributors to carbon dioxide emissions in the 
world: for example, Russia was responsible for 5-7% of global CO2 emissions in the period 
from 2000 to 2008 (EIA, 2011a). The carbon intensity of the Russian economy measured as 
metric tons of CO2 per thousand USD was 1.82 in 2009, whereas the world’s average was 
0.62 (EIA, 2011a). Among other countries, Russia ratified the Kyoto protocol, which came 
into force on February 16th, 2005 (Federal Law No.128-FZ from October 27th, 2004). 
According to the Kyoto protocol, Russia may not exceed the level of GHG emissions 
recorded in 1990, which was approximately 3,322 Mt CO2e (metric ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent). GHG emissions in Russia were 2,230 Mt CO2e in 2008, which is approximately 
67% of the committed level. In other words, Russia has emission quotas on its commitments 
(Figure 2.2).  
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Figure 2.2: Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions Excluding Emissions/Removals from Land 
Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (Mt CO2) 
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Source: UNFCCC (2010a; 2010b). 
The Russian growing economy will unambiguously require more energy resources. Therefore, 
domestic consumption of energy is expected to increase, which will lead to higher GHG 
emissions. Approximately by 2035, Russia would have the highest level of carbon dioxide 
emissions per capita among non-OECD countries so that environmental obligations could 
slow down the economic growth in the future (EIA, 2011b).  
According to the Fifth National Report of the Russian Federation (UNFCCC, 2010a), the 
power generation sector is the largest source of GHG emissions, where the majority of GHG 
comes from CO2 and CH4. For example, CO2 accounts for 79% of total GHG stemming from 
the power generation sector (Table 2.1). Other large sources of GHG are industries, 
agriculture and waste. GHG from industries consists mainly of CO2 and F-gases. The largest 
contributors to GHG among industries are the metals (53.4%), mineral products (26.5%), and 
the chemical products sectors (11.7%). The agricultural sector is a large contributor to CH4 
and N2O, whereas waste induces mainly CH4.  
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Table 2.1: GHG Emissions by Sources in 2007 (per cent) 
 
Shares 
of GHG 
by sector 
Shares in total sectoral GHG 
CO2 CH4 N2O F-gases Total 
Energy generation 81.5 79.0 20.8 0.2 0.0 100 
Industries 9.4 81.3 0.4 1.9 16.4 100 
Agriculture 6.1 0.0 31.1 68.9 0.0 100 
Waste 3.0 0.0 93.8 6.2 0.0 100 
Total 100 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: UNFCCC (2010a). 
Furthermore, according to the Fifth National Report of the Russian Federation (UNFCCC, 
2010a), CO2 accounts for 72% of the total GHG emission, followed by CH4 (21.7%), N2O 
(4.7%), and F-gases (1.6%). Improvement of energy efficiency, especially in the power 
generation sector, can lead to a substantial reduction of GHG emissions (Bashmakov, 2009). 
2.3 Energy Saving Potential 
Most equipment applied in Russia is outdated and highly energy intensive. For example, the 
average operating time of all power generation plants in Russia is approximately 30 years. 
The majority of existing capacity in most industries was built during the Soviet Union era 
(EFA, 2009a). Large scale modernization of the whole Russian economy provides a large 
“source” of energy. Bashmakov (2009) distinguishes between three categories of energy 
saving potential:  
1) Technical energy saving potential. “A technical energy saving potential is estimated 
as an amount of energy that can be saved by replacing the whole equipment stock with 
the best available one.” 
2) Economic energy saving potential. “An economic energy saving potential is defined 
as a part of technical energy saving potential which can be cost-effectively realized 
using public cost effectiveness criteria, such as discount rates, export prices of energy 
resources, positive and negative externalities.” 
3) Market energy saving potential. “A market energy saving potential is a part of 
economic energy saving potential which can be costs-effectively realized using private 
cost effective criteria, such as energy prices, capital costs, and risks. The economic 
energy saving potential is higher than the market energy saving potential since positive 
and negative external effects are often not accounted for in evaluating investment 
projects by private sectors.”  
  32 
Furthermore, according to Bashmakov (2009), the technical energy saving potential includes 
a direct and indirect potential for energy saving. The direct energy saving potential defines the 
amount of primary energy that can be saved by final consumers via technological (technical) 
modernization. The indirect energy saving potential accounts for energy that can be saved to 
produce and distribute a unit of a certain energy input. For example, a certain amount of gas 
or coal is required to produce 1 ton of oil equivalent (toe) of electricity, whereas production of 
gas and coal also requires electricity. The indirect energy saving potential is estimated 
through the whole energy supply chain. According to the study carried out by Bashmakov 
(2009), Russia could save about 45% of its total primary energy consumption in 2005, when 
both the direct and indirect effects are accounted for. Such improvement of energy efficiency 
will result in a substantial reduction of CO2 emissions – approximately 50% of Russian total 
CO2 emissions in 2005. Table 2.2 shows the estimated technical energy saving potential in 
Russia for 2005. The potential to reduce the total final energy consumption via technical 
modernization is estimated at 154 mtoe (million ton of oil equivalent) or 36% of the final 
energy consumption in 2005.  
Table 2.2: Technical Energy Saving Potential 
 Technical energy 
savings potential 
(Mtoe) 
Technical energy 
savings potential 
(per cent to total) 
Total, including elimination of natural 
gas flaring  294 100 
Elimination of natural gas flaring 12 4.1 
Total primary energy supply: 282 95.9 
Electricity generation (direct) 22 7.5 
Electricity generation (indirect) 40 13.6 
Heat supply (direct) 9 3.1 
Heat supply (indirect) 16 5.4 
Fuel production, transformation, 
transmission, and distribution (direct) 17 5.8 
Fuel production, transformation, 
transmission, and distribution (indirect) 24 8.2 
Total final energy consumption:  154 52.4 
Agriculture and forestry 3 1.0 
Mining 1 0.3 
Manufacturing 42 14.3 
Construction 1 0.3 
Transport  38 12.9 
Municipal utilities 1 0.3 
Services 15 5.1 
Residential 53 18.0 
Source: Bashmakov (2009).  
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Among non-energy producing sectors, the largest sources of energy efficiency improvement 
are the residential buildings, manufacturing, the transport sector, and services. The energy 
efficiency potential increases from 154 to 282 mtoe, if both the technical energy efficiency 
potential in the energy sector and indirect effects are accounted for. In particular, the power 
generation sector (electricity and heat) in Russia has a large energy saving potential. As 
shown in Table 2.2, technical modernization of the electricity generation sector (direct effect) 
can induce a reduction in energy consumption by 22 mtoe, whereas the indirect effect 
accounts for 40 mtoe. For heat supply, the direct effect is responsible for a reduction of 
energy consumption by 9 mtoe and the indirect effect yields 16 mtoe, whereas for fuel 
production and transportation it is 17 mtoe and 24 mtoe, respectively. 
Based on Bashmakov (2009), some specific aspects of energy saving potential with respect to 
a certain sector are introduced below.    
Buildings. Residential buildings are one of the largest energy users in Russia with the greatest 
potential for energy efficiency improvement: 53 mtoe. Total energy consumption of 
residential buildings is used for heating (58%), hot water (25%), cooking (10%), lighting 
(2.5%), and appliances (4.5%). 
Manufacturing. The manufacturing sector is a large final consumer of energy, which has the 
second large technical energy savings potential (42 mtoe). In particular, ferrous metallurgy, 
pulp, and paper production have a great potential for energy efficiency improvement. 
Transportation. The transport sector has the third largest technical energy saving potential 
among final users of energy: 38 mtoe or 41% of its energy consumption in 2005. The 
economic energy saving potential is evaluated at 95% of the technical energy saving potential, 
whereas the market energy saving potential accounts for 83%. About 49.3% of the technical 
energy saving potential falls into roads and 39.8% into gas pipelines, followed by aviation 
(4.3%), rail (2.7%), oil pipelines (1.6%), others (1.6%), and water transportation (0.7%).   
Agriculture. Approximately 50% of total energy consumed by the agricultural sector is liquid 
fuels. Most tractors and other agricultural machineries used in Russia are outdated and very 
energy intensive. For example, consumption of diesel fuel per hectare as well as consumption 
of heat and electricity can be reduced by 50% in the agricultural sector via technical 
modernization. 
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Electricity generation. In particular, condensation power stations and combined heat and 
power (CHP) stations have a large technical energy saving potential. About 90% of technical 
energy saving potential is evaluated as economically viable, whereas 72% can be market 
viable with respect to fuel prices in 2010. The market energy saving potential is expected to 
be much higher, if opportunities of CO2 credits trade are accounted for. 
Heat generation. The economic energy saving potential in the heat generation sector is 
estimated at 90% of the technical energy saving potential, while the market potential varies 
from 30% to 87% depending on assumed fuel prices, operation costs, opportunities of CO2 
trading. The outdated heat supply system in Russia induces considerable losses of energy; for 
example, losses of municipal heat distribution are evaluated at 20-25% of energy 
consumption. The average losses of municipal and industrial heat distribution are estimated at 
15%, whereas heat distribution losses in most West European countries are between 2% and 
10% of energy consumption.  
Fuel production and transformation. The technical potential to improve energy efficiency 
by oil extraction and petroleum refineries is estimated at 4.0-5.6 mtoe or 26%-37% of total 
energy consumed by the petroleum refinery. Another important source for energy efficiency 
improvement is technical modernization of the natural gas sector as well as utilization of 
associated natural gas. Consumption of energy in the gas sector can be reduced by 20% of 
energy consumed by the gas sector in 2005. The use of energy in the coal sector can be 
reduced by 0.26 mtoe or 15% of energy used by the coal sector in 2005.  
Benefits of energy efficiency improvement. Improvement of energy efficiency in Russia 
would result in several economic and environmental benefits, which are summarized as 
follows (World Bank, 2008):  
1) Energy security. According to the estimation carried out by IEA (2006), the main 
reserves of crude oil and natural gas in Russia are in decline. This raises concerns 
about the ability of Russian gas producers to satisfy growing domestic and export 
demand for energy resources. Realizing energy saving potential in Russia can unlock a 
large source of energy. Investment in energy efficiency in Russia can be more cost 
effective compared to investment in new production capacity.  
2) Economic development. Higher energy costs will lead to decreases in profit. 
Investment in less energy intensive technologies, however, will support the 
competitiveness of domestic producers in domestic and export markets. Moreover, 
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decreasing energy intensity results in more revenues from export of energy via higher 
export supply. In addition, government expenditures on energy services are high in 
Russia and improvement of energy efficiency will reduce these expenditures.  
3) Environmental improvement. Energy use, especially fossil fuel, induces high health 
risks for the population. Air pollution is one of the reasons for many diseases so that 
less energy consumption implies ultimately less pollution. Another important 
challenge related to energy use is climate change. Improvement of energy efficiency in 
Russia will lead to a decline of GHG emissions. As mentioned, the technical energy 
efficiency potential in Russia is associated with a reduction of carbon dioxide 
emissions by 50% of total CO2 estimated for 2005. In particular, heat and electricity 
generation, transportation and distribution losses, and the manufacturing sector has the 
greatest potential for a reduction of CO2 emissions.  
4) Carbon credits. Finally, the level of GHG emissions in Russia in 2008 accounted for 
approximate 67% of the committed level of emissions. Therefore, Russia has emission 
quotas, which can be sold in international carbon markets (Article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol). Furthermore, a large technical energy saving potential provides 
opportunities to benefit from Joint Implementation projects (Article 6 of the Kyoto 
Protocol).  
Barriers and solutions to energy efficiency. There are different barriers for energy 
efficiency improvement, such as lack of information, lack of organization, lack of 
technologies, lack of motivation and lack of funding (Bashmakov, 2009). According to a case 
study for Russia which was carried out by World Bank (2008), barriers and suggested 
solutions for energy efficiency improvement are summarized in Table 2.3. For more detail, 
see World Bank (2008).  
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Table 2.3: Barriers and Solutions to Energy Efficiency in Russia  
Barriers Solutions 
Residential housing 
• Apartment owners or building managers have little 
information on EE; 
• Developers and their contractors have no incentives 
to improve EE; 
• Apartment owners have no incentive to invest in EE;  
• Apartment owners have limited access to capital to 
make EE investments;  
• Disseminate information on energy efficiency; 
• Make existing energy efficiency standards 
mandatory for the construction and renovation of 
buildings and monitor energy efficiency of 
buildings in use; 
• Require that energy efficiency improvements be 
made as a condition of government financial 
support for capital repairs; 
• Provide incentives for more widespread metering; 
• Develop standardized performance-based 
management contracts for HOAs and building 
management companies; 
• Establish a capital repairs loan guarantee facility; 
• Introduce energy efficiency standards and labelling 
for lighting and household appliance; 
Public organization 
• Public organization cannot retain any energy; 
• Public organizations cannot enter into financing 
agreements, multi-year contracts, or contracts that 
pay for the investment through future savings; 
• Procurement rules favour lowest cost of bid, not the 
lowest lifetime cost; 
• Very little statistic information or awareness exists; 
• Allow more budget flexibility; 
• Change procurement legislation to allow for multi-
year contracts; 
• Prioritize EE equipment procurement; 
• Set energy consumption targets based on 
benchmarking; 
• Introduce autonomous status of public 
organizations; 
• Disseminate information on energy efficiency; 
Industries 
• A lack of awareness among managers; 
• Macroeconomics constraints on banks; 
• A failure of banks to understand energy efficiency 
investments; 
• High transaction costs; 
• Tariffs that lag producer prices; 
• Inflexible electricity and gas supply contracts; 
• Disseminate information on energy efficiency; 
• Facilitate financing for EE investment through 
Russian financial institutions; 
• Develop equipment standards and labels; 
• Provide subsidies for transaction support; 
• Provide fiscal incentives; 
• Introduce taxation or  cap-and trade schemes for 
pollutants and/or emission; 
• Complete electricity and gas sector reforms;  
Heat supply sector 
• Inappropriate tariff methodology; 
• Political interference; 
• Cost plus method; 
• Tariff periods is too short; 
• Legal structure and governance of municipal heat 
suppliers; 
• Lack of information and sectoral coordination; 
• Reform tariff methodologies; 
• Price cap system; 
• Full cost recovery; 
• Transform municipal heat suppliers into 
commercial entities or PPP; 
• Coordinate municipal heat supply development 
plants; 
Electricity sector 
• Inappropriate tariff methodology; 
• Bias toward new capacity; 
• Exaggerated demand growth projection; 
• Lack of coordination between energy service 
providers; 
• Uncertainty over sector reforms; 
• Reform tariff methodologies; 
• Regulated assert base tariffs; 
• Two part tariff; 
• Remove cross-subsidies; 
• Demand side management or rate payer funded 
energy efficiency programs; 
• Clarify and standardize requirements and 
procedures for setting new plants and connecting 
to the grids; 
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Gas flaring  
• Remoteness of potential markets; 
• Market structure that prevents third party 
access to spare pipeline capacity; 
• Low price of dry natural gas and APG; 
• Insufficient information on volumes of 
APG flaring and utilization; 
• Soft penalties for excessive gas flaring; 
• Improved monitoring and enforcement of utilization 
requirements, possibly through an independent regulatory 
body; 
• Enact Federal legislation requiring APG utilization, including 
heavier fines and possible loss of operating licenses; 
• Allow third-party access to Gazprom pipelines;  
Source: World Bank (2008). 
One of the most important economic reasons for high energy intensity in Russia is low prices 
of energy. Domestic prices of energy are considerably lower compared to world market prices 
mainly because of administrative price regulation, high export taxes, and non-internalized 
negative environmental externalities.     
2.4 Summary of the Chapter 
The Russian economy is a highly energy- and carbon-intensive economy. The main reasons 
for this are outdated equipment, climatic condition and low domestic prices of energy. 
Nevertheless, Russia has a large potential for energy efficiency improvement with consequent 
economic and environmental benefits. It has been estimated (Bashmakov, 2009) that Russia 
could reduce its use of primary energy use by some 45% with a consequent reduction in GHG 
emissions. Energy efficiency can be improved through substitution effects (substitution 
between primary factors and energy) and through technological change (Gillingham et al., 
2009). In the empirical analysis (Section 7), the only energy efficiency improvements 
resulting from factor-energy substitution are considered. Modelling technological changes 
will require a more elaborated dynamic framework.      
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3 Theoretical Background 
Chapter 2 shows that there is a large technical potential for energy efficiency improvement in 
Russia. Realizing this potential covers economic and environmental benefits. In this context, 
it raises concerns whether there is underinvestment in energy efficiency and government 
intervention is required. Chapter 3 deals with the economic concept of energy efficiency and 
environmental regulation. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part starts with the 
concept of an energy efficiency gap, followed by the discussion of possible policy instruments 
to improve energy efficiency. The second part is focused on environmental taxation as one of 
the powerful instruments to reduce emissions and to encourage investment in energy 
efficiency. This part aims mainly at addressing the theoretical aspects of an environmental tax 
reform with respect to economic efficiency and income equity, especially the concept of a 
double dividend is discussed in detail. Based on Chapter 2 that provides the problem 
statement and Chapter 3 that provides the theoretical background, the main objectives of this 
analysis are derived. Chapter 3 also aims at giving the basis for discussion of the empirical 
results as well as suggestions for further research.  
3.1 Economics of Energy Efficiency  
3.1.1 Energy Efficiency Gap  
The Russian economy is very energy intensive, yet Russia has a large energy efficiency 
potential, which can be realized via technical modernization. It has been estimated 
(Bashmakov, 2009) that Russia could reduce its use of primary energy by some 45%. In the 
presence of such large technical energy efficiency potential, concerns are whether there is a 
gap between the current and the social optimal energy use in Russia. In other words, one can 
ask whether there is underinvestment in energy efficiency, which in turn can lead to 
overconsumption of energy.  
In theory, there are three explanations for slow technology diffusion namely (1) non-market 
failures, (2) market failures, and (3) behavioural failures. The non-market failure explanation 
refers to incorrectness which can occur in the calculation of social optimal diffusion rates. 
These are classified as follows (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994a and 1994b; Jaffe et al., 2004):  
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1) Overestimation of energy savings. Energy savings are often overestimated.1 
2) Unaccounted adoption costs. New technologies can have high adoption costs or other 
“hidden” costs, which often are not taken into consideration in cost-benefit analysis. 
3) High discount rates. The irreversible nature of investment and uncertainty about 
future benefits and costs result in higher discount rates compared to those often used in 
the calculation of social optimal diffusion rates in various studies.  
4) Heterogeneity of energy users. Some less energy intensive technologies can be 
economically efficient on average, but not for all individuals or firms because of 
heterogeneity.  
High adoption costs and high discount rates can be considered as market barriers for faster 
technology diffusion. Since technical modernization is a long and costly process, the 
government can encourage this by using different command-control and market instruments. 
This will lead to higher energy efficiency, but not necessarily in higher economic efficiency, 
as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Energy efficiency measures energy use per unit of output, whereas 
economic efficiency measures overall economic costs per unit of output (Jaffe et al., 2004). 
Figure 3.1: Energy Efficiency Gap 
       
Source: Jaffe et al. (2004).  
                                                 
1 “Projects often are based on highly controlled studies that do not necessarily apply to actual realized savings in 
a particular situation (Jaffe et al., 2004)”. 
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The second explanation for slow technology diffusion is market failures. From a theoretical 
point of view, the existence of market failures can justify government intervention for the 
reason of economic efficiency. The market failure explanations for slow technology diffusion 
are summarized as follows (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994a and 1994b; Jaffe et al., 2004):  
1) Lack of information. Information is a public good, which can be underprovided 
because of a free rider problem. Moreover, the adoption of new technologies can 
provide positive externalities, since this gives information about experiences from 
using new technologies, i.e. the so-called learning by using effect.  
2) Principal-agent problem. This problem can occur when builders or landlords decide 
about investment in energy efficiency, but energy costs are borne by purchasers. As a 
result, this can lead to an underinvestment in energy efficiency. 
3)  Average-cost pricing. Energy prices can differ from marginal social costs because of 
subsidies or average-cost pricing. Under average-cost pricing, marginal social costs to 
increase capacity can exceed the average-cost price. Therefore, investment in energy 
efficiency is not optimal since existing capacity can exceed the socially desirable 
level. 
4) Non-internalized negative environmental externalities. Private firms do not have 
economic incentives to minimize external environmental costs. Therefore, marginal 
social damage from use of energy is not covered in energy prices. In particular, this 
becomes of high relevance, if concerns about climate change are taken into account. 
5) Non-internalized positive externalities. There can be also positive externalities from 
introduction of less energy intensive technologies, i.e., learning by doing.  
The third explanation for slow technology diffusion is behavioural failures. In addition to 
market failure, behavioural failures should also be corrected by government interventions. 
The three concepts from behavioural economics can be related to energy efficiency 
(Gillingham et al., 2009): 
1) Prospect theory: status quo effect. Prospect theory is an alternative theory describing 
decision making behaviour to utility theory under uncertainties. This concept claims 
that consumers are irrationally reluctant to mover from the status quo. In the context 
of energy efficiency, as the status quo can be considered usage of conventional 
technologies.  
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2) Bounded (limits) rationality. This concept suggests that consumers are rational, yet 
there are limitations: (i) limited information with respect to possible alternatives, (ii) 
human mind has limited capacity to evaluate and process the information, and (iii) 
limited amount of time is available.   
3) Heuristic decision making. Heuristics are simplifications of decisions process. There 
is evidence that consumers sometimes simplify their methods to evaluate energy 
savings benefits. This can lead to overconsumption of energy.   
The issue of energy efficiency is very complex. There are different reasons for inefficient use 
of energy as well as there are different instruments to correct inefficiencies. The focus of this 
analysis lies on non-internalized environmental externalities as a market failure which, inter 
alia, cause slow technology diffusion and imply high pollution in Russia. 
3.1.2 Environmental Policy and Technology Diffusion  
There are different instruments that can accelerate the diffusion of new energy-efficient 
technologies, such as pollution taxes, adoption subsidies, tax credits, tradable permits, and 
command-control instruments. According to the theoretical literature, economic incentive-
based instruments, such as adoption subsidies and pollution taxes, can be more efficient in 
providing incentives for technology adoption compared to command-control instruments 
(Kerr and Newell, 2004; Newell et al., 2006). Furthermore, according to the empirical studies 
carried out by Jaffe and Stavins (1995) and Hassett and Metcalf (1995), adoption subsidies 
can be more effective compared to taxes in encouraging technology diffusion. On the other 
hand, adoption subsidies do not provide incentive to save energy compared to pollution taxes. 
Moreover, adoption subsides or tax credits requite large government expenditures (Jaffe et al., 
2004). Providing subsidy funds implies welfare losses in the second best world, since the 
government is reliant on distortionary taxes. For example, Parry (1998) shows that the 
revenue-financing effect – the welfare costs arising from financing subsidies via increase in 
labour taxes – is typical larger than the tax-interaction effect – the welfare gain resulting from 
higher labour supply driven by increasing in the real wage. Finally, Mulder (2005) shows also 
that investment subsidies cannot be effective because they can induce effects of lock-in 
relative to inferior technologies in the long-run.  
3.1.3 Environmental Policy and Innovation 
There is theoretical and empirical evidence regarding the relationship between energy prices 
and innovation, i.e., price induced technological change. The hypothesis of price induced 
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innovation was firstly introduced by Hicks (1932), who argues that high factor prices 
encourage innovation. Following Hicks (1932), the hypothesis of price induced innovation 
was also applied by Newell et al. (1998) to explain the relationship between energy prices and 
innovation of energy saving technologies. Furthermore, Popp (2002) shows that both energy 
prices and the quality of existing knowledge can significantly encourage the innovation 
process. Using U.S. patent data from 1970 to 1994, he found that environmental taxes and 
command-control instruments can reduce not only pollution by shifting away to less polluting 
activities, but also encourage the development of new technologies which are more cost-
effective in the long term. Moreover, Goulder and Schneider (1999) emphasize that the 
existence of price-induced technological change may imply lower costs of environmental 
policy. 
There are various policy instruments, such as environmental taxes, tradable emission permits, 
adoption subsidies, subsidies for research, and performance standards, which all can be used 
for pollution regulation. The choice of an appropriate one (or a combination of these) is not a 
trivial task since different policy objectives, such cost effectiveness, environmental 
effectiveness, and income equity, should be covered. The criterion for cost effectiveness 
suggests that the marginal abatement costs should be equalized among all polluters. Parry and 
Goulder (2008) conclude that i) no single policy instrument can be defined as superior 
compared to others, ii) the choice of a certain instrument typical raises a trade off between 
different policy objectives, such as efficiency, political feasibility, and income equity, iii) a 
combination of instruments can be desirable in the presence of market failures, and iv) there 
can be overlapping between policy instruments.    
3.2 Optimal Environmental Taxation  
3.2.1 Double Dividend Hypothesis  
Property rights cannot be defined for environmental goods due to their non-exclusive and 
non-rival nature so that there are no markets for environmental goods, resulting in an 
inefficient allocation of resources (Helfand et al., 2003). Negative environmental externalities 
arising from production and usage of environmental goods can be internalized by using 
environmental taxes, i.e., Pigouvian taxes. The analysis of optimal commodity taxation in the 
presence of externalities was pioneered by Sandmo (1975), who modified the Ramsey rule for 
optimal taxation (Ramsey, 1927) by incorporating external effects. Compared to other 
abatement polices to combat climate change such as carbon quotas and grandfathered carbon 
permits, environmental taxes provide a revenue-raising benefit – called as Ramsey component 
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in taxation literature – which can increase welfare. Revenue-raising abatement policies tend to 
be more efficient compared to command administrative instruments, especially in the 
presence of pre-existing distortions (Parry, 1997; Goulder, 1998; Parry et al., 1999). 
Moreover, market-based instruments are typical more efficient for emission abatement since 
these equalize marginal abatement costs among emission sources.     
According to the environmental taxation literature, an introduction of environmental taxes is 
often related to the double dividend hypothesis. The hypothesis claims that substituting 
environmental taxes for other distortionary taxes benefits not only the environment, but also 
reduces efficiency costs of the tax system (e.g. Oates, 1995). “Weak” and “strong” double 
dividend hypotheses are distinguished. The relatively uncontroversial “weak” double dividend 
hypothesis suggests that using revenues from environmental taxes to reduce other 
distortionary taxes, one can achieve cost savings (reductions in welfare costs of taxation) 
compared to the case where revenues are returned to households in lump-sum form. The more 
ambiguous “strong” double dividend hypothesis argues that not only the environment can be 
improved, but also inefficiencies of the tax system can be alleviated (Goulder, 1995). It 
should be noted that the term “double dividend” in some studies is defined in terms of 
employment and other in terms of welfare. This can induce some confusion with respect to 
the definition what a double dividend is. According to Bosello et al. (1999), all studies of the 
double dividend hypothesis can be divided into two categories: 1) studies that analyse a 
double dividend in terms of welfare, and 2) studies that analyse a double dividend in terms of 
employment.   
Important aspects of the double dividend hypothesis are summarised as follows:  
1) Environmental taxes and pre-existing tax distortions. Parry (1995) and Goulder et 
al. (1997) find that substituting environmental taxes for labour taxes exacerbates pre-
existing distortions from labour taxation. The intuitive explanation behind this is that 
narrow-based taxes (pollution taxes) induce a larger marginal excess burden compared 
to broad-based taxes (income taxes) because under narrow-based taxation implies a 
wide range of substitution possibilities (Parry and Oates, 2000). In addition, 
Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) show that the optimal pollution tax typically falls short 
of the Pigouvian tax in the presence of tax distortions in the labour market. This means 
that substituting pollution taxes for labour taxes exacerbates pre-existing distortions 
rather than alleviating such distortions.     
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2) Non-separable environmental effects. Williams (2002; 2003) analyses the link 
between pollution, human health, and labour productivity. By using a modified version 
of the model developed by Parry et al. (1999), he shows that a reduction in pollution, 
resulting from the introduction of a pollution tax, can have different economic effects. 
i) Reductions in pollution can improve health, resulting in higher labour productivity. 
This induces additional benefit, a benefit-side tax-interaction effect, which can offset 
the negative tax-interaction effect under certain conditions. ii) If a reduction in 
pollution leads to higher fixed-factor productivity or less medical expenses, the 
environmental tax reform would lead to a welfare loss. iii) If a reduction in pollution is 
associated with less time lost in illness, the net welfare effect of the environmental tax 
policy can be either positive or negative. 
3) Production externalities. Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997) use a simple endogenous 
growth model to examine the link between environmental taxes and endogenous 
growth. They find that substituting pollution taxes for output taxes can encourage 
economic growth in the presence of strong environmental production externalities.   
4) Substitution between consumption and environmental quality. Schöb (2003) 
shows that, in the presence of substitutability between taxed consumption goods 
(defensive goods) and the environmental quality, welfare losses are lower compared to 
those without substitutability. This is because welfare costs are partially compensated 
by higher tax revenues from the increased demand for taxed clean goods. 
5) Tax deductions. Parry and Bento (2000)2 show that welfare gains from substituting 
environmental taxes for labour taxes can be substantially larger when tax-favoured 
consumption (e.g. housing and medical care) is introduced in the model. The tax-
favoured consumption is defined as the consumption, spending on which is fully (or 
partially) deducted from labour taxes so that labour taxes distort not only the labour 
market, but also the choice among consumption goods. 
6) Tax shifting effect. Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) point out that if the initial tax 
system is inefficient, the introduction of environmental taxes can reallocate the burden 
of taxation, making the tax system more efficient. They also state that the welfare cost 
of an environmental tax reform will be lower if i) the applied tax instruments differ 
strongly with respect to their marginal efficiency costs, ii) the burden of environmental 
taxation shifts to the factor, whose taxation has relatively low marginal efficiency 
                                                 
2 For another special case, see Parry and Bento (2001).  
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costs, and iii) revenues from environmental taxes are refunded through a reduction of 
tax rates of a factor, whose taxation has high marginal efficiency costs.   
7) Tax-shifting effects: capital and labour. De Mooij and Bovenberg (1998) find that 
in the presence of capital, in the short and medium term, an environmental tax reform 
can induce the so-called tax-shifting effect between factors. Intuitively, if the reform 
shifts the tax burden from the overtaxed factor to the undertaxed factor, this can 
alleviate the pre-existing inefficiency of the tax system. For example, if capital is 
internationally mobile, substituting environmental taxes for capital taxes can yield a 
double dividend, or if capital is internationally immobile, substituting environmental 
taxes for labour taxes can reduce efficiency costs of the tax system. In the long-run, 
however, capital is quite mobile, which implies elastic supply of capital. Therefore, 
under the assumption of international capital mobility in the long term, substituting 
environmental taxes for labour taxes exacerbates initial inefficiencies in the tax 
system. The main factor with respect to the tax-shifting between labour and capital is 
the initial burden of labour taxation relative to capital taxation. In reality, capital is 
neither perfectly mobile nor perfectly immobile across countries. One of the plausible 
explanations for international capital immobility is asymmetric information across 
countries (Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996). 
8) Tax-shifting effect: natural resources. Apart from capital, natural resources can also 
be considered as a fixed factor. For example, Bento and Jacobsen (2007) show that in 
the presence of a fixed factor and untaxable Ricardian rents, an environmental tax 
reform can induce a double dividend since the burden of environmental taxes is borne 
not only by labour, yet it is also borne by natural resources in terms of lower prices of 
natural resources (i.e., Ricardian rents). This conclusion is based on these drawn in the 
previous papers such as Perroni and Whalley (1998). They find that the existence of 
natural rents (Ricardian rents) reduces the cost of taxation, whereas market structure 
rents arising from imperfect competition increase this. This conclusion suggests that 
commodity taxes should be high on commodities, whose production involves a fixed 
factor. Intuitively, commodity taxes operate like implicit taxes on profits (rents) in the 
absence of an explicit profit tax.  
9) Tax-shifting effect: net return on investment and profits. Bovenberg and de Mooij 
(1997) find that substituting pollution taxes for output taxes can reduce efficiency 
costs of the tax system in shifting the burden of taxation from the net return on 
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investment towards profits, where the most important factor for a strong tax shifting 
effect is low substitutability between physical capital and pollution. The intuitive 
explanation behind this is that pollution taxes operate like implicit taxes on profits 
(rents) so that additional revenues from pollution taxes allow for larger reduction in 
distortionary output taxes. It should be noted that an economic profit under perfect 
competition occurs typically in the presence of a fixed factor.  
10) Magnitude of the tax-shifting effect. According to Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 
(1996; 1998) important conditions under which an environmental tax reform can 
increase employment in the presence of a fixed factor are the following: i) low initial 
tax rates on resources, ii) a large production share of the fixed factor, and iii) high 
substitutability between labour and resources. 
11) Production structure. The production structure can significantly impact the tax-
shifting effect between labour and a fixed factor, thereby affecting employment. 
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998) analyse three separable production functions, 
where each production function includes three factors: resources, labour and a fixed 
factor. The findings are the following. i) If resources are separable from the aggregate 
of labour and the fixed factor in the production function, and substitution between 
resources and the value added aggregate is high (low), substituting environmental 
taxes for labour taxes tends to reduce (increase) the employment. ii) In the case of 
separability between labour and the aggregate of resources and the fixed factor, an 
increase in employment is likely if substitution between resources and the fixed factor 
is low as well as substitution between labour and the aggregate of resources and the 
fixed factor is high. iii) If the fixed factor is separable from the aggregate of labour 
and resources, substituting environmental taxes for labour taxes leads to an increase in 
employment if the elasticity of substitution between the fixed factor and the aggregate 
of labour and resources is small.    
12) Substitution between consumption and leisure. The tax burden effect, inter alia, 
depends on substitution between private consumption and leisure. A high elasticity of 
substitution between private consumption and leisure implies a strong tax burden 
effect. This is because a high elasticity of substitution leads to a strong reduction in 
private consumption. A high elasticity of substitution between labour and polluting 
goods as well a large share of resources implies a strong tax shifting effect (Bovenberg 
and van der Ploeg, 1996).      
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13) Tax-shifting effects: terms of trade. Furthermore, there are other types of tax-
shifting effects which can lead to a double dividend, such as tax-shifting across 
countries (i.e., the terms of trade effect) and tax-shifting among household incomes. 
For example, Killinger (2000), de Mooij (2000) and Krutilla (1991) show that the 
burden of environmental taxation can be partially shifted to foreign suppliers through a 
terms-of-trade effect. This, however, is feasible only for large economies which can 
affect the world market price. 
14) Tax-shifting effect: intertemporal inefficiencies. Fernandez et al. (2011) using a 
stylized dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous growth show that 
substituting environmental taxes for income taxes can yield a double dividend, if the 
current tax system is intertemporal inefficient with respect to the income taxes. If 
intertemporal inefficiencies of income taxes are visible, a change in the income tax 
rate over time by using debt issuing can enhance the welfare. The main feature of the 
model is the incorporated debt issuing so that the burden of environmental taxation 
can be shifted from the present to the future.        
15) Environmental policy and labour markets. Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1999) show 
that in the case of a downward-sloping labour supply curve, an increase in the labour 
tax is refunded in favour of public abatement activities can lead to a double dividend 
under certain conditions.3 The intuition behind this is that lower wages resulting from 
higher labour taxation will drive households work more to satisfy their subsistence 
consumption.     
One of the most important lessons which can be derived from the theoretical literature on 
environmental taxation is that environmental taxes are implicit taxes on production factors so 
that increasing environmental taxes raise the pre-existing tax distortions (Bovenberg and 
Goulder, 2002). On the other hand, inefficiencies in the tax system provide possibilities for a 
strong double divided (Parry, 1998). In particular, a strong tax-shifting effect is a necessary 
condition for the occurrence of a strong double dividend (de Mooij, 2000). On grounds of 
economic efficiency, it is likely more efficient to reform the tax system directly in order to 
alleviate such inefficiencies, rather than indirectly via an environmental tax reform; however, 
there may be strong political opposition (Parry and Bento, 2000). In general, the occurrence 
of the strong double-dividend is ambiguous. The outcome, inter alia, depends on the tax and 
                                                 
3 Upward slopping labour supply curve is the curve where the substitution effect between work and leisure 
dominates the income effect, which is indicated by positive uncompensated wage elasticities. Backward sloping 
(downward sloping) labour supply curve is the curve where the income effect overweight the substitution effect 
(Ligthart and van der Ploeg, 1999).  
  48 
economic structure, household preferences, factor mobility, factor substitution, and revenue 
recycling strategies (Goulder, 2002). Fullerton and Gravelle (1999) point out that the 
theoretical literature on the double dividend hypothesis does not provide a clear answer since 
this is based on strong assumptions so that an empirical evaluation of the double dividend 
hypothesis becomes crucial. Hence, general equilibrium analysis is an appropriate analytical 
method (Goulder, 2002).  
Empirical evidence. Some European countries have already implemented an environmental 
tax reform, where an introduction of various environmental taxes (carbon dioxide or sulphur 
dioxide) is compensated by reductions either in personal income taxes or social security 
contributions. Bosquet (2000) reviewed 139 modelling simulations with respect to an 
environmental tax reform. The main finding is that positive employment and welfare effects 
are likely in the short and medium term, whereas in the long run the effect are less certain. In 
addition, Bosquet (2001) argues that, under certain conditions, an implementation of such 
environmental tax reform in Russia can simultaneously achieve environmental and economic 
gains. Pauelli et al. (2005) investigate the studies on environmental tax reform by using a 
quantitative meta-analytic approach. They show that an environmental tax reform typically 
leads to higher employment (employment double dividend), while the occurrence of a strong 
double dividend in terms of welfare is ambiguous.4  
Empirical studies reviewed by Bosquet (2000) and Pauelli et al. (2005) and Bosello et al. 
(1999) and Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) deal with empirical studies which were carried out 
until 2000. Some more recent empirical studies on the double dividend issue are reviewed 
below (Table 3.1). Many studies are based on the assumption of international capital 
immobility while this study also considers the introduction of carbon taxes under international 
capital mobility, which is shown to influence strongly the results.   
 
                                                 
4 For other surveys on employment double dividend see Bosello et al. (1999) and Bovenberg and Goulder 
(2001). 
Table 3.1: Empirical Studies on Double Dividend Hypothesis  
Authors Country Model Policy simulation Special assumptions5 Effects 
Bor and Huang (2010) Taiwan Dynamic single-country multi-sector CGE model 
Substituting energy taxes for 
individual income taxes and 
business income taxes. 
n.a. Positive GDP growth 
Takeda (2007) Japan Dynamic single-country multi-sector CGE model 
Substituting a carbon tax for 
capital income taxes, labour 
income taxes and consumption 
taxes. 
n.a. 
A strong double dividend 
arises only if revenues 
from the carbon tax are 
refunded through a 
reduction in the capital 
tax. 
Heerden et al. (2006) South Africa 
Single-country multi-sector 
comparative static CGE 
model 
Four environmental taxes are 
analysed: i) a tax on GHG 
emissions, ii) a fuel tax, iii) a tax 
on electricity, and iv) a tax on 
energy use. Revenues are 
refunded in a reduction in i) tax 
on factor income, ii) consumption 
taxes and iii) consumption taxes 
on food.     
Unemployment in the 
unskilled labour market is 
assumed. Capital is 
assumed to be immobile 
across sectors. 
There is a triple dividend 
– reductions in emissions 
and poverty as well as an 
increase in GDP – in case 
when revenues from 
environmental taxes are 
refunded through a 
reduction in the 
consumption tax on food.  
Babiker et al. (2003) Global economy Recursive dynamic multi-regional CGE model (EPPA) 
Carbon permits are introduced to 
achieve Kyoto agreement. The 
following recycling scenarios are 
considered: i) lump-sum 
recycling, ii) labour tax recycling, 
iii) non-energy consumer tax 
recycling, and iv) 50% labour and 
50% consumer tax recycling. 
Labour-leisure choice is 
incorporated into the 
model. Factor and 
consumption taxes are 
introduced in the 
database. 
i) The weak double 
dividend is unlikely to 
hold for a number of 
European countries. ii) 
Results differ by region 
depending on the tax 
system. In particular 
existing energy policy has 
a significant impact on the 
results.  
Manresa and Sancho 
(2005) Spain 
Single-country multi-sector 
comparative static CGE 
model 
Substituting an ecotax and a 
petrol tax for payroll taxes.  
Wage rigidity and 
unemployment are 
incorporated.  
Under certain conditions, 
a triple dividend can 
occur: i) reduction in 
unemployment, ii) lower 
emissions, and iii) non-
                                                 
5 The “standard” assumptions are perfect competition in output and factor markets, international immobility of capital and labour, constant return to scale in production, the 
Armington specification of domestic demand, production is typically modeling by using nested CES function with substitution between labour, capital, and energy.    
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environmental welfare 
gains.  
Glomm et al. (2008) USA 
Dynamic inter-temporal 
single-country single-sector 
CGE model  
Substituting gasoline taxes for 
capital taxes.  n.a. 
A double dividend in 
terms of welfare 
(“efficiency” dividend) is 
feasible under certain 
conditions, yet this can 
come on account of the 
first dividend.  
Saveyn et al. (2011) EU 
Recursive dynamic multi-
country multi-sector CGE 
model (GEM-E3) 
Copenhagen Accord is 
implemented. Four options for 
the allocation of permits are 
considered: i) free allocation in 
EU, ii) auctioning only in the 
power generation sector in EU, 
iii) auctioning in all energy 
intensive sectors in EU, and iv) 
auctioning in energy intensive 
sectors and tax for non-energy 
intensive sectors in EU.   
Labour-leisure choice is 
incorporated into the 
model.  
Increases in the GDP arise 
if revenues from 
auctioning of permits and 
GHG taxation are 
recycled through a 
reduction in social 
security contributions.  
Bach et al. (2002) Germany  
Two macroeconomic models 
are employed: an 
econometric input-output 
model (PANTA RHEI) and a 
dynamic CGE model 
(LEAN). The distributional 
impacts of policy 
simulations are analysed by 
using a micro-simulation 
model of households. 
An excise tax is introduced on 
usage of fuel oil, gasoline, diesel 
oil, electricity and natural gas. 
Several tax differentiation and tax 
exemptions are implemented. 
Revenues from energy taxes are 
recycled via a reduction in social 
security contributions.  
n.a. 
The environmental fiscal 
tax reform results in an 
employment double 
dividend, where CO2 
emissions are reduced and 
employment is increased. 
The positive employment 
effect is rather moderate.  
Source: Own compilation.  
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3.2.2 Environmental Taxation under Imperfect Competition  
One of the central questions raised in the environmental taxation literature is whether the 
second best optimal environmental tax rate is higher or lower than the Pigouvian one in the 
presence of pre-existing distortions. In a first best world, the optimal environmental tax rate 
equals the marginal social damage, i.e., the so-called Pigouvian tax (Carlsson, 2000). Under a 
second best setting, the design of environmental tax policy can be much more complicated. 
For instance, Bovenberg and Goulder (1996)6 show that in the presence of distortionary taxes 
in the labour market, the optimal environmental tax rate is generally below the Pigouvian tax 
rate. Furthermore, if polluters are imperfectly competitive, there can be a trade-off between 
the two distortions, one due to suboptimal production (underproduction), and the other due to 
externalities. 
Analytical model. Using a partial equilibrium model developed by Stern (1987), the effects 
of environmental taxes on output, emissions, profits and number of firms are summarized.7 
Moreover, the second best optimal pollution tax is derived. The model is a Cournot oligopoly 
with homogenous products and symmetric firms. Equation (3.2.1) defines the first order 
condition for profit maximization, which implies that marginal revenue equals marginal cost:  
01 =−




 − cp
ε
γ ,                       (3.2.1) 
where p is the price, ( )


 −+=
n
α
αγ
1 , α  is the parameter for conjectural variation (a 
Cournot  Nash assumption implies that α =0), n  is the number of firms, c  is the marginal 
cost, and ε  is the elasticity of demand. Equation (3.2.2) defines profit (Π ): 
( ) knpXcp −−=Π )( ,                   (3.2.2) 
where )( pX is demand function for aggregated output and k  is fixed costs. The industrial 
level of emissions ( E ) is defined by equation (3.2.3):  
 )(XEE = ,                    (3.2.3) 
                                                 
6 Fullerton (1997) showed that (i) in the absence of labour taxes, the tax on the dirty good could exceed the 
Pigovian rate. Moreover, if the tax on the dirty good is zero, a higher tax on labour and a subsidy on the clean 
good can achieve the same outcome as the dirty tax. See also Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997)   
7 The same conclusions were drawn by Stern (1987) with respect to commodity taxation under a Cournot 
oligopoly.  
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where XE >0
8. Equation (3.2.4) defines the stability condition (Seade, 1987):    
ε
γ
ε
γ F
+−1 >0,                       (3.2.4) 
where F  is the elasticity of the elasticity of demand:
ε
ε ppF =  and pε  is the derivate of ε  
with respect to p. The term on the LHS of equation (3.2.4) should be strictly positive. The 
stability condition is useful to recognize the sign of several derivations below. Using this 
analytical framework, the following propositions can be derived.  
Proposition 1. Introducing a pollution tax leads to a reduction in output.   
Proof. Introducing pollution taxes results in higher production costs. Therefore, changes in 
production costs reflect an introduction of pollution taxes. Totally differentiating equation 
(3.2.1) with respect to c, we obtain: 



 +−
=
ε
γ
ε
γ Fdc
dp
1
1 .                    (3.2.5) 
Since 
dc
dpX
dc
dX
p= , we obtain:  



 +−
=
ε
γ
ε
γ F
X
dc
dX p
1
<0,                      (3.2.6) 
which is negative because pX <0 and 


 +−
ε
γ
ε
γ F1 >0 according to the stability condition 
(3.2.4). Since the term is negative, introducing pollution taxes unambiguously induces a 
reduction in output. Q.E.D.        
Proposition 2. Introducing a pollution tax leads to a reduction in emissions.   
Proof. 
dc
dE <0 because 
dc
dX <0 and XE >0. Q.E.D.   
                                                 
8 For convenience, partial derivates of functions are noted as suffixes: for example, 
X
EE X ∂
∂
= , 
p
XX p ∂
∂
= , 
dc
dEEc = and dc
dXX c = .     
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Proposition 3. Introducing a pollution tax leads to a reduction (increase) in profit if demand 
is elastic (inelastic) in case of isoelastic demand. 
Proof. Totally differentiating equation (3.2.2) with respect to c and replacing 
dc
dp  by the term 
in the RHS of equation (3.2.5), we obtain: 9     



 +−



 +−−
=
Π
ε
γ
ε
γ
εε
γ
F
FX
dc
d
1
11
< >0,                             (3.2.7) 
where 


 +−
ε
γ
ε
γ F1 >0, γ >0, ( )X− <0. Therefore, 
dc
dΠ <0 iff F>1-ε . In case of isoelastic 
demand, which implies F=0, 
dc
dΠ <0 iff ε >1 and vice versa. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4. Introducing a pollution tax leads to a reduction (increase) in the number of 
firms if demand is elastic (inelastic) in case of isoelastic demand.    
Proof. Equation (3.2.2) is replaced by equation (3.2.8), where profit equals zero and the 
number of firms is variable under the assumption of free entry and exit: 
( ) 0)( =−− knpXcp .                  (3.2.8) 
Totally differentiating equation (3.2.1) and (3.2.8), we obtain the following system of 
equations:  
( ) XdckdnXXdp =−+ γ ;                 (3.2.9) 
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n
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

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εε
γ
ε
γ ;              (3.2.10) 
or in matrix form: 
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             (3.2.11) 
Solving this system of equation for 
dc
dn  yields:  
                                                 
9 For convenience, the demand function is written without arguments, i.e. X instead of X(p).  
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pXX
ε
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γα
ε
γ . Therefore, 
dc
dn <0 iff F>1-ε . In case of 
isoelastic demand, which implies F=0, 
dc
dn <0 iff ε >1 and vice versa. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 5. Second best optimal pollution tax rate falls short of marginal social damage.    
Proof. Using this analytical framework, we can derive the second best optimal pollution tax 
rate as follows. Equation (3.2.13) defines the consumer welfare (W):  
 ( ) ( )∫ −−=
X
xEcxxxPW
0
,                (3.2.13) 
where )(xP is an inverse demand function for aggregated output.10 Totally differentiating 
function (3.2.13) with respect to t , we obtain: 
  ( ) 0=−−= XEcPdt
dx
dt
dW ,               (3.2.14) 
where 0=
dt
dW is the condition for an optimal tax rate. Profit function (3.2.2) is modified by 
adding a pollution tax (t):  
  ( ) knxtxcxP −−−=Π )(                (3.2.15) 
Differentiating profit function (3.2.15) with respect to x  yields: 11 
 XxPtcP −=− .                 (3.2.16) 
Substituting (3.2.16) into (3.2.14), we obtain: 
   ( ) 0=−− XX ExPtdt
dx .               (3.2.17) 
Dividing the both side by 
dt
dx , the second best optimal pollution tax rate is defined as follows: 
  XX xPEt += .                (3.2.18) 
                                                 
10 Since the price is introduced as an inverse demand function, a capital letter is used. In contrast, independent 
variables are written in small letters.   
11 For convenience, the inverse demand function is written without arguments, i.e. P instead of P(x). 
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From equation (3.2.18) we can see that the second best optimal pollution tax rate falls short of 
marginal social damage ( XE ) by the term ( XxP ). Note that XP <0. Q.E.D. This confirms 
conclusions drawn by Ebert (1992).  
Other aspects. The main findings regarding environmental taxation under imperfect 
competition from other studies are summarized as follows:  
1) Distortions from imperfect competition. If polluters are imperfectly competitive, 
there can be a trade-off between the two distortions, one due to suboptimal production 
(underproduction), and the other due to negative externalities. A pollution tax can 
reduce external damages, but it can also lead to a reduction of an already suboptimal 
production level (Buchanan, 1969). Barnett (1980) and Misiolek (1980) formally show 
that the second best optimal environmental tax rate for monopolistic polluters is 
typically less than marginal social damage. Ebert (1992) draws the same conclusion 
for the case of oligopolistic polluters. Generally, under the assumption of symmetric 
firms and blocked entry/exit, the second best optimal tax rate falls short of the 
marginal social damage. 
2) Asymmetry in production costs. In contrast, Simpson (1995) argues that the optimal 
environmental tax rate can exceed the marginal social damage under an imperfectly 
competitive market structure, if firms have different production costs. The intuition 
behind this is that a pollution tax can shift production from less to more efficient firms. 
3) Asymmetry in pollution and production costs. The importance of firms’ asymmetry 
was also stressed by other authors. For example, Levin (1985) and Sugeta and 
Matsumoto (2005) show that due to asymmetry in pollution and production costs, 
environmental taxes might even induce increases in pollution through a reallocation of 
output across firms. 
4) Inefficiencies from excessive entry. Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995) and Lee 
(1999) show that environmental taxes can also have a corrective effect regarding the 
market structure, by limiting the number of firms to a social optimum. The intuition 
behind this is that homogeneous product oligopolies have a tendency towards an 
excessive entry of firms (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). Therefore, an over-
internalisation can reduce the distortion arising from an excessive number of firms. 
Requate (1997) and Sugeta and Matsumoto (2005) show that the optimal 
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environmental tax can exceed the marginal damage cost in case of a strictly concave 
demand.  
5) Positive externalities. Moreover, Yin (2003) demonstrates that the optimal 
environmental tax can exceed the marginal social damage, if a reduction in emissions 
leads to a significant decline in marginal costs of other producers in the presence of 
positive inter-firm externalities. 
3.2.3 Environmental Taxation and Distributional Effects  
Apart from economic efficiency, another important political concern associated with carbon 
taxes is a distributional impact of taxation. The main concern with respect to environmental 
taxation is that it tends to be regressive since the burden of taxation is expected to fall 
disproportionately on poor households (Hassett et al., 2009). Fullerton (2011) defines six 
distributional effects arising from a carbon permit system, which are summarized as follows. 
1)  Uses-side incidence. He distinguishes between the “uses-side” and “source-side” 
incidence of an environmental tax. The uses-side incidence represents the first 
distributional effect of an environmental tax. This is defined as an effect on income 
distribution via changes in commodity prices. The uses-side incidence of 
environmental taxation is typically regressive (Fullerton and Heutel, 2010). 
2) Source-side incidence. The source-side effect defines a distributional impact via 
changes in factor prices. For instance, polluting industries are often capital intensive so 
that the source-side incidence can be progressive, if capital is a more important income 
source for rich households compared to poor households. This is because introducing 
environmental taxes is expected to lead to a lower return to capital relative to wage. 
Nevertheless, the source-side incidence can be regressive under certain conditions.  
3) Scarcity rents. A reduction in output of polluting goods provides scarcity rents. If the 
government levies a pollution tax or carries out an auction of permit, then the scarcity 
rents are captured by the government in terms of high revenues from pollution taxes. 
Otherwise, polluting firms receive the scarcity rents from selling restricted quantities 
(e.g. Buchanan and Tullock, 1975; Bovenberg and Goulder, 2000). 
4) Effects of improvement in environmental quality. Climate policy can have various 
distributional effects. For example, more environmental concern will reduce global 
warming. This will be beneficial especially for the poorest counties. This is because 
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reductions in global warming are associated with higher agricultural productivity in 
the poorest countries with high temperature.  
5) Transition costs. Labour and capital are often assumed to be perfectly mobile among 
sectors so that they have the same return. In a real economy, a reallocation of 
production factors from one sector to another could result in large adjustment costs 
since production factors can have different productivities. For example, an 
environmental tax reform can have an adverse effect on employment. Therefore, 
adjustment costs arising from environmental policy should also be taken into account.  
6) Capitalization effects. Environmental improvement (air quality improvement) could 
lead to benefits not to low-income renters, but to landlords who own the house 
because of increasing rents.  
Substitution between pollution and production factors has a significant impact not only on the 
economic efficiency of an environmental tax reform, but also on the income distribution. 
Fullerton and Heutel (2007) analyse the incidence of environmental taxes by using a simple 
general equilibrium model which was developed by Harberger (1962). The main findings are 
the following. i) Introducing carbon taxes raises the wage relative to the return to capital, if 
substitution between labour and pollution is higher than that between capital and pollution, or 
if the polluting sector is capital intensive. In other words, the “substitution effect” induces less 
tax burden on a factor which is easier substitutable with pollution, whereas the “output effect” 
places more tax burden on a factor which is more intensively used in the polluting sector 
(Fullerton, 2011)12. ii) Numerical sensitive analyses suggest that the impact of elasticities of 
substitution between pollution, capital and labour is more important than the impact of factor 
intensities.13  
Ekins et al. (2011) review empirical studies on distributional effects of environmental taxes. 
They conclude that environmental taxes typically have a regressive impact on households. 
Moreover, taxes on overall energy consumption by households tend to be strongly regressive, 
whereas taxes on petroleum products are sometimes progressive since poor households cannot 
afford cars. Despite the regressive impact of environmental taxes, their simulation results 
suggest that an environmental tax reform in Europe will lead to higher real income and will 
not be generally regressive.  
                                                 
12 The substitution effect is determined by elasticities of substitution between capital, labour, and pollution, 
whereas the output effect is determined by factor intensity.    
13 For some special cases see Fullerton and Heutel (2007). 
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Furthermore, West and Williams (2004) examine the distributional effects of a gasoline tax. 
They find that a gasoline tax is regressive, if revenues from the gasoline tax are not recycled. 
The gasoline tax can be significantly less regressive, if revenues are refunded through a 
reduction in labour taxes, whereas the gasoline tax can be even progressive, if gasoline tax 
revenues are returned to households in lump-sum form. Metcalf (1999; 2009) states that an 
environmental tax can be regressive, yet an environmental tax reform can be progressive 
depending on revenue recycling strategies. Moreover, Rausch et al. (2011), using a multi-
region and multi-sector CGE model with incorporated 15,588 households from the U.S. 
Consumer and Expenditures Survey data, found that the source-side incidence of carbon taxes 
can be sufficiently progressive to offset the regressive uses-side incidence.    
3.2.4 Environmental Tax Differentiation 
The theoretical literature on commodity taxation suggests a principal of uniform taxation so 
that tax rates should be uniform between sectors and households. The theory of environmental 
taxation also follows this principle. Nevertheless, there are some cases where an 
environmental tax differentiation may be more desirable on grounds of economic efficiency 
and income distribution (Rutherford and Böhringer, 2002):   
1) Tax interaction. In the presence of pre-existing tax distortions, it may be rational to 
differentiate the environmental tax rates among industries and households to correct 
inefficiencies of the tax system. 
2) Distributional concern. Lower tax rates (or even exemptions) can be applied for 
certain poor household groups to alleviate a regressive impact of environmental 
taxation. Alternatively, tax rates can be uniform among households, yet the 
government can correct the regressive effect resulting from the introduction of 
environmental taxes by using different revenue recycling strategies (Metcalf, 1999). 
3) Carbon leakage. Environmental concerns in the home country can lead to a 
reallocation of domestic production to other countries so that emissions abroad can 
rise. A numerical analysis carried out by Böhringer (1998) by using a multi-region 
CGE model shows that a differentiation in carbon tax rates (or even exemption from 
taxation) for some specific sectors can diminish carbon leakage, but the welfare costs 
of such an environmental policy tend to be higher compared to those under uniform 
taxation. 
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4) Terms of trade effects. In the absence of trade policy, the government can impose 
different environmental tax rates to improve its terms of trade so that environmental 
taxes operate like proxies for optimal export and import taxes (e.g. Krutilla, 1991).   
Nevertheless, some empirical analyses state that there is not much economic rationality for a 
strong tax preference for energy intensive sectors (e.g., Rutherford and Böhringer, 2002).  
In the absence of administrative and compliance costs of taxation, the first best policy would 
be a targeted tax on an emission since this would provide a behavioural response to avoid the 
emission by implementing abatement measures (technologies). For example, Devarajan et al. 
(2011) show that the introduction of a carbon tax leads to less marginal costs of abatement 
compared to when energy taxes are levied. In contrast, if administrative costs of a targeted 
taxation are substantial, an indirect tax (a broad based tax) may be more efficient because its 
implementation is typically associated with less administrative costs, yet this is not so 
efficient in providing the “right” behavioural incentives compared to a targeted tax (e.g. 
Smulders and Vollebergh, 2000). Schmutzler and Goulder (1997) examine how monitoring 
costs, input and output substitution possibilities can affect the design of optimal 
environmental taxation. They, inter alia, state that an output tax can be more desirable under 
i) high monitoring costs, ii) small input substitution, and iii) high output substitution. 
Furthermore, a combination of different policy instruments can be rational, so-called two part 
instruments. For example, Eskeland and Devarajan (1996) show that a combination of 
environmental standards and a tax on polluting inputs (e.g. excise tax) may operate as a 
targeted environmental tax. Fullerton and Wolverton (1997) examine the equivalence between 
a Pigovian tax and a tax-subsidy combination. A tax-subsidy combination includes an 
environmental tax on all polluting activities, whereas an environmental subsidy is imposed on 
clean technologies. They also point out that a tax-subsidy combination can be easier 
implemented than the Pigouvian tax.        
3.3 Summary of the Chapter 
The replacement of technologies could be slow due to non-market failure – underestimation 
of adoption costs, high discount rates, and heterogeneity of energy users – and market failures 
– lack of information, principle-agent problems, and low energy prices because of inefficient 
price regulation and non-internalized environmental externalities. On ground of economic 
efficiency, only the existence of market and behavioural failures can provide justifications for 
government intervention. As shown in Chapter 2, the replacement of technologies in Russia is 
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particularly slow due to a combination of non-market failures and market failures. This 
analysis is focused on non-internalized environmental externalities as a reason for high GHG 
emissions and slow technological replacement in Russia.  
Environmental taxes are one of the powerful instruments to encourage the diffusion of energy 
saving technologies. Compared to other policy instruments, environmental taxes have an 
important advantage: they provide additional tax revenues. Furthermore, substituting 
environmental taxes for other distortionary taxes may reduce inefficiency of the tax system, 
i.e., a strong double dividend may occur. According to the theoretical and empirical literature, 
the occurrence of a strong double dividend is ambiguous since it depends on various factors 
such as the tax system, factor mobility, factor substitution and household preferences. 
In this context, the following objectives of this analysis are derived: i) to test the double 
dividend hypothesis under perfect and imperfect competition in output markets in Russia, to 
analyse ii) the incidence of carbon taxes, iii) impacts on sectoral competitiveness, iv) effects 
on income equity, and v) interactions of carbon taxes with other taxes.  
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4 The Tax System and Tax Interactions 
As shown in Chapter 3, the theoretical literature on environmental taxation is mainly focused 
on pre-existing distortionary taxes in the labour and capital markets, whereas interactions with 
other taxes such as trade taxes, value added taxes, excise taxes, and mineral resource 
extraction taxes are often neglected. At the same time, tax-interaction effects play a crucial 
role in determination the cost of an environmental tax reform. Chapter 4 starts with an 
overview of the Russian tax system, aims at recognizing the relevance of certain tax 
instruments. As it is shown below, export taxes on energy is an important source of 
government revenues in Russia. Therefore, the theoretical analysis of environmental taxation 
with respect to the double dividend issue is furthermore extended by addressing the 
interaction between environmental and export taxes on energy.    
4.1 Structure of Government Revenues 
As in other countries, the Russian economy is distorted by various taxes. This chapter gives a 
short overview of the Russian tax system, especially the tax regime which is applied to the 
production, consumption, and trade of energy commodities. Data on the tax system are taken 
from different legislative documents,14 which were reviewed in March, 2012 and are 
summarised in Table 4.1.    
Table 4.1: Legislative Documents of the Russian Tax System  
Taxes Corresponding legislative documents 
Value added tax, excise tax, corporate 
income tax, personal income tax, mineral 
resource extraction tax, and others  
Russian Tax Code (second part) No.117-FZ 
from August 5th, 2000 (hereafter Russian Tax 
Code) 
Export taxes on crude oil and oil products Government Decree No. 695 from November 16th, 2006  
Export taxes on other commodities Government Decree No. 88 from February 6th, 2012 
Import tariffs Enactment No. 850 from November 18
th, 
2011  
Calculation of export taxes on crude oil  Law of Trade Tariffs No. 5003-1 from May 21st, 1993  
Calculation of export taxes on oil products Government Decree No. 1155 from December 27th, 2010  
                                                 
14 All documents are available (in Russian) at http://www.consultant.ru/. 
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Figure 4.1 illustrates the structure of government revenues15 in Russia in 2010. The largest 
source of government revenues – 20.8% of total government revenues – is from trade taxes, 
followed by value added taxes (16.1%), social security contributions (16.0%), personal 
income taxes (11.6%), corporate income taxes (11.5%), and mineral resource extraction taxes 
(9.8%). The magnitude of tax revenues depends on both tax bases and tax rates.   
Figure 4.1: Structure of Government Revenues in 2010 (per cent) 
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Unified income taxes are taxes imposed according to the simplified tax system in Russia; Others payments are 
payments for the use of public property, free payments and others.  
Source: FSSS (2012b). 
4.2 Trade Taxes 
In April, 2010 the Customs Code of the Customs Union (hereafter Customs Code) came into 
force. The Customs Code is a legislative document which regulates trade within the Customs 
Union as well as trade with non-members of the Customs Union. The Customs Union consists 
of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation. It allows 
for free trade between Union members, whereas import tariffs are imposed on imports from 
non-Customs Union countries. According to the Enactment No. 850 from November 18th, 
2011, there are high import tariffs on some food products, textile products, machineries, 
electronic equipment, and transports. For example, in 2012, there was a 15% import tariff on 
beef and pork and a 25% import tariff on sheep meat and poultry. Import tariffs on textile 
products, machineries, electronic equipment, and transports differ by product with tariff rates 
                                                 
15 A three-level budget system is applied in Russia: federal budget, regional budget, and local budget. The total 
government revenue is defined as the total revenue of the consolidated budget, which is a sum over federal, 
regional and local budgets.   
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varying between 5% and 30%. Import tariff rates on energy commodities excluding electricity 
were 5% in 2012.    
High export taxes are imposed on commodities such as seeds, animal hide, timber, scrap 
metals, and energy resources. For example, according to Government Decree No.88 from 
February 6th, 2012, the rates of export taxes on seeds in 2012 were between 10% and 20%, 
500 Euro/ton for raw animal hides, between 10% and 25%, or 100 Euro/m3 for timber, and 
between 6.5% and 50% for scrap metals. Revenues from trade taxes consist mainly of export 
taxes on energy resources such as crude oil, oil products, and natural gas. For example, the 
revenue share of export taxes on crude oil was 52% of the total revenues from trade taxes in 
2010, while for petroleum products it was 19% and for gas it was 6% (Roskazna, 2010). 
There are no export taxes on electricity and coal; however, an export tax on coke coal with a 
tax rate of 6.5% was introduced in 2007. Export taxes on crude oil and oil products are 
recalculated monthly by the Russian Government in accordance with changes in the price of 
Urals16 oil (Law of Trade Tariffs No.5003-1 from May 21st, 1993). The tax rate is calculated 
according to the formula shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Formula for the Calculation of Export Taxes on Crude Oil  
Tax regimes Formula 
if PWoil < 109.5 $/ton then TEoil = 0% 
if 109.5 $/ton < PWoil < 146 $/ton then TEoil = 0.35*(PWoil – 109.5 $/ton) 
if 146 $/ton < PWoil< 182.5 $/ton then TEoil = 12.77 $/ton + 0.45*(PWoil – 146 $/ton) 
if PWoil > 182.5 $/ton then TEoil = 29.2 $/ton + 0.65*(PWoil –182.5 $/ton) 
where PWoil is the world price of Urals oil and TEoil is the rate of export taxes on crude oil.   
Source: Law of Trade Tariffs No.5003-1 from May 21st, 1993. 
The formula for the calculation of the export tax rate on crude oil includes four regimes. For 
example, the export price of Urals oil was 774 $/ton since January 1st to May 1st, 2011 
(Ministry of Economics, 2011). Since the export price (PWoil) was higher than 182.5$/ton, the 
specific export tax rate on crude oil (TEoil) is calculated as follows:  
29.2 $/ton + 0.65*(774 $/ton – 182.5 $/ton) = 413 $/ton.             
Therefore, the rate of export tax on crude oil was approximately 413 $/ton from January to 
May in 2011, which amounts to approximately 53% of the export price of Urals oil. Rates of 
export taxes on oil products depend on the export tax rate on crude oil. According to 
                                                 
16 Urals is an oil brand, whose prices are used to calculate export taxes on crude oil.  
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Government Decree No.1155 from December 27th, 2010, the rates of export taxes on oil 
products are calculated as follows:  
  TEpetl = Kpetl* TEoil,            
where TEpetl are specific tax rates on oil products in $/ton, Kpetl are multiplier coefficients, and 
TEoil is the specific export tax rate on crude oil in $/ton. From 2003 to 2010, the multiplier 
coefficient was 0.9 for all oil products. Since 2010 coefficients differ among oil products 
(Government Decree No.1155 from December 27th, 2010). Unless there are changes in policy, 
the multiplier coefficients will equal 0.66 for most oil products until 2015. The calculated 
rates of export taxes on crude oil and oil products can be found in Government Decree No.695 
from November 16th, 2006. 
The export tax rate on natural gas is 30%, while the export tax rate on liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG) is specific and calculated according to the formula shown in Table 4.3. For example, if 
the price of LPG is higher than 740 $/ton, then the specific tax rate on LPG equals 135 $/ton 
plus 0.7 times the difference between the observed average price and 740 $/ton.  
Table 4.3: Formula for the Calculation of Export Taxes on LPG  
Tax regimes Formula 
if PWgas < 490 $/ton then TELPG = K1*490 
if 490 $/ton <PWgas < 640 $/ton then TELPG = K2*(PWgas – 490) 
if 640 $/ton <PWgas < 740 $/ton then TELPG = 75 + K3*(PWgas – 640) 
if PWgas > 740 $/ton then TELPG = 135 + K4*(PWgas – 740) 
where PWgas is the average price of LPG observed on the border of Poland, TELPG is the 
specific rate of export tax on LPG, K1 = 0, K2 = 0.5, K3 = 0.6, K4 = 0.7.                  
Source: Government Decree No.1155 from December 27th, 2010.  
According to the theoretical literature on taxation, export taxes can be welfare improving for 
countries with market power in export markets. Otherwise, imposing export taxes reduces 
welfare and economic growth. Often export taxes are also used to generate government 
revenues or to encourage high value added (processing) industries. In both cases, export taxes 
are not the first best policy instrument to achieve the objective (Devarajan et al., 1996). For 
example, consumption taxes such as value added taxes or income taxes are considered as 
more efficient revenue rising instruments than production taxes (taxes on intermediates) 
(Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). The intuition behind this is that consumption taxes distort 
only the consumption-leisure choice, while taxes on intermediates distort production as well 
as consumption decisions. High export taxes on energy in Russia seem to be a rational policy 
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instrument since Russia is a large exporter of energy. Moreover, export taxation of energy can 
be justified by income equity considerations because energy resources are owned by a relative 
small group of rich households. Concerns are that export tax rates may be “too” high.         
4.3 Domestic Taxes 
As shown in Table 4.4, the rate of corporate income tax was 20%, the rate of value added tax 
was 18%, the flat tax rate on labour earnings was 13%, and the rate of social security 
contributions was 34% in 2012. In February, 2012, the rate of mineral tax on the extraction of 
crude oil was approximately 411.2 $/ton, on condensate gas it was 18.5 $/ton, and on natural 
gas it was 8 $/1000m3. The rate of excise tax on petrol (Euro-5) was approximately 227 $/ton 
and for diesel (Euro-5) it was approximately 119 $/ton in 2012. 
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Table 4.4: Tax System of the Russian Federation  
Federal taxes17: 
Corporate income 
tax 
According to Federal Law No. 223-FZ from November 26th, 2008, 
the rate of corporate income tax was reduced from 24% to 20% in 
2008. 
Value added tax 
According to Federal Law No. 117-FZ from July 7th, 2003, the rate 
of value added tax was reduced from 20% to 18% in 2003. 
Moreover, a tax rate of 10% is applied on some products such as 
food products, children’s clothing, books, education, and medical 
services. The tax rate on exported commodities equals 0%.      
Personal income tax 
The flat tax rate on labour income was 13%, the tax rate on 
dividends was 35%, and tax rates on other personal income were 9% 
and 30% in 2012.     
Social security 
contributions 
According to Federal Law No. 212-FZ from July 24th, 2009, a 
unified social tax with a rate of 26% was replaced by social security 
contributions (SSC) with a rate of 34%. SSC are distributed between 
different uses: a pension fund (26%), a social insurance fund (2.9%), 
and obligatory health insurance (5.1%).  
Mineral resource 
extraction tax 
Mineral resources extraction taxes, inter alia, are imposed on 
condensate and natural gas, coal, and crude oil with different 
specific tax rates. For example, in February, 2012 the rate of mineral 
tax on the extraction of crude oil was approximately 411.2 $/ton, 
condensate gas was 18.5 $/ton, and natural gas was 8 $/1000m3. For 
more details, see the text below.   
Excise tax 
Excise taxes are imposed on commodities such as alcohol, 
cigarettes, cars, and petroleum products with different specific tax 
rates. Rates of excise taxes on petroleum products differ among 
products according to their environmental impact. For example, in 
2012, the rate of excise tax on petrol (Euro-5) was approximately 
227 $/ton and for diesel (Euro-5) it was approximately 119 $/ton. 
For more details, see the text below.  
Other taxes 
Federal taxes also include (1) water taxes, (2) state fees, and (3) fees 
for the use of biological resources. These taxes are specific with 
different tax rates. 
Regional and local taxes: 
Transport and These are specific tax rates which differ by region. gambling tax 
Property tax Regions may set their own tax rates, yet tax rates may not exceed 2.2% of the property value.   
Land tax The tax rate can be either 0.3% or 1.5% of the value of the land.  
Source: Russian Tax Code (2012). 
Mineral resource extraction taxes. Table 4.5 shows tax rates on the extraction of condensate 
and natural gas. The rate of mineral tax on the extraction of natural gas was approximately 8 
$/1000m3 in 2012, which was about 10% of the average price18 of natural gas for households. 
                                                 
17 The differentiation between federal, regional and local taxes is in accordance with Russia’s three-level budget 
system.   
18 Prices of natural gas for households are regulated by the Federal Tariff Service. According to the Regulation of 
Federal Tariff Service No. 333-e/2 from December 9th, 2011, the average price of natural gas for households was 
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The multiplier coefficient (Kng) is planned to be reduced from 0.493 to 0.447 until 2014. In 
2012 the tax rate on condensate gas was approximately 18.5 $/ton. Associated gas is not 
subject to taxation. 
Table 4.5: Rates of Mineral Tax on Gas Extraction from 2012 to 201419 
Time period Condensate gas Natural gas 
from January 1st to 
December 31st, 2012 TMcgas =18.5 $
20/ton TMnatlgas = Kng*17 $/1000m3,  where Kng=0.493 
from January 1st to 
December 31st, 2013 TMcgas = 19.7 $/ton 
TMnatlgas = Kng*19 $/1000m3, 
where Kng=0.455 
from January 1st, 
2014 TMcgas = 21.6 $/ton 
TMnatlgas = Kng*21 $/1000m3, 
where Kng=0.447 
where TMcgas is the specific mineral tax rate on the extraction of condensate gas, TMnatlgas is 
the specific mineral tax rate on the extraction of natural gas, and Kng are multiplier 
coefficients.   
Source: Russian Tax Code (2012). 
The rate of mineral tax on the extraction of coking coal was approximately 1.9 $/ton in 2012, 
which equals 2.3% of the producer price21 (82 $/ton) and the tax rate for brown coal was 
approximately 0.4 $/ton in 2012, which equals 2.6% of the producer price (15 $/ton). 
According to the Russian Tax Code, the rate of mineral tax on the extraction of crude oil is 
calculated as follows:   
TMoil = BTMoil * KP * KD* KS          
 
261
*)15( ERPWK oilP −=            
 
V
NK D *5.38.3 −=   if 0.8< V
N <1        
   3.0=DK    if V
N >1       
1=DK    others        
375.0*125.0 += SS VK   if SV < 5 Mio. ton and 5.0≤
SV
N         
                                                                                                                                                        
approximately 86 $/1000m3 since July, 2012. The price was recalculated using an exchange rate of 30 Ruble/$. 
The legal document is available at the official web-side of the Federal Tariff Service, 
http://www.fstrf.ru/tariffs/info_tarif/gas  
19 Tax rates for 2013 and 2014 are calculated by indexing the current tax rate with the expected inflation rate.  
20 The tax rates are recalculated from Ruble into USD using an exchange rate of 30Ruble/$ with an accuracy of 
one decimal point.   
21 Producer prices of coal are taken from the Federal State Statistic Service, available at  
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/price/#   
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1=SK     if 5≥SV  Mio. ton and 
SV
N > 0.5       
1=SK    for the difference  (N-VS) if VS>N                 
where TMoil is the company specific mineral tax rate on crude oil in Ruble/ton, BTMoil is the 
base mineral tax rate on crude oil in Ruble/ton, PK  is a coefficient representing changes of 
the world price of crude oil, DK  is a coefficient representing the depletion of resources, SK is 
a stock coefficient, PWoil is the average price of Urals oil in $/barrel, ER is the exchange rate, 
N is the volume of extracted oil, V are oil reserves registered on January 1st, 2006, 
V
N  is the 
depletion rate with respect to V, SV are oil reserves registered in the previous year,  and 
SV
N  is 
the ratio of reserves. The base mineral tax rate on crude oil (BTMoil) was approximately 14 
$/ton in 2011, 15 $/ton in 2012, and 16 $/ton in 2013. Tax rates for 2012 and 2013 are 
calculated by indexing the current tax rate with the expected inflation rate.   
Environmental taxes. Among energy commodities, excise taxes are applied only on oil 
products such as petrol and diesel as specific tax rates. According to Federal Law No.282-FZ 
November 28th, 2009, since January, 2011, rates of excise tax on oil products differ according 
to adverse environmental effects22, where a high tax rate corresponds to oil products with 
worse environmental effects, as shown in Table 4.6. For example, from January until June, 
2012 the excise tax rate on petrol (Euro-3) was approximately 246 $/ton, whereas it was 227 
$/ton on petrol (Euro-5). Hence, excise taxes on oil products can be considered as taxes on 
pollution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 This is according to European environmental standards for fuels, which were introduced in Russian with 
Government Degree No. 118 from February 27th, 2008.   
  69 
Table 4.6: Excise Taxes on Oil Products from 2012 to 2014 (USD per ton23) 
 from January 
1st to June 30th, 
2012  
from July 1st to 
December 31st, 
2012 
from January 
1st to December 
31st, 2013  
from January 
1st to December 
31st, 2014 
Petrol (others) 258 274 337 370 
Petrol (Euro-3) 246 263 325 258 
Petrol (Euro-4) 227 227 285 314 
Petrol (Euro-5) 227 171 171 189 
Diesel (others) 137 143 195 215 
Diesel (Euro-3) 127 143 195 215 
Diesel (Euro-4) 119 119 164 181 
Diesel (Euro-5) 119 99 144 159 
Motor oil 202 202 250 275 
SRG 261 261 321 353 
SRG is the straight-run gasoline.  
Source: Russian Tax Code (2012). 
The producer price of petrol (Euro-3) was approximately 604 USD per ton in 2011, whereas 
the excise tax was 189 USD per ton, which accounts for 31% of the producer price (Russian 
Tax Code, 2010; FSSS, 2012c). Furthermore, according to Government Decree No.632 from 
August 28th, 1992 as well as Federal Law N 7-FZ from January 10th, 2002, there are also 
environmental payments (Table 4.7).  
Table 4.7: Payments on Air Pollutions from Usage of Energy Inputs in 2009 (USD24 per 
ton) 
 Limit 
N2O 8.67 
NO 5.83 
C4H 8.33 
CO 0.1 
S2O 3.5 
Source: Government Decree No.632 from August 28th. 
For instance, all thermal power generation companies in Russia made some payments for 
local air pollution from nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide, sulphur dioxide, particles and 
others. The average share of emission payments, however, does not exceed 0.1% of the total 
production costs (EFA, 2009a; Power Generation Company Reports, 2009). 
4.4 Tax Interactions: Relevance of Export Taxes 
The theoretical literature on environmental taxation is mainly focused on pre-existing 
distortionary taxes in the labour and capital markets (Goulder et al., 1997; de Mooij and 
                                                 
23 The rates of excise taxes are recalculated from Ruble into USD by using an exchange rate of 30 Ruble/USD 
with an accuracy of zero decimal points.   
24 Recalculated from Ruble into USD with an exchange rate equals 30 Ruble/USD.  
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Bovenberg, 1998), whereas interactions with other taxes such as trade taxes, valued added 
taxes, excise taxes, and mineral resource extraction taxes are often neglected. 
Using the analytical model developed by Goulder et al. (1997), and further modified to an 
open economy model25 by Parry (2001), the welfare effect of pollution taxes is analysed. 
Since the Russian economy strongly depends on revenues from export taxes on energy 
resources, the model framework is extended by introducing an export tax on polluting 
commodities. Household utility is given by the following equation:  
)(),,( 21 HEvHCCuU −= ,                 (4.4.1) 
where u(*) is a utility function which is quasi-concave and v(*) is a disutility function which 
is concave. Both functions are continuous. C1 is the domestic demand for the non-polluting 
good 1, which is a composite of the domestically produced good (Q1) and the imported good 
(M). The domestically produced and imported good 1 are treated as perfect substitutes 
(equation 4.4.2). C2 is the domestic demand for the polluting good 2, which is produced 
domestically only. The domestic supply of good 2 (C2) is defined as the difference between 
the total supply (Q2) and export (X), as given in equation (4.4.3). A situation is considered, 
where the country is an exporter of the polluting good. H is leisure.    
MQC += 11 ,                   (4.4.2) 
 XQC −= 22 .                   (4.4.3) 
A small open economy is assumed, where the world price of the exported good (X) and the 
world price of the imported good (M) are normalised at unity. Therefore, the trade account 
balance is simply given by the following equation: 
 XM = ,                   (4.4.4) 
Consumption of good 2 induces emissions. The environmental quality at home country (EH) 
and abroad (EA) is defined by the following functions:  
 )( 2CeE HH = ,                  (4.4.5) 
)(XeE AA = .                        (4.4.6) 
The marginal environmental damage (D) from consumption of good 2 (C2) in the home 
country is measured in value terms. This can be derived using the disutility function (4.4.1) 
and (4.4.5): 
                                                 
25 To make it comparable, we keep the notation applied by Parry (2001).  
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where λ  is the marginal utility of income. Perfect competition and constant returns to scale in 
the production of both goods is assumed, where labour is the only input. Therefore, supply of 
both goods is perfectly elastic.26 The marginal product of labour is constant, implying a 
perfectly elastic demand for labour, whereas labour supply faces an upward sloping curve. 
Normalising the wage rate and prices at unity, the economy resource constraint can be written 
as follows: 
 HQQT ++= 21 ,                   (4.4.8) 
where T is the household time endowment. The total labour supply is the difference between 
the time endowment and leisure (T – H). Households are assumed to maximise utility (4.5.1) 
subject to the following household budget constraint: 
 TRHTCC LC +−−=++ ))(1()1( 221 ττ  ,               (4.4.9) 
where 2Cτ is the pollution tax rate on good 2 (C2), Lτ  is the tax rate on labour income, and TR 
is the total government revenue, which is returned to households as lump-sum transfers.  
The total government revenue consists of revenues from the pollution tax, labour tax, and 
export tax: 
 XHTCTR XLC τττ +−+= )(22 ,                (4.4.10) 
where Xτ  is the export tax. TR is exogenous in the model because a revenue neutral 
experiment is analysed, where the revenue from the pollution tax is recycled through a 
reduction in the labour tax. Using this analytical framework, three propositions are derived.   
Proposition 1. The tax-interaction effect dominates the revenue-recycling effect if 2Cτ >0, 
Xτ =0, and C1 and C2 are equal substitutes for leisure.    
Proof. Totally differentiating equation (4.4.1) with respect to 2Cτ , the following expression 
for the welfare effect is obtained: 
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26 The assumption of perfectly elastic supply of goods is a “standard” assumption which is also used in previous 
studies (e.g. Parry and Bento, 2000).  
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Maximising the utility function (4.4.1) with respect to the household income balance (4.4.9), 
the following first-order conditions are obtained: 
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∂ .          (4.4.12) 
Implicit demand functions are the following:  
 ),( 21 LCC ττ ;   ),( 22 LCC ττ ;    ),( 2 LCH ττ .          (4.4.13) 
Substituting (4.4.2) and (4.4.7) into (4.4.11), we obtain: 
 ( )
22
1
2
2
2
2
)1(11
C
L
CC
C
C d
dH
d
dC
d
dC
D
d
dU
τ
τ
ττ
τ
τλ
−++−+= .                      (4.4.14) 
Differentiating (4.4.8) with respect to 2Cτ  and making use of (4.4.2), (4.4.3), and (4.4.4), we 
obtain: 
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Substituting (4.4.15) into (4.4.14), we obtain: 
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Totally differentiating the implicit demand function for leisure (4.4.13) with respect to 2Cτ , 
we obtain:   
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Totally differentiating the government revenue equation (4.4.10) with respect to 2Cτ , after 
some simple algebraic manipulation, gives: 
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Substituting (4.4.18) and (4.4.17) into (4.4.16), we can obtain: 
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According to Goulder et al. (1997), the numerator in equation (4.4.20) defines the partial 
equilibrium net welfare from a marginal change in the labour tax. This is the change in leisure 
multiplied by Lτ . The denominator defines the partial equilibrium change in government 
revenues from a marginal change in the labour tax. Therefore, M are the partial equilibrium 
efficiency costs27 resulting from an increase in the labour tax to receive an additional dollar. 
The first term in the RHS of the equation (4.4.19) is the Pigouvian effect, PdW , which is 
defined as a reduction of C2, multiplied by the difference between the marginal social benefit 
and the marginal social cost. The revenue recycling effect is RW∂ . The revenue-recycling 
effect defines efficiency gains from a reduction of the labour tax as well as gains from 
pollution tax revenues. The tax interaction effect is IW∂ . This is defined as the welfare loss, 
resulting from decreases in the labour supply and in revenues from labour taxes. The tax 
interaction effect (∂WI) can be shown by the following approximation, which is derived 
following Goulder et al. (1997) (see Appendix A): 
 2MCW C
I φ=∂ ,                 (4.4.21) 
where  
LI
C
HC
C
HC
LI
C
HC
C
n
CC
C
n
CC
C
n
nn
+
+
+
+
+
=
21
2
21
1
21
2φ ,         
where CHCn 1 and 
C
HCn 2  are the compensated elasticities of demand for C1, and C2 with 
respect to the price of leisure and LIn is the income elasticity of labour supply. The degree of 
substitution between C2 and leisure compared to that between total consumption and leisure is 
measured by Cφ . For example, if C1 and C2 have equal elasticities of substitution for leisure 
( CHCn 1  equals
C
HCn 2 ), then Xφ  equals unity. Therefore, the difference between the revenue-
recycling effect ( RW∂ ) and the tax-interaction effect ( IW∂ ) equals: 
                                                 
27 According to Goulder et al. (1997), M is also defined as the marginal excess burden of labour taxation, where 
one plus the marginal excess burden of taxation equals the marginal cost of public funds.     
dWP                                               ∂WR                                                      ∂WI 
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If 2Cτ >0 and  Xτ =0, then 
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This confirms the conclusion drawn by Parry (1995) and Goulder et al. (1997) and implies a 
failure of the strong double dividend hypothesis. The intuitive explanation behind this is that 
narrow-based taxes (pollution taxes) induce a larger marginal excess burden compared to 
broad-based taxes (income taxes). This is because substituting narrow-based taxes for broad-
based taxes raise a wide range of substitution possibilities (Parry and Oates, 2000). 
Nevertheless, if pollution goods and leisure are complements, the tax-interaction effect is an 
efficiency gain (Goulder et al., 1997). 
Proposition 2. The tax-interaction effect is less than the revenue-recycling effect if 
0< 2Cτ < Xτ and C1 and C2 are equal substitutes for leisure. 
Proof. Under the assumption of a small open economy and homogeneity of C2 and X in 
supply, 
2
2
Cd
dC
τ
=
2Cd
dX
τ
where 
2
2
Cd
dC
τ
< 0 and 
2Cd
dX
τ
> 0. Therefore, from equation (4.4.22), if 
2Cτ < Xτ , then 
IW∂ < RW∂ . Q.E.D.  
Expanding the base of the export tax results in additional revenues, which allows for a larger 
reduction in labour taxes. Such a positive tax-interaction effect decreases the cost of 
environmental tax reform, raising the possibility of a strong double dividend. Due to export 
taxes, the polluting good is oversupplied domestically and undersupplied in the export market. 
Therefore, introducing a pollution tax has a corrective effect since this leads to a reduction in 
the demand for the polluting goods, whereas its export supply increases.        
Proposition 3. The tax-interaction effect equals the revenue-recycling effect if 2Cτ = Xτ , 
Xτ >0, and C1 and C2 are equal substitutes for leisure. 
Proof. This proof follows from the proof of Proposition 2 (see equation 4.4.22). Q.E.D.  
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Using this analytical framework, we can also see that introducing (increasing) pollution taxes 
harms the environmental quality abroad: 
22 C
A
C
A
d
dX
X
e
d
de
ττ ∂
∂
= < 0 because 
X
eA
∂
∂
< 0 and 
2Cd
dX
τ
> 
0. This indicates increases in emissions abroad.     
4.5 Summary of the Chapter  
The theoretical literature on the double dividend concept is mainly focused on interactions of 
environmental taxes with pre-existing labour and capital taxes, while tax interactions with 
other taxes are often neglected. In particular, export taxes on crude oil, petroleum products 
and gas are a substantial source of government revenues in Russia: approximately 21% of 
total government revenues. Export taxation leads to oversupply of energy in domestic markets 
since it lowers the domestic price level of energy. Introducing environmental taxes in Russia 
would increase revenues from export taxes via higher export supplies of energy. At the same 
time, high revenues from export taxes reduce the cost of environmental tax reform since they 
allow for a larger reduction in distortionary taxes. The relevance of the interaction between 
carbon taxes and export taxes on energy as well as other taxes are further analysed in the 
empirical analysis in Section 7.               
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5 Energy Markets 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the occurrence of a strong double dividend is ambiguous since this 
depends on various factors and assumptions. Analytical models due to their simplicity are not 
able to capture all real-world complexities. A general equilibrium framework turns out to be 
an appropriate tool to deal with this issue because this allows analysing the effects of 
environmental taxation in the presence of pre-existing distortions as well as this provides an 
explicit interaction between output and factor markets. From Chapter 5, this study departs 
from the theoretical to a numerical analysis. The design of energy markets determines the 
response of demand and supply of energy to a policy simulation. Hence, an explicit design of 
the model with respect to energy markets is expected to be crucial for the credibility of 
results. Chapter 5 provides an overview of energy markets in Russia. Four energy markets – 
gas market, oil market, coal market and electricity market – are analysed with respect to the 
market structure. This chapter forms the basis for the model design described further in 
Chapter 6.        
5.1 Gas Market 
5.1.1 Supply 
Russia has the largest natural gas reserves in the world (British Petroleum, 2010). Moreover, 
Russia is the world’s largest producer and exporter of dry natural gas (EIA, 2011c). As shown 
in Figure 5.1, Ural region is the major producer of natural gas. This region has also the largest 
reserves of natural gas in Russia. Following Stern (2009), the main supply sources and 
demand categories of the Russian gas market are defined. There are three main sources of gas 
supply in Russia: Gazprom production, non-Gazprom production and imports from Central 
Asia.  
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Figure 5.1: Hydrocarbons Produced by Russian Regions in 2008 
 
Source: Gazprom (2011a). 
The largest domestic producer of natural gas is Gazprom, whose share accounted for 83% of 
Russian total gas production in 2008. Gazprom is a state run company with a government 
property share of slightly above 50%. Gazprom operates as a vertically integrated company, 
which deals with production, distribution and transportation of natural gas (Ministry of 
Energy, 2011a). Gazprom is a proprietary organisation in Russia’s unified system of gas 
transportation. Therefore, Gazprom has control over all domestic and export transportation of 
gas from Russia (Gazprom, 2011b). The unified gas supply system in Russia is a natural 
monopoly. According to Government Decree No.1021 from December 29th, 2000, to avoid a 
monopolistic behaviour of Gazprom with respect to independent gas producers, transport 
tariffs for natural gas are regulated by the government. Gazprom, however, is entitled to 
decide about the volume of gas transitions from other companies so that independent gas 
producers do not have free access to pipeline networks. Based on the demand for gas and the 
pipeline capacity, Gazprom provides several quotas of gas transportation for independent gas 
producers (Gazprom, 2011c). A non-discriminating access to pipeline networks for 
independent gas producers remains a controversial issue in Russian gas policy. In addition, 
Gazprom owns many holdings in such sectors as banking, insurance, agriculture, mass media 
and construction, which enforces Gazprom’s political power (Ahrend and Tompson, 2005).  
Nevertheless, Gazprom does not have the absolute control over production of natural gas in 
Russia. The role of independent gas producers has increased recently. The production share of 
independent companies accounted for 17% of Russian total gas production in 2008, whereas 
in 2003 it was approximately 12% (Gazprom, 2010). Non-Gazprom natural gas is produced 
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either by oil companies as a by-product of oil production or by small gas companies (Robeck, 
2006). The largest independent producers of gas in Russia are the companies “Itera”, 
“Novatek”, and “TNK-WP Holding” (Gazprom, 2011d).  
5.1.2 Demand 
Three main gas markets are distinguished: (1) domestic market, (2) European market, and (3) 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS’s) market. Russia is not only a large producer of 
gas, yet it is also a large consumer of gas. The domestic market is the largest market, whose 
share accounted for 58% of total gas supply in 2008 (Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1: Supply of Natural Gas to Domestic and Export Markets  
    2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Supply to domestic 
markets 
BCM* 327.0 333.5 339.8 352.0 356.4 352.8 
share to total, % 58.3 57.6 57.5 58.0 59.0 58.4 
growth rate, % 0.0 1.99 1.89 3.59 1.25 -1.01 
incl. imports from 
Central Asia BCM 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Supply to export 
markets 
BCM 233.8 245.9 251.2 254.7 247.3 251.1 
share to total, % 41.7 42.4 42.5 42.0 41.0 41.6 
growth rate, % 0.0 5.18 2.16 1.39 -2.91 1.54 
incl. transits from 
Central Asia to 
exports 
BCM 47.0 50.3 54.5 56.8 59.7 61.3 
Total supply BCM 560.8 579.4 591.0 606.7 603.7 603.9 growth rate, % 0.0 7.02 8.35 4.22 5.11 2.68 
* Billion cubic meters   
Source: Gazprom (2010). 
Domestic market. The domestic market of natural gas is divided into a regulated and a non-
regulated market. Gazprom and its subsidiaries operate in the regulated market, where 
domestic prices of gas are administratively regulated by the Federal Tariff Service (FTS) 
(Government Decree No.1205 from December 31st, 2010). Independent producers of natural 
gas operate in the non-regulated market. Due to administrative price regulation, domestic 
prices of gas were approximately at 50% of export prices in 2010 (Ministry of Economics, 
2010). Moreover, regulated prices of natural gas differ by household group as well as industry 
and region (FTS, 2010). 
The Russian economy depends strongly on natural gas. Natural gas is the main energy input 
in total energy consumption. For example, the share of gas accounted for 54% of total energy 
consumption in 2009, followed by crude oil and oil products (21%), coal (14%), nuclear 
(6%), and hydroelectricity (6%) (British Petroleum, 2010). As shown in Table 5.2, the largest 
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domestic consumer of natural gas in 2008 was the power generation sector with a share of 
33% of total domestic demand for gas, followed by households (17%), and the utility sector 
(11%). The largest consumers of gas among Russian regions are Central and Volga regions, 
whose consumption share accounted for 66% of total domestic consumption of gas. This is 
because industries are mainly concentrated in the European part of Russia (Gazprom, 2011e).  
Table 5.2: Demand for Natural Gas from Gazprom by Consumer Type (per cent) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Power generation  37 37 38 37 37 33 
Metallurgy 6 7 7 6 7 7 
Agrochemical industry 6 6 7 6 7 7 
Households 16 15 16 15 16 17 
Utility sector 11 9 10 10 11 11 
Rest 24 26 22 26 24 27 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Gazprom (2010). 
Export market. Russia is the world’s largest exporter of natural gas: for example, its 
production share was 20% of world’s total natural gas production in 2009 (British Petroleum, 
2010). Among Russian gas producers, only Gazprom is entitled to export natural gas (Federal 
Law No.117 from July 18th, 2006) so that Gazprom has a legal monopoly with respect to 
exports of natural gas from Russia. Gazprom exports natural gas to 32 countries such as CIS, 
EU as well as Turkey, Japan and other Asian countries (Ministry of Energy, 2011a). As 
shown in Table 5.3, the largest importers of Russian natural gas are Ukraine and Germany. 
The consumption share of Russian gas in most European markets is high. Therefore, Russia 
can have some market power in these markets. For example, consumption of natural gas in 
countries, such as Slovakia, Finland, Macedonia, and Belarus consists mainly of gas 
deliveries from Russia. According to the estimation carried out by Tarr and Thomson (2004), 
the Lerner index for Russian gas in European markets varies from 0.37 to 0.63, which 
indicates significant market power. In contrast, Locatelli (2008) argues that the possibility to 
exercise market power by Gazprom in export markets is limited because of long-term 
contracts and limited capacity.  
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Table 5.3: Major European and CIS’s Importers of Russian Natural Gas in 2010 
  
Export supply 
(bn. m3) 
Export shares a  
(per cent) 
Import shares b  
(per cent) 
European importers:  
Austria 5.4 2.4 68 
Belgium  3.3 1.5 n.a. 
Finland 4.4 2.0 100 
France 10.0 4.5 23 
Germany 33.5 15.2 35 
Greece 2.1 1.0 80 
Italy 19.1 8.7 31 
Switzerland 0.3 0.1 10 
Netherlands 5.1 2.3 25 
Turkey 20 9.1 63 
UK 9.7 4.4 n.a. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.2 0.1 100 
Bulgaria 2.2 1.0 100 
Croatia 1.1 0.5 90 
Czech Republic 7.1 3.2 68 
Hungary 7.6 3.4 89 
Macedonia 0.1 0.0 100 
Poland 9.0 4.1 78 
Romania 2.5 11.0 100 
Serbia 1.7 0.8 100 
Slovakia 5.4 2.4 100 
Slovenia 0.5 0.2 57 
Rest 2.5 1.1 n.a. 
CIS’s importers:  
Armenia 1.7 0.8 100 
Belarus 17.6 8.0 100 
Estonia 0.8 0.4 100 
Georgia 0.1 0.0 13 
Kazakhstan 3.1 1.4 37 
Latvia 1.1 0.5 100 
Lithuania 2.5 1.1 100 
Moldova 3.0 1.4 57 
Ukraine 37.8 17.1 100 
Total 67.7 100 n.a. 
a Export shares of gas from Russia to destination in Russian total export supply.  
b Import shares of Russian gas in total import demand for gas in destination country.   
Source: Gazprom (2010) and British Petroleum (2010). 
Recently, there are some concerns about the stability of future exports of natural gas from 
Russia, especially Gazprom’s ability to fulfil its contracts with respect to gas its supplies 
(IEA, 2006). The Russian gas sector has large reserves of natural gas, yet it suffers from a 
lack of investment in extraction and infrastructure (Goldthau, 2008; Fernandez, 2009). For 
instance, Soederbergh et al. (2010) show that the major Russian gas fields are in decline. 
Moreover, the authors stress the importance of development of large-scale projects, such as 
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the Yamal Peninsula and Shtokman fields, which would be needed to avoid a reduction in gas 
supply in the near future. According to another study carried out by Fernandez (2009), export 
supply of gas from Russia will continue to increase but rather moderately. The growth of 
export supply would significantly depend, inter alia, on investment strategies and domestic 
demand for gas. Development of domestic demand for gas in Russia would be influenced by 
factors, such as substitution possibilities among energy inputs, changes in the economic 
structure, and modernization of existing capacity (Fernandez, 2009). In contrast, Stern (2005) 
gives a more optimistic opinion with respect to the future gas supply from Russia. He points 
out that the Russian gas sector faces different supply options to meet increasing domestic and 
export demand in the future. According to Stern (2005), development of large-scale projects 
such as Yamal Peninsula would satisfy domestic as well as export demand for natural gas for 
a long-term. Such investment projects, however, require high investments associated with 
high risks and uncertainties regarding future prices and demand for gas. Alternative sources of 
gas supply could be some small-scale projects which are less costly compared to the Yamal 
Peninsula project. Stern also stresses that a delay of large-scale projects would increase the 
importance of independent gas producers as well as imports from Central Asia. Therefore, the 
development of prices and demand for gas becomes one of the important factors, which 
would determine the Russian gas balance in the future (Stern, 2005). 
5.1.3 Challenges for Gas Policy 
According to the Russian Energy Strategy up to 2030 (Ministry of Energy, 2009) and the 
General Plan of Development of the Gas Sector (Energyland, 2010), the main challenges of 
the gas sector are summarized as follows:  
1) Technical and technological modernization of the gas sector, especially the pipeline 
network since the majority of pipelines is outdated. Deterioration of the pipeline 
network leads to large losses by gas transportation (Mitrova et al., 2009; Dergunova, 
2007). 
2) Investment in development of new gas deposits since the main gas basins in Russia are 
in decline.  
3) Liberalization of the domestic gas market. Domestic prices of gas are still 
administratively regulated, and they are significantly lower than export prices.  
4) Support of competition in the domestic gas market as well as non-discriminatory 
access to the pipeline network for non-Gazprom gas producers. 
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5) Development of the gas chemical and gas processing industries: for example, 
development of production and export of liquefied petroleum gas. 
6) Diversification of export deliveries of gas because of high transit risk (conflict with 
Ukraine).   
Price regulation. One of the most important issues of Russian gas policy still is the 
regulation of domestic prices. The Russian government planned to unify domestic and export 
prices of gas until 2011 based on the principle of “equal profitability” of export and domestic 
markets. According to this policy reform, the domestic price level should equal the average 
export price excluding export tax of 30% and transport costs (Government Decree No.333 
from May 27th, 2007). Unified pricing for gas should lead to more efficient use of gas and 
encourage investment in domestic infrastructure of the sector. Another argument for unified 
pricing is to diversify the energy balance, by supporting the production of coal through 
increasing domestic prices of gas (Ministry of Economics, 2010). The Russian government 
has implemented a gradual increase of domestic prices of gas for industries and households. 
The full equalization of domestic and export prices was delayed to 2015 because of the 
economic crisis (Gazprom, 2011e; Government Decree No.1205 from December 31st, 2010). 
The unified pricing implies an increase in domestic prices of gas, which results in various 
effects. On one hand, increasing domestic prices of natural gas will encourage investment into 
extraction and infrastructure of the gas sector and provide other energy-saving measures 
which will lead to energy efficiency improvement (Goldthau, 2008). One of the most 
important factors in the analysis of Russian gas policy is how domestic demand would 
respond to higher gas prices, in particular sectors with a large energy saving potential (Stern, 
2005; Pirani, 2009). Moreover, higher domestic prices of gas would raise the profitability of 
independent producers of gas in Russia. Because of low domestic prices of gas, most oil 
companies flare associated gas rather to sale this (Goldthau, 2008). On the other hand, unified 
pricing for natural gas can result in negative social and economic consequences for Russia 
because of higher energy costs. Tarr and Thomson (2004) found that unified pricing for gas 
would not be economically rationale from a Russian perspective since Gazprom has some 
market power in the export market. Moreover, unified pricing of natural gas will lead to 
increases in domestic demand for other energy fuels such as coal which produce more 
emissions. Therefore, dual pricing for gas can also be justified from an environmental point of 
view, since low domestic prices of gas imply significant environmental benefits (Dudek et al., 
2006). Finally, an increase in the domestic price level of gas in Russia can lower the incentive 
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to export some additional amount of gas apart from existing contracts. Thus, the European 
security of gas supply from Russia may even be worse off under unified pricing of gas 
(Spanjer, 2007; Sagen and Tsygankova, 2008).  
Sectoral structure. The structure of the gas sector remains a controversial issue in Russia. 
The total control of Gazprom over pipeline networks and export supply of natural gas is 
highly criticized. At the end of the nineties, a reorganization of Gazprom into a production 
and transportation company was discussed. This was aimed to support non-discriminating 
access to pipeline networks. Currently, Gazprom is considered as an important strategical 
company, which reorganization is politically undesirable (Orttung et al., 2008). On the one 
hand, a reorganization of Gazprom would increase the competition in the Russian gas market. 
Moreover, free access to the pipeline system would raise incentives to invest into production 
and infrastructure of gas for independent producers (Grigoryev, 2007). On the other hand, a 
splitting up of Gazprom can deteriorate the Russian position in the export market. According 
to Tsygankova (2010), the relation of Gazprom’s shares in the domestic and export markets 
determine welfare effects of Gazprom’s reorganization. For example, a small market share in 
the export market and a large market share in the domestic market can lead to welfare gains 
from Gazprom’s reorganization. Another argument against the reorganization of Gazprom, 
which is often raised by Gazprom, is losses in economies of scale (Pirani, 2009). 
Nevertheless, it is not clear how significant benefits from economies of scale are, and whether 
they can overweigh welfare gains from a more competitive structure of the gas market.   
5.2 Crude Oil and Oil Products Market  
5.2.1 Supply 
Russia is the second largest producer of oil after Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Russia has the 
world’s eighth largest proved reserves of oil: approximately 13% of world’s proved reserves 
(Ministry of Energy, 2011c). Most Russian oil reserves are located in West Siberia, between 
the Ural Mountains and the Central Siberian plateau. There are also some reserves in Eastern 
Siberia (EIA, 2011c). The market share of petroleum products from Russia accounted for 
8.6% in total world exports in 2007 (EIA, 2011a).  
The oil sector in Russia consists of 10 large vertically integrated oil companies, which deal 
with extraction, processing and transportation of crude oil and oil products. The largest oil 
companies are “Rosnefty”, “Lukoil”, “TNK-BP”, “Surgutneftegas”, and “Gazprom nefty” 
(Ministry of Energy, 2011c). The pipeline network is a natural monopoly so that 
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transportation of oil and oil products in Russia is controlled by state run companies 
“Transnefty” and “Transneftyproduct”, respectively (Transnefty, 2010; Ministry of Energy, 
2011c). These companies are also entitled to export crude oil and oil products. As shown in 
Figure 5.2, the production of crude oil has increased by 52% between 2000 and 2009.  
Figure 5.2: Extraction and Export of Oil and Oil Products (billion tons)    
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Source: FSSS (2010). 
5.2.2 Demand 
Export market. Russia exports crude oil as well as oil products. For example, the share of 
exported crude oil amounted to 50% in 2009, as shown in Figure 5.2. The largest export 
market is the European market with a share of 81% of total export of crude oil, especially 
Germany and the Netherlands are the largest importers of Russian crude oil. About 12% of 
Russian oil exports go to Asia, whereas exports to North and South America amount to 6%, 
Africa (0.7%), and Australia and New Zealand (0.3%) (EIA, 2011c).  
Domestic market. About half of extracted oil in Russia is processed into oil products such as 
petrol and diesel, which are sold either in domestic or export markets. Domestic prices of oil 
products are not regulated, but lower than export prices due to high export taxes (see Section 
4.3). Furthermore, domestic prices of oil products are subject to regular inspections, which are 
performed by the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service. This is because of suspicion of 
oligopolistic behaviour among oil companies and “too” high domestic prices of petroleum 
products (FAS, 2009). The largest domestic users of petroleum products are households and 
the transport sector.  
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5.2.3 Challenges for Petroleum Policy 
According to the Russian Energy Strategy up to 2030 (Ministry of Energy, 2009), the main 
challenges of the Russian oil sector are summarized as follows: 
1) Technical and technological modernization of the oil sector, especially pipeline 
networks. 
2) Development of oil refinery in Russia, i.e., development of downstream industries 
with high value added. As mentioned, about 50% of extracted crude oil is exported. 
3) Improvement of the quality of oil products, especially with respect to their 
environmental impact. 
4) Diversification of oil products assortment. 
5) Support of competition in the domestic market of oil products since the Russian oil 
sector is oligopolized by some vertically integrated companies.     
5.3 Coal Market 
5.3.1 Supply 
Russia has the second largest reserve of coal after USA (EIA, 2011c). The main regions of 
coal extraction are West and East Siberia, which produce about 85% of total coal production 
in Russia (Figure 5.3). At present, the Russian coal industry can be characterized as a 
liberalized and deregulated sector.  
Figure 5.3: Production of Coal by Region in 2010 (billon tons)    
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Source: Ministry of Energy (2011d). 
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As shown in Figure 5.4, total production of coal in Russia increased by about 27% in 2010 
compared to 2000. Moreover, the share of stone coal in total coal production increased 
compared to brown coal. For instance, the share of stone coal was 67% in 2000, whereas it 
increased to 77% in 2009 so that the share of brown coal was 23% in 2009. The Russian coal 
sector is mainly represented by ten private companies, which are formed as joint stock 
companies (Ministry of Energy, 2011d).  
Figure 5.4: Production of Coal Products from 2000 to 2009 (billon tons)    
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Source: FSSS (2010). 
5.3.2 Demand 
Domestic market. Domestic production of coal is redistributed between domestic and export 
markets. The domestic market is the largest market, whose share accounted for 65% of total 
production in 2009. Moreover, Russia imports coal as well, where almost all imports come 
from CIS countries in particular from Kazakhstan (Ministry of Energy, 2011d). As shown in 
Figure 5.5, the largest domestic consumer of coal is the electricity sector, whose share 
accounted for 47% of total coal production in 2008. The second largest consumer of coal is 
the top stream industry, which dealt with processing of coal in other energy commodities. Its 
share amounted to 15% in 2008. Figure 5.8 illustrates that during the period from 2000 to 
2008 production of coal switched from domestic to export markets. For example, the share of 
exported coal in total coal production increased from 16% to 32%. 
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Figure 5.5: Consumption of Coal by Demand Categories (per cent of total production)     
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Source: FSSS (2010). 
Export market. The export market can be divided into two markets: (1) CIS and (2) other 
export markets. The largest importers of Russian coal are Ukraine, Britain, Turkey, China, 
Japan, Holland, Poland and Korea, whose overall share accounts for approximately 70% of 
total coal exports from Russia (Ministry of Energy, 2011d). Russia exports mainly stone coal. 
Figure 5.6 illustrates that exports of stone coal have significantly increased in particular to 
non-CIS countries. For instance, total export supply of stone coal increased by 140% from 
2000 to 2009.  
Figure 5.6: Export and Import of Stone Coal from 2000 to 2009 (billion tons)    
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Source: FSSS (2010). 
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5.3.3 Challenges for Coal Policy 
According to the Russian Energy Strategy up to 2030 (Ministry of energy, 2009), the main 
challenges of the Russian coal sector are summarized as follows: 
1) Technical and technological modernization of the coal sector. The coal industry 
suffers from a lack of investment. Low domestic prices of gas make investment in the 
coal industry less profitable than in the gas industry. Therefore, gas policy in Russia 
significantly affects the coal sector.  
2) Improvement of the quality of coal products. Russian coal products are of low quality 
with high ash content, which varies from 20% to 40%. For example, coal for power 
generation is not cleaned (Kozuchowski, 2008).  
3) Development of transport infrastructure.  
4) Improvement of social and working standards to reduce accident and injury rates in 
coal mining.  
5) Efficient regulation of transport tariffs for coal transportation. Transport costs 
accounts for a large part relative to total production costs. For example, transport costs 
account for 50-60% of export prices so that high transportation costs make Russian 
coal less competitive in the export market (Plakitkin and Plakitkina, 2009). 
5.4 Electricity Market 
5.4.1 Supply  
The major sources of electricity generation in Russia are thermal, hydro and nuclear energy. 
Table 5.4 shows that the structure of electricity generation in Russia remained unchanged 
during the period from 2000 to 2009. Thermal energy is the main source of energy generation, 
whose share accounts for 66% of total electricity generation.  
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Table 5.4: Structure of Electricity Generation and the Production Growth Rate (per 
cent)  
Years Nuclear Hydro Thermal Growth, in per cent to 2000 
2000 14.8 19.6 65.6 0.0 
2001 15.0 20.5 64.5 1.1 
2002 15.9 19.1 65.0 1.6 
2003 16.3 17.8 65.9 4.3 
2004 15.6 19.7 64.7 6.4 
2005 15.6 19.0 65.4 8.5 
2006 15.4 18.3 66.3 13.0 
2007 15.8 18.2 65.9 15.8 
2008 15.7 16.6 67.7 18.5 
2009 16.8 17.6 65.7 11.4 
Source: EIA (2011a).  
Thermal energy generation. As shown in Table 5.5, the main fuel inputs of thermal energy 
generation are natural gas and coal. The electricity generation sector in Russia is strongly 
reliant on natural gas. For example, in 2009, the share of natural gas in total demand for 
energy by thermal electricity generation amounted to 70.1%, followed by coal (27.8%), oil 
(2.0%), and other (0.1%) (Table 5.5). During the period from 2000 to 2009, the share of gas 
increased from 63.8% to 70.1%, whereas the share of coal decreased from 30.6% to 27.8%. 
The main reason for this is low domestic prices of gas (Ministry of Energy, 2011b).   
Table 5.5: Structure of Fuel Consumption by Thermal-Electric Generation (per cent) 
  2000 2005 2006   2007 2008 2009 
Gas 63.8 70.3 69.2 71.2 69.7 70.1 
Coal 30.6 26.4 26.9 26.2 28.3 27.8 
Oil 5.1 2.7 3.3 2.0 1.9 2.0 
Others 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: EFA (2009b). 
The reorganization of the power generation sector in Russia started in 2001 (Government 
Decree No.526 from July 11th, 2001; RAO-EES, 2001). According to the reform, all 
generation companies were divided into two types: Generation Companies of the Wholesale 
Electricity Market (WGC) and Territorial Generation Companies (TGC). Almost all WGC are 
specializing in electricity generation, whereas TGC are specializing in electricity and heat 
production. Furthermore, all WGC companies have a larger capacity compared to TGC 
(Ministry of Energy, 2011b). The largest WGCs with respect to generation capacity are 
WGC-1, WGC-6 and WGC-5. Among TGCs, the largest companies are Mosenergo and TGC-
1 (Table 5.6). At present, there are 24 main electricity generation companies, which are 
formed as joint stock companies (JSC) (Ministry of Energy, 2011b). Table 5.6 shows the 
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technical and production characteristics of some of these companies. The generation 
companies consist of many affiliates and use different energy generation technologies. The 
majority of the power plants, however, are built as dual fuel plants (coal-gas). The main fuel 
input still remains natural gas, which is used by almost all thermal energy generation 
companies. Only JSC TGC-13 and TGC-14 are generating energy mainly using coal and 
alternatively using some oil products. The largest electricity producers among thermal energy 
companies are JSC Mosenergo, JSC WGC-4, and JSC WGC-2. 
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Table 5.6: Technical and Production Characteristics of Russian Energy Generation 
Companies in 2008 
JSC 
companies 
Production in 2008 Power capacity 
Stations Workers Fuel Balance Electricity, million 
kWth 
Share 
in total, 
in % 
Heat, 
thousand 
Gcal/h 
MWt Gcal/h 
Energoatom 162,300  22.61 n.a. 25,200  n.a. 10 38,545 Nuclear  
RusHydro 77,704  10.82 n.a. 24,372 n.a. 19 filial  5,748 Hydro 
Mosenergo  64,274 8.95 62,440 
 
11,900  
 
34,900  CHP**:15 Hydro: 1 13,580 
Gas: 98.4% 
Coal: 1.3% 
Oil: 0.3% 
WGC-4 56,676  7.89 2,261  8,630  2,179  CHP: 5 5410 Gas and Coal 
WGC-2 49,827 6.94 2,338 8,695  1,834 CHP: 5 n.a. Gas and Coal 
WGC-1 46,349  6.46 1,226  9,531  2,788 CHP: 6 5,835 
Gas: 91% 
Coal: 8% 
Oil: 1% 
Enel WGC-5 43,005  5.99 6,819  8,732  n.a. CHP: 4 4,270 
Gas: 52% 
Coal: 47%  
Oil: 1% 
WGC-3 33,912  4.72 1,570  8,357  1,615  CHP: 6 7,500 
Gas: 57% 
Coal: 41% 
Oil: 2% 
WGC-6 38,857  5.41 4,350 9,052  2,704  CHP: 6 6,266 
Gas: 51.3% 
Coal: 47.7%  
Oil: 1% 
TGC-1 26,888 3.75 23,905 6,279  14,548  n.a. 9,114 
Gas: 90% 
Oil: 6% 
Coal: 4% 
Volshskaj 
TGC-7  22,548  3.14 37,495  5,851  25,946 CHP: 21  n.a. Gas: 100% 
Forum 16,600  2.31 21,800  2,785  11,862  CHP: 8 7,000 Gas: 95% Coal: 5% 
TGC-9 16,340 2.28 40,388 3,279  16,666  CHP: 21 Hydro: 2 
10,201 
 
Gas: 70% 
Coal: 30% 
TGC-13 14,236  1.98 14,451 2,518  6,988 CHP: 9 7,093 Coal and Oil 
TGC-6 13,083 1.82 16,884  3,112  10,689  CHP: 11 n.a. 
Gas: 95% 
Coal and Oil: 
5% 
TGC-4 Kvadra 12,878 1.79 26,669 3,348  12,472  CHP: 25  12,011 
Gas: 95% 
Coal and Oil: 
5% 
TGC-2 10,530  1.47 19,993 2,577  12,770 CHP: 15 n.a. n.a. 
TGC-11 9,398  1.31 15,700  2,026  8,202  CHP: 6 5,289 Coal: 51.7% Gas: 48.3% 
TGC-14 2,501  0.35 6,531  633   3,175  CHP: 7 4,857 Coal and  Oil  
Total 717,906 100 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
** CHP – combined heat and power stations.   
Source: own calculation based on companies annual reports for 2008 which are available at 
companies’ websites.  
Hydroelectric energy generation. The second most important source of electricity 
generation is hydro power, whose share accounts for 18% of total electricity generation in 
Russia (Table 5.4). The share of nuclear has slightly increased, whereas the share of 
hydroelectric has declined recently. At present, there are 102 hydroelectric stations running in 
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Russia. Russia faces a large potential to enlarge its hydroelectric generation, because it uses 
only approximately 20% of total hydro power potential. Furthermore, Russia has 
approximately 9% of the world’s hydro power resources. The main problem is a large 
distance between the main hydroelectric producers, such as Siberian and Far East regions and 
the largest consumers of energy, such as Central and South regions (Ministry of Energy, 
2011b). More than 50% of the total installed hydroelectric capacity in Russia is concentrated 
in one single company, JSC RusHydro. The government has a property share of 57.97% in the 
company’s capital stock. JSC RusHydro is the largest hydro company in Russia, which 
concentrates more than 50% of the total hydro power capacity. JSC RusHydro is the world’s 
second largest hydro-power company after Hydro Qebec with respect to the installed capacity 
(RusHydro, 2009). 
Nuclear energy generation. Another large source of electricity generation is nuclear energy. 
The nuclear energy sector is represented by a sole company, JSC Rosenergoatom. At present, 
10 nuclear stations with 31 nuclear reactors are operation in Russia, and 5 stations are under 
construction (Rosenergoatom, 2009). The production share of nuclear energy is 16% in total 
electricity generation (Table 5.4). Nuclear electric stations are mainly located in the western 
part of Russia (Ministry of Energy, 2011b). JSC Rosenergoatom and JSC RusHydro are the 
largest electricity producing companies in Russia with respect to power capacity.  
5.4.2 Demand 
The whole Russian electricity market can be divided into three regional markets: (1) 
European regional Market, (2) Siberian regional market, and (3) Non-pricing regional market. 
These regional markets are weakly interrelated with each other because of an underdeveloped 
network infrastructure. In addition, the regional markets differ significantly with respect to 
their power capacity and applied technologies of electricity generation (Ministry of Energy, 
2011b). The European regional market includes regions (okrug), the Northwest, Volga 
(Privolzhskiy), Central, South (Northern Caucasus) and Urals (Figure 5.7).  
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Figure 5.7: Map of Russian Regions 
 
Source: NSP (2010). 
European regional market. As shown in Figure 5.8, the European regional market is the 
largest electricity market in Russia in terms of electricity consumption. Its power capacity 
amounted to 72-75% of total power capacity in 2007 since the most energy intensive 
industries, such as metallurgy and mining, are concentrated in this region. Electricity 
generation stations are quite homogenously distributed within this regional market with 
different electricity generation technologies (Ministry of Energy, 2011b). The main sources of 
electricity in the European regional market are thermal energy and nuclear (Figure 5.8).  
Figure 5.8: Electricity Consumption by Region in 2007 (billion kWh) 
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Source: EFA (2009b). 
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Figure 5.9: Structure of Electricity Generation by Russian Regions in 2010* (per cent)    
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* Forecasts based on data from 2007. 
Source: EFA (2009b). 
Siberian regional market. The Siberian regional market concentrates approximately 20% of 
total power capacity. The largest source of electricity generation is hydro: for example, the 
production share of hydroelectricity was 46% of total electricity generated in 2010 (Figure 
5.9). Moreover, there is a large potential to enlarge coal and hydro power in this region. 
Thermal energy generation in the Siberian regional market is mainly represented by coal-fired 
technologies. According to the Russian Energy Strategy, it is planned to enlarge coal and 
hydro power generation in Siberia and Far East to decrease the energy dependency on natural 
gas. The Siberian regional market is relatively low interrelated with the European regional 
market because of underdeveloped infrastructure between these markets. The Siberian 
regional market as well as the European regional market have large numbers of producers and 
consumers of electricity and heat with relatively well developed network infrastructure within 
these regions (Ministry of Energy, 2011b).  
Non-pricing regional market.28 The least developed market is the Non-pricing regional 
market, which is located in the Far East region. Its power capacity amounts to about 10% of 
total power capacity. This market faces quite outdated network infrastructure, and it is almost 
not interrelated with other regional markets (Ministry of Energy, 2011b). The main sources of 
energy generation are hydro power and thermal energy (Figure 5.9). 
                                                 
28 Non-pricing markets is a direct translation from Russia. This term implies that prices of electricity are 
regulated by the government for all demand categories.  
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Domestic consumers of electricity. Industries are the largest domestic consumer of 
electricity in Russia, whose share accounted for 54.6% of total electricity consumption in 
2009, followed by households (12.4%), and losses of electricity in networks (11.3%) (FSSS, 
2010). Among industries, the most electricity intensive sector are metals, whose consumption 
shares accounted for 30.3% of total electricity consumption by industries in 2009, followed 
by extraction of oil and gas (17.7%), production and distribution of electricity (14.5%), and 
chemical products (7.5%). In addition, the share of electricity consumption by the extraction 
of oil and gas sector has considerably increased from 2005 to 2003 from 12.8% to 17.7% 
because of increased production in this sector.  
Table 5.7: Electricity Consumption by Industries (per cent) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Extraction of coal 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Extraction of oil and gas 12.8 13.7 14.5 15.2 17.7 
Minerals 5.0 5.1 5.1 4.7 4.9 
Food products 3.0 3.1 2.9 3.0 3.0 
Textile products 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.5 
Paper, publishing 3.5 3.5 3.4 4.5 3.6 
Oil products 4.2 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.8 
Chemical products 7.4 7.7 7.4 7.5 7.5 
Plastic material 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.7 
Non-metal minerals 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9 3.3 
Metals and metal products 30.9 30.8 31.1 31.1 30.3 
Machinery equipment 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.5 
Electronic equipment 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.9 
Transport equipment 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.7 
Production and distr. of electricity 17.6 16.8 15.9 13.7 14.5 
Production and distr. of water 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.8 
Others 1.1 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Own calculation based on FSSS (2010). 
In the domestic market, electricity is sold according to long-term contracts (take or pay), 
which can be either regulated or non-regulated. In the case of regulated contracts, the 
domestic prices of electricity are regulated by the Federal Tariff Services. Since January 2011 
electricity for industries is sold for non-regulated prices (Government Decree No.205 from 
April 7th, 2007), whereas domestic prices of electricity and heat for households are still 
administratively regulated. Regulated prices of electricity for households are lower than prices 
for industries. Recently, regulated prices for households were increased in order to reduce 
price differences between industries and households (Ministry of Economics, 2008). 
Moreover, electricity prices for households differ by region, where the highest prices are 
imposed in Far East and Central regions of Russia (FTS, 2011).  
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5.4.3 Challenges for Electricity Policy 
According to the Russian Energy Strategy up to 2030 (Ministry of Energy, 2009), the main 
challenges for the Russian power generation sector are summarized as follows: 
1) Development of a grid network between the regions, such as Siberia, Ural, and Centre 
to provide an effective redistribution of energy between regions. 
2) Technical and technological modernization of the power generation sector, especially 
installation of new low carbon-intensive generation technologies.  
3) Diversification of the energy balance from gas-fired to coal-fired generation since the 
electricity generation in Russia strongly depends on natural gas.  
4) Encouragement of more competition in the domestic electricity market.   
Technical modernization. One of the most important issues for the power generation sector 
as well as the whole economy is a large-scale modernization of the capital stock. 
Modernization of the power generation sector, however, is a costly and slow process. For 
instance, according to the General Plan of Power Plants Location until 2030, it is planned to 
replace approximately 51.9 GW of power plant capacity up to 2030. According to estimations 
based on company reports, however, this will take place only 26% of the planned capacity 
replacement (EFA, 2009b). According to the director of the Energy Forecasting Agency, 
Kozuchowski (2008), the technical modernization of the Russian power generation sector is 
slowed down due to economic reasons, such as high capital costs and low energy prices. 
Technical replacement could be delayed via technical reparation, especially in capital 
intensive sectors such as the power generation sector. Under current economic conditions, it is 
more economically efficient for companies to repair some old power plants than replace them. 
This is because energy inputs such as natural gas and coal products are quite cheap, whereas 
capital costs of new power generation plants are high. In addition, investment in new power 
plants implies uncertainties and high risk regarding future energy demand and prices of 
energy inputs. Slow technical modernization of the power generation sector is associated with 
high reparation costs and high demand for energy resources (Kozuchowski, 2008).  
Modernization of the power generation sector requires large financial resources. Among 
thermal power generation companies, on average more than 50% of total investment is 
financed through external investment sources such as credits, whereas other 50% are financed 
through company profits and fiscal depreciation. Hydro and nuclear power generation in 
Russia are mainly represented by two companies, which are basically state run with 
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government’s property share being more than 50% of capital stock. Therefore, investment in 
nuclear and hydro generation is mainly financed by the government (Makarov et al., 2008). 
Price regulation. Reformation of the power generation sector is an important aspect of the 
energy policy in Russia. At present, the electricity market in Russia is almost liberalized. 
Since 2011 domestic prices of electricity for industries are not regulated anymore. Moreover, 
the Russian government plans gradually to eliminate the regulation of electricity prices for 
households in the long run. According to the Long Run Project of Social and Economical 
Development in Russia, domestic prices of electricity for households will be regulated until 
2014 (Ministry of economics, 2008). Regulation of electricity prices for households leads to 
cross subsidization effects. In Russia, three kinds of cross subsidization can be distinguished: 
(1) regional cross subsidization, (2) sectoral cross subsidization and (3) cross subsidization 
between heat and electricity. The sectoral cross subsidizing effect occurs via regulation of 
electricity prices for households, whereas electricity prices for industries are not regulated. As 
a result, low electricity prices for households are indirectly “subsidized” by higher electricity 
prices for industries, which lead to overconsumption of electricity by households and 
underconsumption by industries. In addition, cross subsidization increases production costs in 
industries and, therefore, increase prices of other products. Regulation of domestic prices of 
heat also leads to a cross subsidization effect between electricity and heat so that relatively 
high prices of electricity subsidize low prices of heat. Similarly with regional cross 
subsidization, where some regions pay higher electricity prices compared to others 
(Bogdanov, 2009). An earlier liberalization of the electricity and heat market in Russia was 
politically undesirable. This is because the poorest households will be affected most adversely 
by higher electricity prices. Moreover, one can raise concerns about an oligopolistic structure 
of the electricity market (Pittman, 2006). 
Energy balance. The electricity sector is strongly reliant on natural gas, which is the main 
energy input in Russia. According to the Russian Energy Strategy up to 2030 (Ministry of 
Energy, 2009), it is planned to diversify the structure of power generation in Russia in favour 
of coal and oil via an increase in domestic prices of gas. Table 5.8 shows the projected 
structure of energy inputs used by the electricity sector up to 2030. For example, the 
consumption share of natural gas is planned to be reduced from 71% to 62% of total energy 
inputs used by the electricity sector. 
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Table 5.8: Projected Structures of Energy Inputs Used by the Electricity Generation 
Sector (per cent in total energy demand)  
  
  
1 State  2 State  3 State 
2009-2015  2015-2020  2020-2030 
Natural gas 70-71  65-66  60-62 
Coal 25-26  29-30  34-36 
Other 5-3  6-4  6-2 
Source: Ministry of Energy (2009). 
5.5 Summary of the Chapter 
The Russian economy strongly relies on energy markets. One of the main objectives of 
energy policy is to ensure an efficient and sustainable use of energy resources. As discussed 
above, the main challenge of the Russia energy sector is a large-scale modernization of 
outdated capital stock, which is one of the main reasons for high carbon/energy intensity of 
the Russian economy. Another important aspect is the structure of energy markets. Energy 
markets in Russia are far from being perfectly competitive. In particular, gas and oil markets 
are strongly oligopolized by a small number of large vertically integrated companies. For 
example, the Russian gas market is dominated by the state run company Gazprom, which has 
market power on export markets. While petroleum and coal markets are completely 
liberalized, reforming the natural gas and electricity market is still in process: domestic prices 
of electricity and natural gas are regulated by the government.      
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6 Database and Model Framework  
The theoretical literature on environmental taxation suggests that a general equilibrium 
framework is an appropriate method to analyse the economic and distributional effects of 
environmental tax reform. This is because general equilibrium models allow analysing 
various policy simulations in the presence of pre-existing distortions such as taxes and 
imperfect competition. Moreover, they provide an explicit link between output and factor 
markets. While analytical general equilibrium models are aimed at determining the key 
factors which drive the results, numerical computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are 
able to capture real-world complexities. Hence, a CGE model is employed for this analysis to 
quantify the effects of the introduction of carbon taxes in Russia under different revenue 
recycling schemes.  
Chapter 6 provides a description of the database as well as the model framework applied. The 
chapter is divided into four parts. The first part gives some summary statistics from the 
benchmark dataset in order to provide intuition for results interpretation. The parameterization 
of the model is also introduced in this part. The second part deals with adjustments of the 
database such as the database aggregation, calculation of carbon coefficients, and 
disaggregation of the power generation sectors. In the third part, the core model is described 
with respect to price and quantity system as well as production system. The last part describes 
the model modifications. 
6.1 Database  
This analysis is based on Version 7 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, 
which represents the global economy in 2004. The GTAP database describes bilateral trade, 
production, and consumption of 57 commodities and 113 regions (GTAP, 2007). The GTAP 
database does not, however, include any enterprise account, and a single private household is 
represented. For our analysis, a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Russia is extracted 
using the GAMS version of the SAM extraction program developed by McDonald and 
Thierfelder (2004).  
Furthermore, the satellite energy database for the Version 7 of the GTAP database is used to 
calculate absolute changes in energy use by industries and households. The energy database 
provides information on sectoral and household energy consumption measured in million tons 
of oil equivalent (Mtoe). The changes in sectoral demand for energy are calculated by 
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multiplying the initial level of energy consumption with relative changes in energy demand 
resulting from policy simulations. To calculate the carbon dioxide coefficients, the satellite 
emission database for the Version 7 of the database (Lee, 2008) is used, which measures 
carbon dioxide emissions in Giga gram (Gg).  
6.1.1 Overview of the Database  
6.1.1.1 Energy Consumption  
Sectoral effects of carbon taxes strongly depend on energy as well as factor intensity of 
industries. Table 6.1 shows the cost structure of industries as well as trade shares. According 
to Version 7 of the GTAP database (2007), the most energy intensive sectors are the 
petroleum products sector in terms of high consumption of crude oil, and the electricity sector 
in terms of high consumption of gas, coal, and petroleum products. For example, the share of 
energy costs in production of petroleum products accounts for 90.9% of total production costs 
and for the electricity sector it is 72.3%. Apart from energy sectors, other energy intensive 
sectors are wood products, whose share of energy costs accounts for 47.4% of total 
production costs, followed by chemical products (37.6%), transports (25.3%), and metals 
(21%). These sectors are mainly energy intensive in terms of high consumption of electricity. 
The most capital intensive sectors are trade commodities, whose share of capital costs 
accounts for 61.4% of total production costs, followed by private services (36.3%), crude oil 
(36.5%), minerals (29.5%), and construction (28.1%). The most labour intensive sectors are 
public services, whose share of labour costs accounts for 53.4% of total production costs, 
followed by agriculture (45.6%), water (39.5%), coal (38.7%), gas manufacture (37.2%), and 
machinery equipment (29.3%). 
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Table 6.1: Shares in Production Costs and Trade Shares (per cent)  
 Production cost shares  Trade shares 
 Energy share Capital sharea Labour share Intermediate share  Import share Export share 
Coal 10.2 24.8 18.6 47.2  16.3 38.8 
Crude oil 2.4 60.9 6.8 29.8  1.0 52.6 
Natural gas 6.6 33.5 5.8 54.5  2.7 15.1 
Petroleum products 90.9 4.9 1.2 2.9  0.4 20.8 
Gas manufacturing 9.5 16.0 37.2 37.9  0.1 20.1 
Electricity 72.3 8.0 5.6 14.0  1.0 0.9 
Wood products 47.4 3.1 11.5 38.3  43.3 40.5 
Chemical products 37.6 8.3 10.5 43.6  45.5 44.8 
Mineral products 20.8 10.1 20.4 49.0  18.4 6.0 
Metals 20.9 16.8 9.5 52.5  13.8 51.3 
Metal products 10.6 7.3 22.8 59.7  35.9 18.2 
Electronic equipment 14.3 8.6 12.1 65.1  80.4 18.0 
Transports 25.3 21.5 19.2 34.0  11.9 15.7 
Machinery equipment 8.1 8.6 29.3 54.4  40.3 14.5 
Water 15.6 13.6 39.5 32.0  0.6 0.5 
Agriculture 6.2 23.3 31.3 40.1  10.2 7.1 
Food products 4.6 13.6 8.6 73.1  21.9 8.3 
Construction 1.5 27.9 21.8 48.6  4.4 2.0 
Trade 1.1 60.1 8.0 29.4  1.7 0.8 
Transport equipment  0.05 5.0 11.7 83.4  48.7 25.0 
Private services 4.9 36.0 25.2 33.6  13.5 6.7 
Public services 3.2 10.9 53.4 33.6  3.0 0.5 
Minerals  0.2 36.3 19.2 44.3  16.4 31.3 
Textiles 5.8 8.6 19.1 66.9  62.7 18.4 
Paper products 0.7 20.8 9.8 68.4  36.6 28.2 
a The capital share includes cost on natural resources and land.  
Source: Own calculations based on Version 7 of the GTAP database. 
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6.1.1.2 CO2 Emissions and Energy Consumption  
Table 6.2 shows data on CO2 emissions by industries and the representative household. 
According to the database, over half (55.1%) of CO2 emissions in Russia comes from the 
electricity sector. Out of this total, 32.3%, 42.2% and 17.4% stem from the coal, natural gas 
and gas manufacture, respectively. Other important sources of CO2 emissions are the 
household (14.1%) and the transport sector (13.2%). According Lee (2008), the largest source 
of CO2 emissions in Russia is the use of natural gas with a share of 33.8% of total CO2 
emissions, followed by petroleum products (23.0%), gas manufacture (22.5%), coal (20.0%), 
and crude oil (0.7%).   
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Table 6.2: Sources of Carbon Dioxide Emissions  
 
CO2 emissions  Per cent of total CO2 by sectors 
Giga gram Per cent of total CO2 emission 
 Coal Crude oil Natural gas Petroleum products 
Gas 
manufacture 
Coal 1647 0.1  99.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Crude oil 17276 1.1  0.0 25.1 56.3 4.4 14.2 
Natural gas 25272 1.6  0.0 8.7 88.8 2.3 0.2 
Petroleum products  23431 1.5  n.a.a) n.a. 88.6 n.a. 11.4 
Gas manufacture 1257 0.1  0.9 8.2 n.a. 20.1 70.8 
Electricity  855234 55.1  32.3 0.3 42.2 7.8 17.4 
Wood products 1736 0.1  1.4 0.1 0.0 97.5 1.0 
Chemical products 34276 2.2  0.1 0.0 11.4 65.0 23.5 
Mineral products 21071 1.4  8.2 0.0 61.4 10.2 20.2 
Metals  61806 4.0  7.9 0.4 38.4 31.8 21.6 
Metal products 1821 0.1  1.4 0.1 17.5 56.4 24.6 
Electronic equipment 625 0.0  0.9 0.1 0.0 76.9 22.2 
Transports 204781 13.2  0.1 0.1 27.1 57.6 15.2 
Machinery equipment  4979 0.3  3.8 0.1 39.9 10.9 45.2 
Water 1315 0.1  23.1 0.0 0.4 73.5 3.1 
Agriculture 16348 1.1  2.9 0.2 6.0 89.1 1.8 
Food products 5829 0.4  9.0 0.2 17.1 49.2 24.4 
Construction 4103 0.3  2.8 1.9 3.2 74.9 17.3 
Trade products 9150 0.6  10.8 0.0 6.5 74.4 8.3 
Transport equipment  69 0.0  8.0 3.9 31.5 8.4 48.1 
Private services 24014 1.5  2.0 0.6 5.1 84.5 7.8 
Public services 15604 1.0  19.9 0.0 6.1 39.6 34.4 
Minerals  104 0.0  1.6 4.1 30.0 51.6 12.7 
Textiles  267 0.0  13.1 1.5 16.1 13.6 55.7 
Paper products 934 0.1  0.7 0.1 26.4 3.0 69.8 
Household 219520 14.1  8.8 0.0 3.6 31.1 56.5 
Total  1552470 100  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
a) n.a. states for non available, which means no CO2 emissions are recorded. Source: Own calculation based on Lee (2008). 
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Table 6.3 shows the shares of energy consumption by various demand categories. Domestic 
energy markets in Russia are mainly served by domestic producers. For example, the share of 
domestically produced coal accounts for 83.7% of total domestic consumption of coal, 
whereas the domestic shares of other energy commodities are considerably larger compared to 
that of coal – more than 97% of total domestic consumption. The electricity sector is the 
largest domestic consumer of coal, natural gas, and gas manufacture as well as one of the 
largest consumers of petroleum products. For example, the electricity sector consumes about 
65.3% of total domestically sold coal, 68% of natural gas, 42.2% of gas manufacture, and 
18.9% of petroleum products. The largest domestic consumer of crude oil is the petroleum 
products sector with a share of 97.8% of total domestic consumption of crude oil. 
Table 6.3: Value Shares of Energy Consumption (per cent) 
 Coal Crude oil Natural gas 
Petroleum 
products 
Gas 
manufac. Electricity 
Domestic shares 83.69 98.75 97.32 99.64 99.91 98.97 
Coal 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.05 
Crude oil 0.00 0.93 1.22 0.15 0.69 2.11 
Natural gas 0.00 0.47 2.81 0.11 0.01 0.75 
Petroleum products 23.15 97.82 2.60 14.42 0.75 3.12 
Gas manufacturing 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.05 0.25 1.65 
Electricity 65.31 0.61 68.04 18.94 42.24 2.67 
Wood products 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00 3.77 
Chemical products 0.01 0.00 6.43 6.66 2.29 9.07 
Mineral products 0.41 0.00 2.89 0.45 1.22 1.61 
Metals 1.16 0.05 4.74 4.15 3.83 13.50 
Metal products 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.89 
Electronic equipment  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.43 
Machinery equipment 0.04 0.00 0.44 0.11 0.65 4.93 
Water 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.01 1.55 
Transports  0.05 0.03 8.66 24.91 8.99 4.58 
Agricultural products 0.11 0.01 0.20 3.08 0.09 2.42 
Food products 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.61 0.41 3.13 
Construction 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.65 0.20 1.11 
Trade products 0.23 0.00 0.08 1.44 0.22 1.15 
Transport equipment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Private services 0.16 0.03 0.21 4.28 0.58 2.07 
Public services 1.19 0.00 0.20 1.30 1.74 3.49 
Minerals 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Textiles 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.70 
Paper products 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.19 0.03 
Households 7.53 0.00 1.00 17.79 35.43 34.19 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Own calculation based on Version 7 of GTAP database (2007). 
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6.1.1.3 Tax Rates 
The database provides information on the main policy instruments, such as trade taxes, 
consumption taxes, taxes on factor income, and taxes on factor use. Consumption taxes 
include value added taxes and excise taxes. Taxes on factor income are taxes on income from 
capital, labour, land and natural resources. Capital taxes include corporate income taxes, taxes 
on interest from bank deposits and dividends. Social security contributions are represented by 
taxes on labour use, which are paid by industries.  
6.1.1.4 Parameterization 
Table 6.4 summarises elasticities of substitution between import and domestically products 
commodities (Armington elasticities), elasticities of transformation between export and 
domestic supply (CET elasticities), and elasticities of substitution among primary factors.   
Table 6.4: Armington Elasticities, CET Elasticities and Elasticities of Substitution 
 
Armington 
elasticities CET elasticities 
Elasticities of 
substitution among 
primary factors 
Coal 1.52 2.90 0.20 
Crude oil 2.60 2.90 0.20 
Natural gas 8.60 2.90 0.20 
Petroleum products 1.05 2.90 1.26 
Gas manufacturing 1.40 2.90 1.26 
Electricity 1.40 2.90 1.26 
Wood products 1.70 2.00 1.26 
Chemical products 1.65 2.00 1.26 
Mineral products 1.45 2.00 1.26 
Metals  1.79 2.00 1.26 
Metal products 1.87 2.00 1.26 
Electronic equipment 2.65 2.00 1.26 
Transports 0.95 2.00 1.57 
Machinery equipment  1.95 2.00 1.26 
Water 1.40 2.00 1.26 
Agricultural products 1.45 1.50 0.22 
Food products 1.48 1.50 1.12 
Construction 2.53 2.00 1.40 
Trade products 0.95 2.00 1.68 
Transport equipment 1.78 2.00 1.26 
Private services 0.59 2.00 1.26 
Public services 0.95 2.00 1.26 
Minerals  0.45 2.00 0.20 
Textiles  1.36 2.00 1.26 
Paper products 1.48 2.00 1.26 
Armington elasticities. Armington elasticities in the GTAP database are not country specific. 
To our knowledge, empirical estimations on Armington elasticities for Russia are scarce. 
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Probably, this is because of structural changes in the Russian economy in 90ies resulting from 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. This makes empirical estimations difficult because of a lack 
of appropriate time series. There are, however, some estimates of Armington elasticities for 
several commodities for Russia. For example, Ivanova (2005) estimated the Armington 
elasticities for textiles, clothing, footwear, furniture, electric household appliances, vehicles, 
and construction materials. Zemnitsky (2002) provides an estimation of the Armington 
elasticity for private services in Russia. Therefore, these estimated values are taken; otherwise 
elasticities are taken from the Version 7 of the GTAP database.         
CET elasticities. Elasticities of transformation (CET elasticities) are taken from Wehrheim 
(2003). His CET elasticities are not specific for Russia, but they are based on empirical 
estimations carried out by Faini (1998) as well as elasticities used in other CGE models for 
other middle income countries (Banse, 1997; Weyerbrock, 1998; Wiebelt, 1996). The values 
of CET elasticities used in our analysis are the following: energy sectors (2.9), industries 
(2.0), and the agricultural and food sectors (1.5). 
Elasticities of substitution. Elasticities of substitution used in production nesting structures 
are reported in Table 6.5. For example, elasticities of substitution between primary factors are 
taken from Version 7 of the GTAP database (Table 6.4), for more detail regarding the 
implemented nesting structures see Chapter 8.   
Table 6.5: Elasticities of Substitution 
 Non-energy Energy Alternate Non-energy 
Xσ  (the elasticity of substitution between the 
value added-energy aggregate and intermediate) 
0.5 0.5 0.5 
VAEσ  (the elasticity of substitution between the 
labour aggregate and the value added-energy 
aggregate) 
GTAP GTAP GTAP 
VLLσ (the elasticity of substitution between 
primary factors such as labour, land and natural 
resources) 
GTAP GTAP GTAP 
VKEσ  (the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and the energy aggregate) 
0.5 0.0 0.0 or 0.5 
VEσ  (the elasticity of substitution between 
electricity and the non-electricity aggregate) 
1.0 0.0 0.0 or 0.5 
VNELσ (the elasticity of substitution between coal 
and the non-coal aggregate) 
0.5 n.a. n.a. 
VNCOσ (the elasticity of substitution within the 
non-coal aggregate) 
1.0 n.a. n.a. 
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6.1.2 Adjustments of the Database  
6.1.2.1 Sectoral Aggregation of the Database  
57 activities are aggregated into 25 activities. The extracted SAM for Russia represents single 
product activities. Therefore, the mapping for commodities is equivalent to the mapping for 
activities, i.e., 57 commodities are aggregated into 25 commodities. Table 6.6 shows the map 
between the base accounts of the GTAP database and the aggregated accounts for the Russian 
SAM.     
Table 6.6: Mapping from the GTAP Accounts to the Aggregated Accounts in the SAM  
Base 
accounts Description of the Base Accounts 
Aggregated 
Accounts 
Description of the Aggregated 
Accounts 
pdr Paddy rice  agric Agriculture 
wht Wheat agric Agriculture 
gro Cereal grains nec* agric Agriculture 
v_f Vegetables fruit nuts agric Agriculture 
osd Oil seeds agric Agriculture 
c_b Sugar cane sugar beet agric Agriculture 
pfb Plant based fibers  agric Agriculture 
ocr Crops nec agric Agriculture 
ctl Bovine cattle sheep and goats horses  agric Agriculture 
oap Animal products nec agric Agriculture 
rmk Raw milk  agric Agriculture 
wol Wool silk worm cocoons  agric Agriculture 
frs Forestry  agric Agriculture 
fsh Fishing agric Agriculture 
coa Coal  coa Coal 
oil Oil oil Oil 
gas Gas gas Gas 
omn Minerals nec  min Minerals nec 
cmt Bovine cattle sheep and goat horse meat prods food Food products 
omt Meat products nec food Food products 
vol Vegetable oils and fats food Food products 
mil Dairy products  food Food products 
pcr Processed rice  food Food products 
sgr Sugar food Food products 
ofd Food products nec food Food products 
b_t Beverages and tobacco products  food Food products 
tex Textiles  tex Textiles 
wap Wearing apparel tex Textiles 
lea Leather products  tex Textiles 
lum Wood products wood Wood products 
ppp Paper products, publishing ppp Paper products 
p_c Petroleum, coal products p_c Petroleum products 
crp Chemical, rubber, plastic products  crp Chemical, rubber, plastic products 
nmm Mineral products nec  minp Mineral products 
i_s Ferrous metals  metl Metals 
nfm Metals nec  metl Metals  
fmp Metal products  metlp Metal products 
  108 
mvh Motor vehicles and parts  transe Transport equipment  
otn Transport equipment nec transe Transport equipment 
ele Electronic equipment  ele Electronic equipment 
ome Machinery and equipment nec mache Machinery and equipment 
omf Manufactures nec  mache Machinery and equipment 
ely Electricity ely Electricity 
gdt Gas manufacture, distribution  gdt Gas manufacture  
wtr Water wtr Water 
cns Construction  cns Construction 
trd Trade trad Trade 
otp Transport nec trans Transports 
wtp Sea transport trans Transports 
atp Air transport trans Transports 
cmn Communication trans Transports 
ofi Financial services nec  servp Private services 
isr Insurance servp Private services 
obs Business services nec servp Private services 
ros Recreation and other services servp Private services 
osg PubAdmin, defense, health, educat  servg Public services  
dwe Dwellings servg Public services 
* nec – not elsewhere classified.  
Sources: Own compilation.  
For example, all agricultural and food products in the GTAP database are aggregated into two 
single groups: “Agriculture” and “Food products”. All transport sectors such as “Sea 
transport”, “Air transport”, “Transport nec” and “Communication” are aggregated into a 
single sector “Transports”. All services are aggregated into two groups namely “Private 
services” and “Public services”. The private services sector in the aggregated SAM for Russia 
includes “Financial services nec”, “Insurance”, “Business services nec”, and “Recreation 
services nec”, whereas the public services sector includes “Public Administration, Defence, 
Health, Education”, and “Dwellings”.  
6.1.2.2 Calculation of CO2 Coefficients 
Carbon taxes are imposed on the use of energy inputs by industries and households according 
to their CO2 coefficients, which are determined by carbon intensity and energy prices. CO2 
coefficients are calculated based on the GTAP emission database (Lee, 2008), by dividing the 
CO2 emission of a certain energy product (measured in Giga gram) by the value recorded in 
the GTAP database (measured in million USD). Table 6.7 shows the calculated CO2 
coefficients for energy inputs.      
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Table 6.7: CO2 Coefficients (giga gram per million USD) 
 Coal Crude oil Natural gas Petroleum products 
Gas 
manufacture 
Coal 87.3 12.9 39.1 10.6 35.6 
Crude oil 87.3 12.9 39.2 10.6 35.7 
Natural gas 85.4 12.9 39.2 10.6 35.8 
Petroleum products n.a. n.a. 39.2 n.a. 35.7 
Gas manufacture 86.8 12.8 n.a. 10.6 35.8 
Electricity 85.8 12.9 26.1 7.3 35.5 
Wood products  87.4 13.0 37.6 9.8 35.4 
Chemical products 87.6 13.0 3.0 6.9 35.4 
Mineral products  84.9 13.0 22.0 9.8 35.2 
Metals 85.0 12.9 24.6 9.8 35.0 
Metal products  87.3 13.0 27.0 9.8 35.1 
Electronic equipment 87.3 13.0 39.2 9.8 35.1 
Transports  85.6 12.9 31.5 9.8 34.8 
Machinery equipment  87.4 13.0 22.4 9.8 35.0 
Water 71.1 12.7 39.1 9.8 34.4 
Agriculture  84.1 12.9 23.9 9.8 35.2 
Food products 86.8 13.0 37.2 9.8 35.2 
Construction  87.4 12.9 39.0 9.8 35.2 
Trade products 87.4 12.7 39.0 9.8 35.0 
Transport equipment  87.9 13.0 39.0 10.6 35.6 
Private services 60.8 12.9 29.1 9.8 32.7 
Public services 53.0 12.9 23.6 9.8 31.1 
Minerals 87.8 12.9 39.2 10.6 35.7 
Textiles  87.4 12.9 38.9 10.6 35.0 
Paper products  87.8 13.0 28.1 10.6 35.2 
Household  52.2 12.5 38.8 8.0 35.3 
Source: Own calculation based on Lee (2008) and Version 7 of the GTAP database. 
CO2 coefficients of coal, crude oil, and petroleum products used by the petroleum sector equal 
zero. The same assumption is made for natural gas used by gas manufacture. Coal has the 
largest CO2 coefficient because of its high carbon intensity. While crude oil and petroleum 
products are more carbon intensive energy inputs compared to natural gas and gas 
manufacture, the CO2 coefficients for crude oil and petroleum products are lower than those 
for gas. The reason for this is that the CO2 coefficients are calculated at values, where 
domestic prices of gas have been quite low due to administrative regulation. Hence, relative 
increases in prices of energy inputs differ not only due to differences in carbon intensity, but 
also due to differences in the initial prices of energy (e.g. Hoeller and Wallin, 1991).   
6.1.2.3 Adjustment of Factor Demand by the Petroleum Sector 
For some of the simulations, a Cournot oligopoly in markets for natural gas, metals, minerals, 
chemical products, and petroleum products is assumed. Cournot oligopoly is based on internal 
economies of scale due to fixed costs. Fixed costs are extracted from the labour and capital 
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account. In other words, a part of labour and capital costs is assumed to be fixed costs, which 
do not vary with the production level. The petroleum product sector, however, has a quite 
small share of capital and labour costs. For example, the total factor cost of the petroleum 
sector does not exceed 10% of total production costs, as shown in Table 6.1. Therefore, 20% 
of capital and labour demand is moved from the oil sector to the petroleum sector, by using 
equations 6.1.1 to 6.1.4. Such adjustment of factor demand in the petroleum sector does not 
destroy the balance of the SAM.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.1.1)  aoilfcapfcapf SAMSAMSAM ,_,_, *20.0+=  
(6.1.2)  ∑−=
f
aoilfcoilaoilcoilaoil SAMSAMSAM ,,, *20.0  
(6.1.3)  ∑−=
f
aoilfcapcoilcapcoil SAMSAMSAM ,_,_, *20.0  
(6.1.4)  aoilfaoilf SAMSAM ,, *)20.01( −=   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The GTAP database distinguishes between two sectors namely “Oil” and “Petroleum, coal 
products” sector. The petroleum sector is the largest domestic consumer of crude oil, whose 
consumption share accounts for 90.9% of the total domestic demand for crude oil. Such 
adjustment of the database is justified from this point of view that the Russian oil sector is 
mainly represented by ten vertically integrated companies, which are dealing with extraction, 
processing, and transportation of crude oil and oil products. 
6.1.2.4 Extraction of Fixed Costs 
Following Harris (1984) and Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) in order to incorporate a Cournot 
oligopoly with internal economies of scale, a part of capital and labour cost is assumed to be 
fixed. Therefore, additional accounts for fixed factors and taxes on fixed factors are 
incorporated into the SAM. Fixed costs and taxes on fixed factors are defined by equations 
(6.1.5) to (6.1.12). For example, equation (6.1.5) and (6.1.6) defines the total fixed costs 
( aFCvalSAM , ) and taxes on fixed factors ( aFCtaxSAM , ), respectively, where aCDR is a cost 
disadvantage ratio that is assumed to equal 15%, aTotalSAM ,  is total production costs, and 
ashval  is the average tax on factor use.      
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.1.5)  ( )a
aTotala
aFCval shval
SAMCDR
SAM
+
=
1
* ,
,  
(6.1.6)  aFCvalaaFCtax SAMshvalSAM ,, *=  
(6.1.7)  
∑
=
ffxf
af
aFCval
a SAM
SAM
shfix
$
,
,    
(6.1.8)  ∑=
airtsa
aFCvalFCvalhous SAMSAM
$
,,  
(6.1.9)  ∑−=
airtsa
afafhousfhous SAMshfixSAMSAM
$
,,, *   
(6.1.10) ∑=
a
aFCtaxFCtaxgovt SAMSAM ,,  
(6.1.11) ∑−=
a
atffatffgovttffgovt SAMshfixSAMSAM ,,, *  
(6.1.12) afaafaf SAMshfixSAMSAM ,,, *−=   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The single household receives income from the fixed factor (equation 6.1.8), whereas the 
initial income from variable factors is reduced by the amount of fixed costs (equation 6.1.9). 
The government receives income from taxes on fixed factors (equation 6.1.10), while the 
initial income from taxes on variable factors is reduced by taxes on fixed factors (equation 
6.1.11). Finally, factor demand of imperfectly competitive sectors is reduced by fixed costs, 
as given in equation 6.1.12. 
6.1.2.5 Disaggregation of the Power Generation Sector 
As discussed in Section 5.4, thermal energy is the largest source of power generation, whose 
share accounts for 66% of total electricity generation in Russia (EIA, 2011a). The main fuel 
inputs of thermal energy generation are natural gas and coal. In 2009 the share of natural gas 
in the total demand for energy inputs amounted to 70.1%, followed by coal (27.8%), oil (2%), 
and other (0.1%) (EFA, 2009a). The SAM for Russia that is extracted from the GTAP 
database does not distinguish among different power generation technologies. Therefore, the 
electricity sector is disaggregated into four sectors, which represent the corresponding power 
generation technologies: gas-fired, coal-fired, hydro, and nuclear. Disaggregation of the 
power generation sector is based on output shares and coefficients of relative factor 
intensities. Output shares define how much energy is produced from a certain technology with 
respect to total power generation. For example, output from gas-fired technologies accounts 
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for 40% of total power generation, coal-fired technologies (26%), hydro (18%), and nuclear 
(16%), as illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: Output Shares of Power Generation Technologies (per cent) 
 
Source: Own compilation. 
Due to lack of information, all intermediate costs are distributed among technologies 
according to the output shares, i.e., the technologies are assumed to have the same intensity 
with respect to the use of intermediates. Energy inputs such as coal, crude oil, natural gas, gas 
manufacture and petroleum products are distributed through a certain technology. For 
example, gas-fired technologies require natural gas, gas manufacture and electricity for power 
generation. Coal-fired technologies require crude oil, coal, petroleum products, and 
electricity. Nuclear and hydro technologies require only electricity. Moreover, the electricity 
intensity is assumed to be the same among all power generation technologies, i.e., electricity 
costs are distributed among the technologies according the output shares. Power generation 
technologies differ with respect to their performance and factor intensity. For example as 
shown in Table 6.8, nuclear technologies are more capital intensive compared to coal-fired 
and gas-fired technologies.    
Table 6.8: Costs and Performance Data of Generation Technologies and CO2 Emissions      
 Capital 
(USD/kW) 
Coal CPP (USC) 2100 
Nuclear 2600 
Combined cycle 
CHP (gas) 1380 
Source: Veselov et al.  (2010).   
To calculate the coefficients of relative capital intensity, capital cost per kW of nuclear 
technologies are divided by capital costs of each technology. Nuclear technology is selected 
as a reference technology because of the largest capital cost. Due to lack of information, it is 
Hydro 18 
Nuclear 16 
Gas-fired 40 
Coal-fired 26 
Electricity 
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assumed that labour intensity would be the same among all technologies. Moreover, the 
capital and labour intensity of hydro technologies is assumed to be the same as the capital and 
labour intensity of nuclear technologies. Table 6.9 shows the coefficients of relative factor 
intensity. For example, the coefficients of labour intensity equal unity among all technologies. 
The coefficient of capital intensity of coal-fired technologies equals 1.24 and for gas-fired 
technologies it is 1.88. This means that coal-fired and gas-fired technologies are by 24% and 
88% less capital intensive compared to nuclear and hydro technologies. 29  
Table 6.9: Coefficients of Relative Factor Intensity 
Factors Gas-fired Coal-fired Hydro Nuclear 
Unskilled Labour 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Skilled Labour 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Capital 1.88 1.24 1.00 1.00 
Source: Own compilation.  
Using the output shares (Figure 6.1) and the coefficients of relative factor intensity (Table 
6.9), the share parameters for distribution of factor costs are calculated as follows:  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.1.13) ;
)(
),(*),(
)(
),(*),(
)(
),(*),(
)(
),(*),(
hshh
hfshfdhfkf
nshqx
nfshfdnfkf
cshqx
cfshfdcfkf
gshqx
gfshfdgfkf ===  
(6.1.14) 1),(),(),(),( =+++ hfshfdnfshfdcfshfdgfshfd ; 
where ,*)( fshfd are share parameters for distribution of factor costs among gas-fired, coal,                                        
                            nuclear, and hydro power generation technologies; 
(*)shqx  are output shares of gas-fired, coal-fired, nuclear, and hydro power generation                  
                          technologies; 
,*)( fkf are coefficients of relative factor intensity among gas-fired, coal-fired, 
              nuclear, and hydro power generation technologies; 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Equation (6.1.13) equalizes the share parameters for distribution of factor costs ( shfd ), which 
are weighted by the output shares ( shqx ) and multiplied by the coefficients of relative factor 
intensity ( kf ). Equation (6.1.14) ensures that the sum over all share parameters ( shfd ) equals 
unity. These two equations can be solved either in GAMS or in Excel by using Solver 
command. Finally, the calculated share parameters ( shfd ) are used for calibration of the 
model with respect to the electricity sector. The share parameters are multiplied by production 
costs of the electricity sector to obtain production costs of a certain technology. Using this 
                                                 
29 Since the capital cost of nuclear technologies is divided by the capital cost of other technologies, the 
interpretation of coefficient of relative capital intensity is as follows. The larger is the coefficient of capital 
intensity, the less capital intensive is the technology.   
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approach, intermediate and factor costs are distributed among the power generation 
technologies, where the SAM remains balanced. 
6.1.2.6 Adjustment of the Export Tax Rate on Natural Gas 
According to the GTAP database, the export tax rate on natural gas is approximately 82%, yet 
according to the Russian Tax Code, the export tax rate is only 30%. The problem is that 
introducing carbon taxes leads to an increase in export supply of natural gas, resulting in 
higher revenues from the export tax, such that the unrealistic value in the original GTAP 
database may distort the results. Therefore, the export tax rate is reduced from 82% to 30%. 
Table 6.10 shows how the SAM for Russia has been adjusted to achieve an export tax rate on 
natural gas equalling 30%.   
Table 6.10: Adjustment of the Export Tax Rate on Natural Gas 
 Natural gas Capital Government Export tax ROW 
Natural gas     (6.1.15) 
Capital   (6.1.17)  (6.1.16) 
Government    (6.1.18)  
Export tax (6.1.19)     
Source: Own compilation. 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.1.15)  gastaxrowgasrowgas SAMadjSAMSAM ,exp,, *−=  
(6.1.16)  gastaxrowgasrowkap SAMadjSAMSAM ,exp,, *+=  
(6.1.17)  gastaxrowgasgovtkap SAMadjSAMSAM ,exp,, *−=  
(6.1.18)  gastaxtaxgastaxgovt SAMadjSAMSAM ,expexp,exp, *−=  
(6.1.19)  gastaxgastaxgastax SAMadjSAMSAM ,exp,exp,exp *−=  
where adj is an adjustment parameter which is manually defined to achieve the export tax rate  
            equalling 30%. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
6.1.3 Estimation of Distributional Effects 
The issue of income equity is of high relevance for Russia since income inequality is high: the 
Gini coefficient of income distribution was 0.42 in 2009 (FSSS, 2011). Our CGE analysis, 
however, is based on a database which includes only one representative household. To assess 
the impact of carbon taxes on income equity, a simple micro-accounting approach is used. 
Micro-data are taken from a Russian Household Budget Survey (FSSS, 2009) as well as 
Rutherford et al. (2005). Figure 6.2 illustrates the income and expenditure shares by ten 
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deciles of overall income and consumption expenditure in 2009. For example, the poorest 
household group (decile1) spends 3.2% of overall consumption expenditure by all deciles, 
whereas for the richest household group (decile 10) the share is 24.3%.         
Figure 6.2: Shares of Income and Consumption Expenditure by Decile in Total in 2009 
(per cent) 
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Source: FSSS (2009). 
Furthermore, the Russian Household Budget Survey (FSSS, 2009) provides also data on the 
expenditure shares on certain commodities consumed by decile. As shown in Table 6.11, the 
consumption share of food products and energy by poor household groups is larger compared 
to that by rich households. In contrast, rich households spend more on consumption of 
transport as well as electronic equipment and catering. 
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Table 6.11: Household Consumption Shares by Deciles (per cent) 
  Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10 
Food products 48.6 45.7 43.7 41.9 39.5 35.3 31.7 28.2 26.3 19.1 
Alcohol and tobacco 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.0 
Textiles 8.2 9 9.7 9.9 10.3 11.1 12.2 12.7 10.9 8.5 
Housing (reparation and keeping) 0.6 0.8 0.9 1 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.1 2.7 2.9 
Water supply (service) and utilities 5.6 5.1 4.7 4.3 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.5 2.2 1.8 
Electricity, gas and fuels  10.0 9 8.4 7.7 7 5.8 4.9 4.1 3.9 2.8 
Electronic equipment, household 
goods 2.9 3.5 4.1 4.5 5.2 6.7 6.6 8.1 10.7 7.4 
Health services 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.6 3.4 3.1 3.5 2.8 
Transport equipment 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.5 3.3 20.7 
Exploitation of transport equipment  1.5 2.3 2.7 3.4 3.8 4.5 4.7 5.4 5.1 4.6 
Transport services 3.8 4 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.4 3.1 3 3 2.4 
Communication 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.1 3.5 2.7 
Holidays and social events 2.7 3.1 3.5 4.3 5 6.4 8.2 9 8.8 8.7 
Education  0.6 1 1.3 1.5 1.7 2 2.3 2.3 1.6 0.8 
Catering 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.4 3.2 3.4 4.3 5.3 
Other goods and services 5.4 5.7 5.7 6.2 6.4 6.6 7.7 8.2 7.7 7.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: FSSS (2009). 
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The Russian Household Budget Survey does not provide data on consumption shares of 
certain energy commodities consumed by households as well as factor income shares. 
Therefore, the estimated shares provided by Rutherford et al. (2005) are used. As shown in 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4, the consumption shares of coal, electricity and gas by poor households 
are larger compared to those by rich households. In contrast, rich household groups (decile 
10) spend more on consumption of petroleum products relative to poor households. The 
intuitive explanation behind this is that poor households cannot afford a car so that they use 
more public transport. 
Figure 6.3: Shares of Consumption Expenditures by Urban Deciles (per cent)  
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Source: Rutherford et al. (2005). 
Figure 6.4: Shares of Consumption Expenditures by Rural Deciles (per cent) 
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Figure 6.5 illustrates the factor income shares by deciles. For example, the income share of 
unskilled labour by the poorest household group (decile 1) accounts for 41% of total factor 
income, whereas by the richest household group (decile 10) it is 11%. The main income 
source of all deciles is skilled labour, whose income share varies among household groups 
with being more pronounced by the middle-income household groups. The income share of 
capital is especially large for rich deciles: for example, 42% of total factor income of the 
richest household group comes from capital, whereas for the poorest household group capital 
accounts for only 2%.  
Figure 6.5: Factor Income Shares by Consumption Deciles (per cent) 
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Source: Rutherford et al. (2004).30 
Using factor income shares and consumption expenditures shares, factor income and 
consumption expenditures are distributed in the macro-data (SAM for Russia) among ten 
deciles, where each decile represents ten per cent of the population ranked according to 
income. Subsequently, factor income and consumption expenditure categories are multiplied 
by relative changes in factor and commodity prices, respectively, i.e. price changes are 
weighted by the base period composition of expenditures and factor income.31 
6.2 Model Framework   
In this study, the effects of carbon taxes on the Russian economy are analyzed by using a 
computable comparative static single-country multy-sector general equilibrium model. The 
use of CGE models has become one of the powerful tools to analyse policy implications since 
                                                 
30 Rutherford et al. (2004) provide also data on factor income shares by rural and urban households.  
31 Due to lack of information, changes in savings and lump-sum transfers are not taken into account.  
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this can cover different fields simultaneously: structural adjustment, international trade, public 
finance, income distribution, and energy and environmental policy (Devarajan and Robinson, 
2002). CGE models are widely used for evaluation of environmental and energy related 
policies such as carbon leakage, carbon trading, and double dividend (Bergman, 2005). One 
of the main advantages of CGE models is that they allow capturing interrelations between 
product and factor markets. Indirect effects arising from factor markets can have a substantial 
impact on results (Parry and Oates, 2000). Moreover, using a general equilibrium model 
allows analysing effects of a tax policy in the presence of pre-existing distortions such as 
taxes and imperfect competition.  
6.2.1 Numerical Model: Core Model   
The model is a modified version of the comparative static “STAGE” model (McDonald, 
2007). The STAGE model is a member of the class of computable-general equilibrium (CGE) 
models descended from the model described by Dervis et al. (1984) and more specifically the 
USDA ERS model (Robinson et al., 1990; and Kilkenny, 1991). The model is a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) based single-country CGE model, which is implemented in 
General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) software. 
6.2.1.1 Quantity System   
Figure 6.6 illustrates the quantity system in the standard version of the STAGE model. On the 
supply side, the domestically produced commodities (QXCc) are distributed between export 
(QEc) and domestic markets (QDc) under the assumption of imperfect transformation. The 
imperfect transformation between export and domestic supply is described by a Constant 
Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. Elasticities of transformation are introduced in 
Table 6.4. Furthermore, the country in question can also be modelled as a large economy with 
respect to certain markets, using an export demand function: 
 
ceta
c
c
cc pwse
PWE
econQE
−






= * ,         ∀c∈ced(c) 
where QE is export demand, econ is a constant in the export demand, PWE is the world price 
of export from the rest of the world (ROW), pswe is the world price of export from the ROW, 
eta is elasticities of export demand, and ced is the sub-set for export commodities with an 
export demand function.  
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Figure 6.6: Quantity System in the Standard Version of the STAGE Model 
 
Source: McDonald (2007).   
The composite commodities (QQc) are defined as the composites of the domestically 
produced commodities (QDc) and the import commodities (QMc) which are treated as 
imperfect substitutes. Hence, intra-industrial trade flows can be covered in the model. The 
imperfect substitution between imported and domestically produced commodities is 
incorporated according to the Armington approach (Armington, 1969), using a Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function. Armington elasticities of substitution are presented 
in Table 6.4.  
As shown in Figure 6.6 the demand side consists of five demand categories: investment 
demand (QINVDc), intermediate demand (QINTDc,a), private consumption demand (QCDc), 
enterprises demand (QENTDc) and government demand (QGDc). Households maximise utility 
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with their preferences being represented by a Stone-Geary utility function. The sources of 
investments are household, government, foreign savings and fiscal depreciation. Since our 
analysis is based on the GTAP database, there are no enterprises and all households are 
represented only by one single household.  
6.2.1.2 Price System  
Figure 6.7 illustrates the price system in the standard version of the STAGE model. The 
supply prices of the composite commodities (PQSc) are defined as the weighted averages of 
the prices of the domestically supplied commodities (PDc) and the prices of the imported 
commodities (PMc). At the same time, the prices of the imported commodities are specified as 
the world import prices (PWMc), converted by the exchange rate (ER) plus the import tariff 
rates (TMc).  
Figure 6.7: Commodity Price System in the Standard Version of the STAGE Model 
 
Source: McDonald (2007).   
The prices of domestically produced commodities (PXCc) are defined as the weighted 
averages of the producer prices of the domestically supplied commodities (PDc) and the 
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prices of the exported commodities (PEc). The prices of the exported commodities are 
determined by the world export prices (PWEc), converted by the exchange rate (ER) minus the 
export tariff rates (TEc).   
6.2.1.3 Calibration of the Commodity Price and Quantity System  
By calibrating the standard version of the STAGE model, the initial values of almost all 
commodity prices are set to unity: PD0c = PE0c = PM0c = PQS0c = PX0a = PXC0c = 1. The 
calibration of the commodity quantity system is introduced in equations (6.2.1) to (6.2.7). By 
normalizing prices at unity, the quantities of total domestic production (QX0 and QXC0), 
export supply (QE0), domestic supply (QD0), import demand (QM0), and total domestic 
consumption (QQ0) equal the corresponding value in the SAM.   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Source: McDonald (2007).   
6.2.1.4 Production System   
In the STAGE model all activities are assumed to maximise profits using two level nested 
production functions. Figure 6.8 illustrates the nesting structure in the standard version of the 
STAGE model. At the top level, the domestic output (QX) is defined by a two argument CES 
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function over the aggregate of intermediates (QINT) and the aggregate of value added (QVA). 
On the second level, the aggregate of intermediates is described by a Leontief function, where 
the aggregate of value added (QVA) is a standard Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
function over primary factors.   
Figure 6.8: Nesting Structure in the Standard Version of the STAGE Model 
 
Source: McDonald (2007). 
Most GTAP applications assume the nest at the top level of the production structure as zero. 
Setting the elasticity of substitution between intermediates and the value added aggregate 
different from zero is quite common for many other well established CGE models, such as 
IFPRI standard, MIRAGE, LINKAGE, and GLOBE. With a substantial change between the 
relative prices for intermediates compared to the value added-energy nest, which are 
simulated by introducing carbon taxes, there would be a substitution at this level in the long-
run. Nevertheless, high substitution possibility between intermediates and the value added-
energy aggregate is not expected: ϬX is set to 0.5. 
6.2.2 Numerical Model: Own Modifications  
The design of the model is especially important where the policy experiment is implemented. 
With respect to our analysis, a more elaborated treatment of demand and supply of energy is 
required. Therefore, for this analysis the standard version of the STAGE model is modified as 
follows: 
1) Incorporating factor-fuel as well as inter-fuel substitution for non-energy producing 
sectors.32  
2) Incorporating a two level nested linear expenditure system for households, where the 
first level consists of energy and non-energy composites. 
                                                 
32 A factor-fuel substitution is a substitution between energy inputs and primary factors. An inter-fuel 
substitution is a substitution among energy inputs (Burniaux and Truong, 2002). 
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3) Disaggregating the electricity sector into four sub-sectors: coal-fired, gas-fired, 
nuclear, and hydro, using a technology bundle approach. 
4) Incorporating imperfect competition and internal economies of scale into output 
markets for natural gas, metals, minerals, chemical products, and petroleum products. 
5) Incorporating a labour supply function. 
6) Modelling Russia as a large economy with respect to the natural gas market. 
7) Incorporating the account of CO2 emissions into the model.  
The implemented modifications of the model are explained further below in more detail. 
6.2.2.1 Production System for Non-Energy Producing Sectors 
According to Burniaux and Truong (2002), results significantly depend on substitution 
possibilities between energy and primary factors as well as substitution among energy inputs. 
Moreover, Sancho (2010), Capros et al. (1996) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998) 
assert that elasticities of substitution between capital, labour and energy are a crucial factor 
driving the results. Therefore, the standard version of the STAGE model is extended by 
incorporating substitution possibilities between capital and energy inputs as well as 
substitution possibilities among energy inputs for non-energy producing sectors. Introducing 
inter-fuel as well as factor-fuel substitution into the model is reasonable from theoretical and 
empirical point of view. The key factor is the values of elasticities of substitution between 
energy and primary factors as well as among energy inputs. The elasticities can differ by 
energy commodity and by sector as well as these can differ intertemporally (short and long 
term). To our knowledge, there are no estimations on elasticities of factor-fuel and inter-fuel 
substitution for Russia. Therefore, elasticities used in the GTAP energy model are taken (see 
Table 6.4).   
The equation block for nesting structures is built using a dual approach. According to the dual 
approach, a unit cost function (or price index) is derived from a production function by 
minimization of production cost subject to a given production level, whereas demand 
functions are derived by applying Shephard’s lemma. Moreover, the equation block for the 
production system as well as household demand is modelled using macro functions in GAMS, 
whose use is quite convenient for changing functional forms (e.g. standard CES, Cobb-
Douglas, Leontief). All macro functions are located in the right hand side in equations, noted 
in small cases. The corresponding macro functions are listed in Appendix B. Figure 6.9 
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illustrates the modified nesting structure of non-energy producing sectors which consists of 
six levels. Nested CES functions are used. The nesting structure for non-energy producing 
sectors is similar to that implemented in the GTAP energy model (Burniaux and Truong, 
2002). The only difference is that substitution possibilities between the intermediates (QINT) 
and the value added-energy aggregate (QVAE) are allowed in the model.  
Figure 6.9: Modified Nesting Structure for Non-Energy Producing Sectors  
 
Source: Own compilation. 
For introduction of energy substitution, energy inputs such as natural gas, gas manufacture, 
coal, crude oil, petroleum products, and electricity are moved from intermediates (QINT) to 
the value added aggregate (QVA). The sub-set gtapa and leona are used to assign sectors to a 
corresponding nesting structure. For example, the sub-set gtapa includes all non-energy 
producing sectors, whereas the sub-set leona includes energy sectors such as coal, crude oil, 
petroleum production, natural gas. Using the sub-set nelya, the electricity sector is excluded 
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from gtapa and leona nesting structures since the electricity sector is modelled using a 
technology bundle approach.  
Top level. The domestic output (QXa) is defined by a two argument CES function over the 
aggregate of intermediates (QINTa) and the aggregate of value added-energy (QVAEa). 
Equation (6.2.8) determines the unit cost function for the activity price of total production 
(PXa), where TXa is a production tax. Equations (6.2.9) and (6.2.10) define the corresponding 
demand functions for QVAEa and QINTa, respectively.  
Production Block – Top Level 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.8)  aaa cespxTXPX _)1(* =−                    ∀a∈nelya  
(6.2.9)  aa cesqvaeQVAE _=                                   ∀a∈nelya    
(6.2.10) aa cesqQINT int_=                                             ∀a∈nelya                                                                 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Second level. The aggregate of value added-energy (QVAEa) is specified as a two argument 
CES function over the aggregate of primary factors (QVLLa) and the aggregate of capital-
energy (QVKEa). Equation (6.2.11) determines the unit cost function for the activity price of 
the value added-energy aggregate (PVAEa). Equations (6.2.12) and (6.2.13) represent the 
corresponding demand functions for QVKEa and QVLLa, respectively. Elasticities of 
substitution between primary factors and the capital-energy aggregate are taken from Version 
7 of the GTAP database (see Table 6.4).     
Production Block – Second Level 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.11) aa cespvaePVAE _=                                  ∀a∈nelya  
(6.2.12) aa cesqvkeQVKE _=                                  ∀a∈nelya                                                                    
(6.2.13) aa cesqvllQVLL _=                                   ∀a∈nelya  
___________________________________________________________________________   
Third level. The aggregate of primary factors (QVLLa) is determined by a standard CES 
function over land, natural resources, skilled, and unskilled labour (FDf,a). Land is used only 
by the agriculture sector, whereas natural resources are used by agriculture, coal, crude oil, 
natural gas, and minerals. Equation (6.2.14) determines the unit cost function for the activity 
price of the primary factors aggregate (PVLLa). Equation (6.2.15) defines the corresponding 
  127 
demand functions for primary factors (FDf,a). Elasticities of substitution among primary 
factors are taken from Version 7 of the GTAP database (see Table 6.4).  
The aggregate of capital-energy (QVKEa) is depicted by a two argument CES function over 
the aggregate of energy inputs (QVEa) and capital (FDfCap,a). Equation (6.2.16) determines the 
cost unit function for the activity price of capital-energy aggregate (PVKEa). Equations 
(6.2.17) and (6.2.18) give the corresponding demand functions for QVEa and FDfCap,a, 
respectively. Elasticities of substitution between capital and the energy aggregate are assumed 
to equal 0.5, following Burniaux and Truong (2002). 
Production Block for Non-Energy Producing Sectors – Third Level 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.14) aa cespvllPVLL _=                             ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa                                                                               
(6.2.15) afaf cesfdFD ,, _=                     ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa and ∀a∈capnf  
(6.2.16) aa cespvkePVKE _=                            ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa  
(6.2.17) aa cesqveQVE _=                                           ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa                                                                                 
(6.2.18) afCapafCap cesfdcapFD ,, _=                                        ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa  
where  capn is the sub set for production factors, excluding capital.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Fourth level. The aggregate of energy inputs (QVEa) is specified as a Cobb-Douglas function 
over the aggregate of non-electric energy commodities (QVNELa) and electricity (QVELa). 
Equation (6.2.19) defines the unit cost function for the activity price of the energy aggregate 
(PVEa). Equations (6.2.20) and (6.2.21) determine the corresponding demand functions for 
QVELa and QVNELa, respectively. Equation (6.2.22) gives the quantity identity for electricity 
demand (QVELa), whereas equation (6.2.23) defines the price identity for electricity (PVELa).  
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Production Block for Non-Energy Producing Sectors – Fourth Level 
___________________________________________________________________________  
(6.2.19) aa cdpvePVE _=                  ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa  
(6.2.20) aa cdqvelQVEL _=                  ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa   
(6.2.21) aa cdqvnelQVNEL _=                 ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa 
(6.2.22) acelya QINTDQVEL ,=                     ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa 
(6.2.23) celya PQDPVEL =                          ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa  
where  aQVEL  and acelyQINTD , is demand for electricity by industries; 
aPVEL  and celyPQD is the consumer price of electricity. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Fifth level. The aggregate of non-electric energy commodities (QVNELa) is defined by a two 
argument CES function over the aggregate of non-coal energy commodities (QVNCOa) and 
coal (QVCOa). Equation (6.2.24) determines the unit cost function for the activity price of the 
non-electric aggregate (PVNELa). Equations (6.2.25) and (6.2.26) define the corresponding 
demand functions for QVCOa and QVNCOa, respectively. Equations (6.2.27) and (6.2.28) 
define the quantity and price identity for coal, where TCARBccoa,a is the rate of carbon tax on 
coal. Elasticities of substitution between coal and non-coal energy commodities are assumed 
to equal 0.5, following the GTAP energy model (Burniaux and Truong, 2002).          
Production Block for Non-Energy Producing Sectors – Fifth Level 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.24) aa cespvnelPVNEL _=                            ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa  
(6.2.25) aa cesqvconQVCO _=                 ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa  
(6.2.26) aa cesqvnvoQVNCO _=                            ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa  
(6.2.27) accoaa QINTDQVCO ,=                 ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa  
(6.2.28) accoaccoaa TCARBPQDPVCO ,+=     ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Sixth level. Finally, the aggregate of non-coal energy commodities (QVNCOa) is specified as 
a Cobb-Douglas function over natural gas, gas manufacture, crude oil, and petroleum 
products (QINTDc,a). Equation (6.2.29) determines the unit cost function for the activity price 
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of the non-coal aggregates (PVNCOa). Equation (6.2.30) defines the corresponding demand 
function for natural gas, gas manufacture, crude oil, and petroleum products.    
Production Block for Non-Energy Producing Sectors – Sixth Level 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.29) aa cdpvncoPVNCO _=                            ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa  
(6.2.30) acac cddqQINTD ,, _int=                              ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈gtapa  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
6.2.2.2 Production System for Energy Producing Sectors  
Following Burniaux and Truong (2002), the energy producing sectors, such as crude oil, coal, 
natural gas, and petroleum products are assumed to have no substitution possibilities between 
capital and energy inputs as well as among energy inputs so that one limits elasticities of 
energy supply. Figure 6.10 illustrates the nesting structure of energy producing sectors.  
Figure 6.10: Nesting Structure of Energy Producing Sectors 
 
Source: Own compilation. 
Third level. The first two levels of the nesting structure for energy producing sectors are 
identical with those for non-energy producing sectors. At the third level, the aggregate of 
capital-energy (QVKEa) is depicted by a Leontief function over energy inputs. Equation 
(6.2.31) determines the unit cost function for the activity price of the capital-energy aggregate 
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(PVKEa), where equations (6.2.32) and (6.2.33) are the corresponding demand functions for 
QVEa and FDfCap,a., respectively. 
Production Block for Energy Producing Sectors – Third Level 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.31) aa leonpvkePVKE _=                            ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈leona  
(6.2.32) aa leonqveQVE _=                   ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈leona                                                                                 
(6.2.33) afCapafCap leonfdcapFD ,, _=                          ∀a∈nelya and ∀a∈leona  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Fourth level. The aggregate of energy inputs (QVEa) for energy producing sectors is 
determined by a Leontief function. Equation (6.2.34) determines the unit cost function for the 
activity price of the energy aggregate (PVEa), where equation (6.2.35) gives the 
corresponding demand functions for energy inputs (QINTDc,a). 
Production Block for Energy Producing Sectors – Fourth Level 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.34) aa leonpvePVE _=                                        ∀a∈nelya  and ∀a∈leona  
(6.2.35) acac leondqQINTD ,, _int=              ∀a∈nelya  and ∀a∈leona and ∀c∈cegc  
___________________________________________________________________________                                                                                               
This nesting structure is also used for non-energy producing sectors to assess the implication 
of carbon taxes under different nesting structures.  
6.2.2.3 Modelling the Power Generation Sector  
The power generation sector is the largest domestic consumer of coal and gas as well as a 
large domestic consumer of petroleum products. An explicit design of the power generation 
sector is expected to be crucial. The electricity generation sector is disaggregated into four 
power generation technologies: coal-fired, gas-fired, nuclear technologies and hydro 
technologies (Figure 6.11). The disaggregation is based on output shares and factor intensities 
by technologies, as discussed in Section 6.1.2.5. For example, gas-fired technologies produce 
40% of total electricity generation, followed by coal-fired technologies (26%), hydro (18%), 
and nuclear (16%) (EIA, 2011a; APEC, 2006). Relative factor intensities are calculated based 
on data on costs and performance of electricity generation technologies provided by the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Veselov et al., 2010).  
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Figure 6.11: Structure of the Power Generation Sector 
 
Source: Own compilation.   
The modelling of electricity generation technologies is based on a technology bundle 
approach similar to that is applied in the MEGABARE model (ABARE, 1996). According to 
this approach, all power generation technologies are substitutes for each other. Substitution 
among technologies is depicted by using a standard CES function. In the MEGABARE 
model, however, electricity technologies are modelled using a CRESH function. It is 
necessary to introduce a CES or CRESH function within the power generation technologies in 
a comparative static CGE model to avoid an unrealistic large switch from one technology to 
another. Due to lack of information, a standard one level CES function is used, where the 
elasticity of substitution among technologies is assumed to equal 2.0. Furthermore, in the 
MEGABARE model each technology is described by a Leontief function, which implies no 
substitution among primary factors and intermediates. In contrast, some substitution 
possibility within the production structure of all technologies is assumed.  
Equation (6.2.36) defines the unit cost function for the activity price of electricity (PXa), 
where TXa is a production tax on electricity. Equation (6.2.37) represents the corresponding 
demand function for output from different electricity generation technologies (QXtba,tb). The 
macro functions are listed in Annex B.  
Technology Bundle for the Power Generation Sector 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.36) aaa cespxeTXPX _)1(* =−                                ∀a∈elya 
(6.2.37) tbatba cesqxtbQXtb ,, _=                                 ∀a∈elya 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Each power generation technology is described by a nested production structure, which is 
similar to the nesting structure applied for non-energy producing sectors (Figure 6.12). The 
same elasticities of substitution among primary factors are used as those are used for non-
energy producing sectors. In addition, to make the nesting structure of electricity generation 
Hydro 18% 
Nuclear 16% 
Gas-fired 40% 
Coal-fired 26% 
σ=2.0 
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technologies comparable with others, the letters tb are added to the notations of prices and 
quantities, where tb states for technology bundle. For example, QINTa is an aggregate of 
intermediates used by non-electricity sectors, whereas QINTtba,tb is an aggregate of 
intermediates used by the electricity sector namely by power generation technologies. Figure 
6.12 illustrates the nesting structure for nuclear and hydro generation technologies.  
Figure 6.12: Nesting Structure for Nuclear and Hydro Generation Technologies   
 
Source: Own compilation.   
Top level. The first four levels of the nesting structure are identical for all electricity 
technologies. At the top level, electricity is produced by each technology (QXtb) using the 
aggregate of intermediates (QINTtb) and the aggregate of value added-energy (QVAEtb). The 
substitution possibility between the QINTtb and QVAEtb aggregates is depicted by a two 
argument CES function. Equation (6.2.38) determines the unit cost function for the activity 
price for electricity technologies (PXtb), where equations (6.2.39) and (6.2.40) are the 
corresponding demand functions for QVAEtb and QINTtb, respectively. Equation (6.2.41) 
defines the price identity for intermediate prices for electricity technologies. The sub-set elya 
defines that the only electricity sector is modelled by using technology bundle approach.       
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Production Block for Electricity Technologies – Top Level 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.38) tbatba cespxtbPXtb ,, _=                               ∀a∈elya 
(6.2.39) tbatba cesqvaetbQVAEtb ,, _=                            ∀a∈elya 
(6.2.40) tbatba cestbqQINTtb ,, _int=                 ∀a∈elya 
(6.2.41) atba PINTPINTtb =,                  ∀a∈elya 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Second level. The aggregate of value added-energy by technologies (QVAEtb) is specified as 
a two argument CES function over the aggregate of labour (QVLLtb) and the aggregate of 
capital-energy (QVKEtb). Equation (6.2.42) determines the unit cost function for the activity 
price of the value added-energy aggregate (PVAEtb), where equations (6.2.43) and (6.2.44) 
are the corresponding demand functions QVLLtb and QVKEtb, respectively.    
Production Block for Electricity Technologies – Second Level 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.42) tbatba cespvaetbPVAEtb ,, _=                          ∀a∈elya 
(6.2.43) tbatba cesqvlltbQVLLtb ,, _=                       ∀a∈elya 
(6.2.44) tbatba cesqvketbQVKEtb ,, _=                 ∀a∈elya 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Third level. The aggregate of labour is defined as a two argument CES function over skilled 
and unskilled labour (FDtbf) since land is used only by the agriculture sector, whereas natural 
resources are used by agriculture, coal, crude oil, natural gas, and minerals. Equation (6.2.45) 
determines the unit cost function for the activity price of the labour aggregate (PVLLtb), 
where equation (6.2.46) defines the corresponding demand function for FDtb.    
Production Block for Electricity Technologies – Third Level 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.45) tbatba cespvlltbPVLLtb ,, _=                 ∀a∈elya 
(6.2.46) tbaftbaf cesfdtbFDtb ,,,, _=                              ∀a∈elya 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The aggregate of capital-energy (QVKEtb) is determined as a two argument CES function 
over capital (FDtbCap) and the energy aggregate (QVEtb), where the energy aggregate for 
hydro and nuclear technologies are represented by electricity only. Equation (6.2.47) 
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determines the unit cost function for the activity price of the capital-energy aggregate 
(PVKEtb), where equations (6.2.48) and (6.2.49) define the corresponding demand functions 
for FDtbCap and QVEtb, respectively. For hydro and nuclear technologies, equations (6.2.50) 
and (6.2.51) represent the quantity and price identity of demand for electricity by the 
technologies.     
Production Block for Electricity Technologies – Third Level 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.47) tbatba cespvketbPVKEtb ,, _=                       ∀a∈elya 
(6.2.48)  tbafCaptbafCap cesfdtbkeFDtb ,,,, _=           ∀a∈elya 
(6.2.49) tbatba cesqvetbQVEtb ,, _=                     ∀a∈elya 
(6.2.50) tbacelytba QINTDtbQVEtb ,,, =          ∀a∈elya and c∈cegc and tb∈therntb 
(6.2.51) celytba PQDPVEtb =,                                  ∀a∈elya  and  tb∈therntb 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
For coal-fired and gas-fired technologies, the production structure consists of four levels, 
where the last level represents an aggregate of energy inputs (QVEtb). Figure 6.13 shows the 
production structure of gas- and coal-fired power generation technologies. 
Figure 6.13: Nesting Structure for Gas-Fired and Coal-Fired Power Generation 
Technologies 
 
Source: Own compilation.   
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Fourth level. Within gas-fired technologies, the energy aggregate (QVEtb) is specified as a 
standard CES function over natural gas, gas manufacture, and electricity (QINTDtb). For 
coal-fired technologies, this is a standard CES function over coal, crude oil, petroleum 
products, and electricity (QINTDtb). Equation (6.2.52) determines the unit cost function for 
the activity price of the energy aggregate (PVEtb), where equation (6.2.53) specifies the 
corresponding demand functions for energy inputs used by thermal technologies.  
Production Block for Coal-and Gas-Fired Technologies – Fourth Level 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.52) tbatba cespvetbPVEtb ,, _=                                  ∀a∈elya 
(6.2.53) tbactbac cesdtbqQINTDtb ,,,, _int=                      ∀a∈elya 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Equations (6.2.54), (6.2.55) and (6.2.56) define the quantity identity of demand for primary 
factors (FDtb), intermediate (QINTtb) and energy inputs (QINTDtb), respectively, which are a 
sum over primary factor as well as intermediate demand over all technologies.    
Quantity Identities for the Power Generation Sector 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.54) ∑=
tb
tbafaf FDtbFD ,,,                       ∀a∈elya 
(6.2.55) ∑=
tb
tbaa QINTtbQINT ,                       ∀a∈elya 
(6.2.56) ∑=
tb
tbacac QINTDtbQINTD ,,,           ∀a∈elya 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
6.2.2.4 Structure of Household Demand   
In the standard STAGE model, the household demand functions are derived from a Stone-
Geary utility function. The main features of such demand function are linearity in prices and 
income. Moreover, in the presence of subsistence consumption, income elasticities are not 
unity; however, the marginal budget shares are constant, implying a straightforward Engel 
curve. For our analysis, a nested linear expenditure demand system for household 
consumption is introduced, which is similar to the government demand system applied in the 
GTAP energy model (Burniaux and Truong, 2002). Figure 6.14 illustrates the household 
demand system in the modified version of the STAGE model. 
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Figure 6.14: Household Demand System 
 
Source: Own compilation.  
Top level. The top level is depicted by a CES function, which describes a substitution 
possibility between the energy composite (QEHh) and the non-energy composite (QNEHh). 
Elasticities of substitution are assumed to equal 0.5. The household demand function is 
derived using a dual approach. Macro functions are used to model price indices and 
corresponding demand functions. Equation (6.2.57) determines the price index for the total 
household consumption (PHEXPh). Equation (6.2.58) and (6.2.59) represents the 
corresponding demand functions for the energy composite (QEHh) and the non-energy 
composite (QNEHh). 
Household Consumption: Top Level 
___________________________________________________________________________                                   
(6.2.57) hh cesphPHEXP exp_=  
(6.2.58) hh cesqehQEH _=           
(6.2.59) hh cesqnehQNEH _=   
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Second level. The composite of energy commodities (QEHh) is a Cobb-Douglas function over 
natural gas, gas manufacture, coal, petroleum products, and electricity, whereas the 
consumption of crude oil is not recorded. Equation (6.2.60) determines the price index of the 
energy composite (PEHh), where equation (6.2.61) defines the corresponding demand 
function for energy commodities (QCDhec,h). 
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Household Consumption: Second Level 
___________________________________________________________________________                                  
(6.2.60) hh cdqehPEH _=  
(6.2.61) hchc cdqcdQCDhe ,, _=                                     ∀c∈hec 
(6.2.62) hh cdqnehPNEH _=  
(6.2.63) hchc cdqcdQCDhne ,, _=                          ∀c∈hnec 
(6.2.64) ∑ +−=
c
hcchchhh TCARBHPQDqcdconstHEXPPHEXPQHEXP )(** ,,  
(6.2.65) hchchc QCDheqcdconstQCD ,,, +=                                  ∀c∈hec 
(6.2.66) hchchc QCDhneqcdconstQCD ,,, +=                                                    ∀c∈hnec 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The composite of non-energy commodities (QNEHh) is also determined by a Cobb-Douglas 
function over non-energy commodities. Demand functions for energy and non-energy 
commodities consumed by the household are differentiated using a sub-set hec and hnec, 
respectively. Equation (6.2.62) defines the price index of the non-energy composite (PNEHh), 
where equation (6.2.63) specifies the corresponding demand function for non-energy 
commodities (QCDhnec,h). Equation (6.2.64) represents the income balance for household 
consumption. Equation (6.2.65) and (6.2.66) determine the total household consumption, 
which consists of the subsistence consumption (qcdconstc,h) and the superior consumption of 
the energy (QCDhec,h) and non-energy composites (QCDhnec,h). Due to lack of information, 
income elasticities are assumed to equal unity so that subsistence consumption equals zero.   
6.2.2.5 Cournot Oligopoly in Domestic Markets 
In any real economy, many markets can be characterized as being imperfectly competitive. 
For example, many resource-based sectors require high investments in plants and equipment 
and, therefore, exhibit decreasing average costs. Usually such sectors consist of a small 
number of firms (Devarajan and Rodrik, 1991). The Russian economy strongly depends on 
resource-based sectors, such as natural gas, crude oil, minerals, and metals.  
Compared to other sectors, as shown in Table 6.12, extraction of energy resources, extraction 
of mineral resources, petroleum products, chemical products, mineral products, and metals 
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exhibit the highest rates of return on sales (ROS).33 For example, the highest ROS is achieved 
by the extraction of mineral resources sector, which ROS was 49.2% in 2008. In contrast, the 
ROS of sectors such as transport and communication and real estate services (leasing) 
equalled 14.2% and 12.2% in 2008, respectively, and the ROS of other sectors does not 
exceed 11%.   
Table 6.12: Sectoral Rates of Return on Sales and the Number of Firms from 2005 to 
2008 (ROS in per cent) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Extraction of energy 
resources 
ROS 34.7 29.2 30.1 22.6 
Number of firms 89 47 53 54 
Extraction of mineral 
resources (non-energy) 
ROS 42.8 42.4 33.3 49.2 
Number of firms 45 43 33 30 
Petroleum products 
ROS 21.4 21.1 27.5 27.8 
Number of firms 7 7 6 n.a 
Chemical products ROS 19.3 16.5 19.0 29.9 Number of firms 32 27 28 22 
Minerals nec ROS 12.3 19.3 28.5 22.4 Number of firms 94 86 84 69 
Metals ROS 30.1 39.2 33.6 28.7 Number of firms 91 85 82 57 
nec states for nevertheless classified  
Sources: FSSS (2009). 
High profitability is not necessarily an indicator of market power since high profitability can 
result from high productivity of primary factors. Therefore, another important aspect is the 
market concentration. As shown in Table 6.12, the number of firms is relatively small in 
sectors with the highest ROS. For example, the petroleum products sector consisted of six 
firms in 2007, the chemical products sector consisted of 22 firms in 2007, and the extraction 
of non-energy mineral resources sector consisted of 30 firms in 2008. In contrast, the 
extraction of energy resources sector which includes sub-sectors such as crude oil, coal, and 
natural gas, consisted of 54 firms in 2008. The metals and metal products sector consisted of 
57 firms and the mineral products nec sector consisted of 69 firms in 2008. The number of 
firms has been changing in each sector. This could result from new small firms entering the 
market or from consolidation of already existing firms. Also, the number of firms is a limited 
indicator of market power. For example, a market can consist of a large number of firms, yet a 
few large companies may hold market power.    
Since imported and domestically produced commodities are treated as imperfect substitutes, 
domestic firms can exploit some market power in the domestic market (Devarajan and 
                                                 
33 Rate of Return on Sales (ROS) is calculated by dividing the firm’s accounting profit by sale revenues 
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Rodrik, 1991). Therefore, and due to the small number of firms and high profitability, an 
oligopolistic structure in sectors such as petroleum products, chemical products, metals, 
minerals, and mineral products is assumed. For example, domestic prices of petroleum 
products in Russia are subject to regular inspections, which are performed by the Russian 
Federal Antimonopoly Service. This is done because prices of petroleum products are “too 
high” and often raise suspicion in terms of oligopolistic behaviour by oil companies (FAS, 
2009). Imperfect competition in these markets is assumed to be based on internal economies 
of scale.  
The natural gas market in Russia is also treated as an imperfectly competitive market. 
Nevertheless, because of administrative price regulation, Russian gas producers (mainly 
Gazprom) do not have any market power in the domestic market, yet they are expected to 
exploit some market power in the world gas market (Tarr and Thomson, 2004). Average-cost 
pricing for natural gas sold in the domestic market is assumed. 
Producers of petroleum products, chemical products, minerals, and metals set the prices in the 
domestic markets according to the Lerner pricing rule where the prices (PDc) are set above 
the average variable costs (PXa) by the mark-ups (MKdc) (equation 6.2.67). The mark-ups 
depend on the “perceived” elasticities of demand (DELdomc) and the number of firms (Na) 
(equation 6.2.68). From equation (6.2.68) we can see that higher (lower) elasticities of 
demand as well as a larger (smaller) number of firms result in a decline (increase) in mark-
ups. Following Francois (1998), a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in domestic markets is assumed, 
which implies that the parameter of conjectural variation (Ώ) equals unity. In other words, 
there are no interactions among firms.    
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__________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.67) 
)1( c
a
c MKd
PX
PD
−
=                              ∀c∈icdomc 
(6.2.68) 
ca
c DELdomN
MKd
*
Ω
=                            ∀c∈icdomc 
(6.2.69) 
a
f
afaffaf
aaa QX
TFWFDISTWFfc
NPXATC
∑ +
+=
)1(***
*
,,,
 
where 
 fcf,a             is a fixed factor per unit of output;  
 WFf            is factor prices; 
WFDISTf,a  is sectoral-specific factor prices;  
TFf,a            is taxes on factor use; and,  
icdomc        is a set for domestic markets operating under imperfect competition.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Equation (6.2.69) defines the average production costs (ATCa), which is the sum over average 
variable costs (PXa) and average fixed costs (the second term in the equation). The existence 
of fixed costs implies internal economies of scale. Therefore, the average production costs 
(ATCa) would equal the average variable costs (PXa). In addition, the average production 
costs (ATCa) equal the prices of domestically produced commodities (PXCc).  
Elasticities of demand for chemical products, petroleum products, minerals, and metals are 
derived from Armington CES functions, which describe substitution between imported and 
domestically produced commodities. This specification of elasticities of demand is a 
“standard” approach used in CGE models analysing imperfect competition (e.g. Francois, 
1998). The elasticities of demand (DELdomc) depend on the elasticities of substitution 
between imported and domestically produced commodities (σc) and the value shares of 
domestically produced commodities (SHarmc), as given in equations (6.2.70) and (6.2.71), 
respectively. The elasticities of substitution are exogenous, yet the elasticities of demand 
change according to the value shares. Derivation of the elasticities of demand is introduced in 
Appendix C. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.70) )1(* −−= cccc SHarmDELdom σσ               ∀c∈icdomc  
(6.2.71) 
cc
cc
c PQSQQ
PDQD
SHarm
*
*
=          ∀c∈icdomc  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Equation (6.2.72) represents economics profits (EPc), which equals the total sales revenues 
(the term in brackets on the RHS34) minus the total production costs (last term on the RHS). 
With internal economies of scale, the total factor income (YFf) consists of income from 
primary factors (the first term on the RHS) and the income from the fixed factor (the second 
term on the RHS), as given in equation (6.2.73).     
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.72) ccccccc PXCQXCPEQEPDQDEP *)**( −+=  
(6.2.73) ∑∑ +=
)($
,,,, *****
airtsa
affafa
a
affaff WFDISTWFfcNWFDISTWFFDYF  
(6.2.74) )1(*)1(* ffff TYFdeprecYFYFDISP −−=  
(6.2.75) ∑∑ +=
c
ch
f
ffhh EPhepshYFDISPhvashYH *)*( ,    
where  hvashh,f     is a share of income from factor f to household h 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Equation (6.2.74) determines the net factor income (YFDISPf), after fiscal depreciation of 
capital (deprecf) and taxation of factor income (TYFf). Finally, the total household income 
(YHf) consists of the net factor income and economic profits, as shown in equation (6.2.75). 
Since there is a single representative household recorded in the database, the share of 
economic profit among households (hepshh) equals unity. 
6.2.2.6 Cournot Oligopoly in the Export Gas Market  
The natural gas market is assumed to exercise some market power in the export market. Both 
the export and domestic supply of natural gas are treated as perfect substitutes. This is 
because it is expected that exported and domestically produced gas has the same quality and 
that the unified pipeline network would allow for a flexible supply so that domestic producers 
of gas can switch between domestic and export markets. Due to administrative price 
regulation, an average cost pricing in the domestic gas market is assumed (equation 6.2.76). 
The export price of natural gas (PE) is set above the average variable cost (PX) by a mark-up 
(MKe) (equation 6.2.77). The mark-up (MKe) on the gas export depends on the number of 
firms (N) and the perceived elasticity of demand for natural gas (DELexp) in the export 
market (equation 6.2.78). A Cournot oligopoly in the export gas market with the conjectural 
variation (Ώ) equalling unity is assumed.    
     
                                                 
34 RHS states for right hand site.  
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.76) ac ATCPD =                  ∀c∈icexpc  
(6.2.77) 
)1( c
a
c MKe
PX
PE
−
=         ∀c∈icexpc                
(6.2.78) 
ca
c DELN
MKe
exp*
Ω
=        ∀c∈icexpc                
where icexpc is a set of commodities which face a downward sloping demand curve in the export market. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The elasticity of demand for natural gas in the export market (DELexp) depends on the 
elasticity of substitution (σexp) between the import of natural gas from Russia (QE) and the 
import of natural gas from the rest of the world (QER), weighted by the value share of 
Russian gas in the global total imports of natural gas (SHexp), as given in equation (6.2.79). 
Equation (6.2.80) defines the value share of natural gas from Russia in the global total gas 
imports, where PWE is the price of natural gas imported from Russia, PET is the composite 
world’s price of natural gas, and QET is the global import of natural gas.    
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.79) )1(*expexp expexp −−= cccc SHDEL σσ      ∀c∈icexpc                            
(6.2.80) 
cc
cc
c QETPET
QEPWE
SH
*
*
exp =                                                   ∀c∈icexpc                                                                                
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Since Russia is assumed to be a large economy regarding the natural gas market, a world 
import demand function for the natural gas market is incorporated. The global demand of 
natural gas (QET) is defined as a CES function over the import of natural gas from Russia 
(QE) and the import of natural gas from the ROW (QER) (equation 6.2.81). Equation (6.2.82) 
gives the corresponding demand functions for QE, and equation (6.2.83) determines demand 
for natural gas from the ROW (QER). In addition, QET and PET are fixed since a single 
country model is used. Economic profit for natural gas is defined by equation (6.2.72). 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.81)   
( ) )
1
*)1(** ccc rhowrhowcc
rhow
cccc QERdeltwQEdeltwatwQET
−−− −+=                        ∀c∈icexpc                                                                      
(6.2.82) 
)1(
1
)1(
**
crhow
c
c
c
c
cc deltw
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PWE
PERQERQE
+
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




−
=           ∀c∈icexpc 
(6.2.83) cccccc PERQERPWEQEPETQER *** +=          ∀c∈icexpc 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
6.2.2.7 Calibration of Imperfect Competition  
In this analysis a Cournot oligopoly with homogenous products and increasing returns to scale 
(IRTS) due to fixed costs is considered. Zero profit is assumed so that changes in the number 
of firms ensure equilibrium. Under the zero profit condition, mark-ups are related to the cost 
disadvantage ratio (CDR) which indicates unexploited economies of scale. A CDR measures 
the ratio between the average fixed cost and the average total cost (Francoise, 1998; Harrison 
et al., 1994).  
There are different approaches for calibration of imperfect competition. For instance, using 
the mark-up and the number of firms, elasticities of substitution between imported and 
domestically produced commodities can be calibrated. Elasticities of substitution and the 
number of firms can be also used to calibrate the mark-up. Alternatively, the number of firms 
can be calibrated using elasticities of substitution and the mark-up. Therefore, two parameters 
could be ether estimated or assumed, where the third parameter should be calibrated (Bchir et 
al., 2002). Following Devarajan and Rodrik (1991), the number of firms is calibrated using 
the Armington elasticities from the GTAP database (Table 6.4) and by assuming a mark-up. 
To our knowledge, there are no estimations on CDR as well as market power for Russia 
industries. Mark-ups can differ by sector and by region. Nguyen and Wigle (1992) use a 
mark-up of 10.5%, whereas Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) assume a mark-p of 25% for all 
resource-based industries which are assumed to be imperfectly competitive. According to the 
empirical estimation carried out by Martins et al. (1996), mark-ups for 14 OECD countries 
over 1970-1992 vary between zero and 30%, depending on countries and industries. Due to 
lack of empirical estimation for Russia, the middle value, 15%, is taken and a sensitivity 
analysis with respect to different mark-ups is applied in Section 7.5.4. Table 6.13 shows the 
calibrated perceived elasticities of demand. 
  144 
Table 6.13: Calibration of the Number of Firms and Elasticities of Demand 
Parameters Chemical products Minerals Metals 
Petroleum 
products 
Natural 
gas 
Mark-up (MK), assumed 15%  15% 15% 15% 15% 
Armington elasticities (σc) 1.65 0.45 1.78 1.05 3.00 
Perceived elasticities of 
demand (PELc), calibrated 
-1.29 -0.90 -1.10 -1.00 -2.60 
Number of firms (Na), 
calibrated 5.14 7.32 6.01 6.66 2.56 
Source: Own compilation. 
The share of natural gas imports from Russia is 20% of the global import of natural gas 
(British Petroleum, 2010). The numbers of firms are calibrated to match a mark-up of 15%. 
Table 6.13 shows the calibrated number of firms, which should be considered as a Cournot 
equivalent number of firms (Devarajan and Rodrik, 1991). 
6.2.2.8 Calibration of the Price and Quantity System under a Cournot Oligopoly  
In the presence of a Cournot oligopoly, total production costs consist of fixed and variable 
costs. To incorporate imperfect competition with economies of scale, the calibration of the 
price system in the standard model is slightly modified so that fixed costs (SAMFCval,a and 
SAMFCtax,a) are excluded from total production costs (SAMtotal,a) by calibration of the activity 
prices (equation 6.2.84).    
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.84) 
a
aFCtaxaFCvalatotal
a QX
SAMSAMSAM
PX
0
)(
0 ,,,
−−
=  
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6.2.2.9 Incorporation of Emissions Equation Block  
Based on the GLOBE_EN model developed by Mcdonald and Thierfelder (2008), emission 
equations are incorporated into the model. Below the equations are listed, which are added to 
the standard version of the STAGE model. For example, equation (6.2.85) defines CO2 
emissions that results from the use of energy inputs by sectors (CO2EMISSc,a), which equals 
sectoral demand for energy inputs (QINTDc,a) multiplied by the coefficients of CO2 emissions 
per unit (co2coc,a). Equation (6.2.86) defines carbon dioxide emissions that results from the 
use of energy commodities by the household (CO2EMISSc,h), which equals final demand for 
energy commodities (QCDc,h) multiplied by the coefficients of CO2 emissions per unit 
(co2coc,h). The total carbon dioxide emission (CO2EMISSTOT) is a sum over emissions 
arising from industries and the representative household (equation 6.2.87).  
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Carbon Dioxide Emission by Industries and Households 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.85) acacac cocoQINTDEMISSCO ,,, 2*2 =         ∀c∈cegc  
(6.2.86) hchchc cocoQCDEMISSCO ,,, 2*2 =          ∀c∈cegc                                
(6.2.87) ∑ ∑+=
ac hc
hcac EMISSCOEMISSCOEMISSTOTCO
, ,
,, 222                                                                                                       
where cegc is a sub-set for energy commodities.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The carbon taxes on emission from industries (TCARBc,a) is defined in equation (6.2.88). The 
scaling factor on carbon taxes on industries (TCADJ) as well as the scaling factor on carbon 
taxes on the household (TCHADJ) and the scaling factor on carbon taxes on the household 
and industries (TCTCHADJ) are instruments for policy simulations. Initially, these scaling 
factors equal unity, whereas carbon taxes (tcbc,a) equal zero. The carbon taxes on CO2 
emissions from the household are similarly defined (equation 6.2.89). The taxes TCARBc,a and 
TCARBHc,h are added to the consumer prices since the carbon taxes are specific taxes. The 
total revenue from carbon taxes (CARBTAX) is defined in equation (6.2.90), which is a sum 
over revenues from carbon taxes on emissions from industries and the household. In addition, 
revenues from carbon taxes are added to the formation of the real GDP at valued added 
(equation 6.2.91).   
Carbon Taxes on Sectors and Households 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6.2.88) TCTCHADJcocoTCADJtcbTCARB acacac *2** ,,, =        ∀c∈cegc                                                                                                       
(6.2.89) TCTCHADJcocoTCHADJtchbTCARBH hcchc *2** ,, =       ∀c∈cegc                                                                                                                                                                               
(6.2.90) ∑ ∑+=
ac hc
hchcacac QCDTCARBHQINTDTCARBCARBTAX
, ,
,,,, )*()*(  
(6.2.91) 
CARBTAXITAXENERGYTAXFTAX
STAXETAXMTAXFDWFDISTWFGDPVA afaff
++++
+++=∑ )**( ,,
 
where MTAX  is the total revenue from import tariffs;  
ETAX  is the total revenue from export taxes; 
STAX  is the total revenue from sale taxes;  
FTAX  is the total revenue from taxes on factor use, and 
ITAX   is the total expenditure on production subsidies. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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6.2.2.10 Model Closures  
In the model, the following closure rules are assumed: 
Foreign exchange closure. The external trade balance is fixed and the exchange rate is 
flexible so that changes in the exchange rate clear the foreign exchange market.  
Investment-savings closure. Volumes of investment and the government savings are fixed 
and the household savings rate is variable so that the capital accounts are cleared by changes 
in the household savings rate. 
Government account closure. Government consumption is fixed so that the government 
account is cleared by changes in policy instruments. In this analysis, either the rate of 
government transfers to households or the tax rate on labour income is assumed to be 
variable. 
Numeraire. The consumer price index (CPI) is set as numeraire. 
International factor mobility closure. All factors are assumed to be internationally 
immobile.  
Factor market closure. Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile among sectors; however, 
immobility of natural resources is assumed. Land is used by the agricultural sector only, and 
hence it is a de facto immobile resource. Furthermore, a perfectly elastic supply of land is 
assumed. This is because Russia has a large potential for land resources – a lot of fertile land 
remains fallow. Therefore, it is expected that the supply of land should be quite elastic. The 
supply of skilled and unskilled labour is assumed to be inelastic. Therefore, a supply function 
for skilled and unskilled labour is incorporated: 
fefs
ffff TYFWFshfsFS ))1(*(* −=  
where FSf  is the supply of skilled and unskilled labour, shfsf  is the shift parameter for the 
supply function, WFf is the wage level, efsf is the labour supply elasticity which is assumed to 
equal 0.30, following Böhringer et al. (2008) 35, TYFf is the tax on factor income.  
                                                 
35 Evers et al. (2008) confirm this order of magnitude, finding that the mean labour supply elasticity for men 
equals 0.07, whereas that for women equals 0.43. 
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7 Results of Policy Simulations 
7.1 Overview of Policy Simulations 
In this analysis, an introduction of carbon taxes on coal, natural gas, petroleum products, 
crude oil, and gas manufacture used by households and industries is simulated. Electricity is 
not subject to carbon taxation. The magnitude of carbon taxation aims at a targeted reduction 
of carbon dioxide emissions by 10% through a proportional increase in tax rates on carbon 
dioxide emissions. Carbon taxes differ among energy commodities and these also slightly 
differ among sectors according to their CO2 coefficients (Table 6.7). Three experiments are 
considered:  
1) CT_HS. An introduction of carbon taxes compensated by an increase in lump-sum 
transfers to households.  
2) CT_LT under perfect competition. An introduction of carbon taxes compensated by 
a reduction of tax rates on income from skilled and unskilled labour under perfect 
competition in output markets. 
3) CT_LT under a Cournot oligopoly. An introduction of carbon taxes compensated by 
a reduction of tax rates on income from skilled and unskilled labour under a Cournot 
oligopoly with increasing return to scale in the markets for natural gas, petroleum 
products, chemical products, metals, and minerals. Moreover, the effects of carbon 
taxes under a Cournot oligopoly with blocked entry and exit are compared with those 
under a Cournot oligopoly with free entry and exit.  
The experiment CT_HS is considered as a reference experiment since revenues from carbon 
taxes are returned to households in lump-sum form (Section 7.2). In Section 7.3, the results 
under a CT_HS are compared with those under a CT_LT with perfect competition so that the 
relevance of such a revenue recycling strategy is examined. Substituting environmental taxes 
for labour taxes is often considered as desirable, especially for Western economies, since it 
also addresses unemployment concerns (Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1994). Moreover, 
some European countries have already implemented such environmental tax reforms, where 
an introduction of various environmental taxes (carbon dioxide or sulphur dioxide) is 
compensated by reductions in personal income taxes or social security contributions (Bosquet, 
2000). The motivation for such a policy would be valid for Russia, too, since the level of 
unemployment in Russia accounted for 7.5% of the total labour force in 2010 (FSSS, 2012a). 
Moreover, distortions from labour taxation may be substantial in Russia: both taxes on labour 
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income and social security contributions accounted for 27% of total government revenues in 
2010 (FSSS, 2012b). Furthermore, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes explicitly 
addresses the issue of income inequality, which is of high relevance for Russia. For example, 
the Gini coefficient for Russia was 0.42 in 2009 (FSSS, 2011). 
Alternatively, revenues from carbon taxes can be refunded through a reduction in capital 
taxes, trade taxes, and consumption taxes or some other taxes. Such revenue recycling 
schemes are not considered in this analysis since this would require substantial modifications 
of the model framework and database. Moreover, it raises concerns with respect to political 
feasibility of other possible revenue recycling strategies. 
Finally, the results from a CT_LT under perfect competition are compared with those under a 
Cournot oligopoly in output markets so that the relevance of the market structure is 
investigated (Section 9.5).    
The result section for each experiment is divided into four main parts:  
1) Macroeconomic and fiscal effects. In this part, the macroeconomic effects such as 
net welfare effects as well as changes in factor prices, factor supply and tax revenues 
in response to carbon taxation are discussed.   
2) Sectoral effects. This part is aimed at providing an overview of the sectoral effects 
due to carbon taxation: for example, changes in producer and consumer prices as well 
as changes in domestic production and consumption are discussed. Moreover, 
technological changes in the electricity sector are analysed.   
3) Carbon dioxide emissions. This part gives information about the changes in CO2 
emissions by sectors. This part is not explicitly discussed in the experiment CT_LT 
under a Cournot oligopoly because the results are very similar to that under perfect 
competition. 
4) Carbon taxation and income equity. In this part, the effects of carbon taxation on 
income distribution are analysed. By using a simple micro-accounting approach, it is 
shown how carbon taxes compensated by an increase in lump-sum transfers as well as 
a reduction in labour taxes affect the consumption expenditure as well as factor 
income and net income by different household groups.   
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Furthermore, the experiments CT_HS and CT_LT under perfect competition are accompanied 
by sensitivity analyses to ensure the robustness of the results and to recognize important 
determinants: 
a) Emission reduction targets (Section 7.4.1). 
b) Substitution between intermediates and the value added-energy aggregate (Section 
7.4.2). 
c) Substitution between labour and the capital-energy aggregate (Section 7.4.3). 
d) Labour supply elasticity (Section 7.4.4). 
e) Substitution between capital and energy (Section 7.4.5). 
f) Capital mobility and immobility (Section 7.4.6). 
g) Substitution among power generation technologies (Section 7.4.7).  
For the experiment CT_LT under a Cournot oligopoly, only one sensitivity analysis is run 
where different values of mark-ups are analysed. 
7.2 Substituting Carbon Taxes for Lump-Sum Transfers 
7.2.1 Macroeconomic and Fiscal Effects 
7.2.1.1 Macroeconomic Effects 
Table 7.1 summarizes the macroeconomic effects of the introduction of carbon taxes 
compensated by an increase in lump-sum transfers from the government to the representative 
household.  
Table 7.1: Macroeconomic Effects 
 Changes in million USD 
Changes in 
per cent 
Equivalent variation -2,176 -0.75 
Exchange rate n.a. 0.08 
Real GDP at value added -2,399 -0.43 
Rate of lump-sum transfers n.a. 10.78 
Household expenditure: -1,278 -0.44 
Household income -7,565 -2.05 
Household savings 224 0.14 
Lump-sum transfers 6,511 8.51 
Source: Model simulation results. 
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Introducing carbon taxes leads to welfare losses measured by equivalent variation (EV) of 
0.75% of base household expenditure. Household expenditures – household income minus 
savings and plus lump-sum transfers – are reduced because of a decline in household income 
as well as an increase in household savings, even though lump-sum transfers from the 
government to the household are increased. Despite a reduction in household income, 
household savings are increased due to a higher household savings rate. According to the 
model closures, the government savings rate and investment are fixed, which implies an 
investment driven closure. Due to a decline in household income, the household savings rate 
is increased by 0.38% to match fixed investment. Alternatively, if the savings rate is fixed, 
investment would decrease due to decreasing household income, yet decreases in the final 
consumption would be less pronounced compared that those under an investment driven 
closure. 
7.2.1.2 Factor Markets 
Table 7.2 shows changes in factor income as well as factor supply and factor prices.  
Table 7.2: Change in Factor Income, Factor Prices, and Factor Supply  
 
 
Household income  
(million USD) 
Factor prices 
(per cent) 
Factor supply 
(per cent) 
Land -28 fixed -0.42 
Unskilled labour -1,343 -1.11 -0.34 
Skilled labour -527 -0.94 -0.28 
Capital  -5,157 -2.59 fixed 
Natural Resources -510 -7.41 fixed 
Total -7,565 n.a. n.a. 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Household income – income from capital, labour, land, and natural resources minus taxes on 
factor income and a fiscal depreciation of capital – decreases by 7,565 million USD because 
of decreased income from all production factors. The increased energy cost negatively affects 
the competitiveness of the Russian economy, resulting in reductions of domestic production 
in the most sectors. Hence, demand for production factors decreases, resulting in lower factor 
supply as well as lower returns to factors. For example, a reduction in capital income results 
from a lower return to capital, whereas capital stock is fixed. Since capital is assumed to be 
international immobile, the burden of carbon taxes is partially borne by capital in terms of 
decreasing capital income. This indicates the so called tax-shifting effect in terms of lower 
capital income (de Mooij and Bovenberg, 1998). Both lower labour supply and lower wages 
lead to a reduction in income from unskilled and skilled labour. Decreases in production of 
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natural gas, coal, agriculture, and minerals are associated with lower returns to natural 
resources. Hence, there is a reduction in income from natural recourses. This indicates a tax-
shifting effect between labour and natural resources (Bento and Jacobsen, 2007; Bovenberg 
and van der Ploeg, 1998). Therefore, the burden of carbon taxes is borne not only by labour, 
yet this is also borne by capital and natural resources. Introducing carbon taxes leads to a 
reduction in domestic production of agricultural products so that there is a decline in demand 
for land. Supply of land is assumed to be perfectly elastic in Russia. Therefore, the decreased 
demand for land is associated with lower land supply, which results in lower income from 
land.   
7.2.1.3 Government Budget 
Table 7.3 shows the changes in government revenues and expenditures from trade and 
domestic taxes. 
Table 7.3: Changes in Government Revenues and Expenditures from Trade and 
Domestic Taxes   
 Changes in million USD 
Changes in 
per cent 
Government revenues:  5,850 n.a. 
Export taxes 499 1.95 
Import taxes -56 -0.57 
Carbon taxes 7,977 n.a. 
Consumption taxes -1,307 -2.62 
Tax on unskilled labour income -478 -1.45 
Tax on skilled labour income -188 -1.22 
Social security contribution from unskilled labour  -46 -1.43 
Social security contribution from skilled labour  -18 -1.21 
Capital tax -488 -2.58 
Mineral resource extraction taxes -43 -1.82 
Land tax -2 -0.42 
Government expenditures:  6,506 n.a. 
Lump-sum transfer 6,511 8.51 
Production subsidies -5 -0.74 
Source: Model simulation results.  
According to the model closure rule, government consumption is fixed and therefore the net 
government income – revenues from taxes minus government subsidies and transfers – 
changes. Introducing carbon taxes compensated by an increase in lump-sum transfers results 
in decreases in revenues from almost all taxes, whereas the only total revenue from carbon 
taxes as well as export taxes is increased. The main consideration with respect to changes in 
tax revenues is that higher (lower) tax revenues reduce (increase) the cost of carbon taxation.  
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Export taxes. As shown in Table 7.4, the largest source of export tax revenues is the export 
tax on crude oil, which accounts for 69.6% of the total revenue from export taxes, followed 
by petroleum products (9.2%), metals (6.9%), and natural gas (6.1%). 
Table 7.4: Changes in Revenues from Export Taxes   
 Baseline revenue shares (per cent) 
Changes in revenues 
from export taxes 
(million USD) 
Changes in export 
supply (per cent) 
Coal 0.1 2.07 7.52 
Crude oil 69.6 357.62 1.93 
Natural gas 6.1 335.23 24.54 
Petroleum products 9.2 34.09 1.37 
Wood products 2.1 -70.63 -13.27 
Chemical products 2.8 -57.56 -8.26 
Mineral products 0.2 -1.21 -2.90 
Metals 6.9 -112.58 -6.43 
Metal products 0.1 -0.71 -3.09 
Electronic equipment 0.02 -0.23 -3.91 
Machinery equipment 0.3 -0.78 -1.13 
Agricultural products 0.01 0.01 0.44 
Transport equipment 0.2 0.41 0.59 
Minerals 0.6 3.75 2.19 
Textiles 0.4 -0.08 -0.14 
Paper products 1.3 9.67 2.83 
Total 100 499.04 n.a. 
Source: Version 7 of the GTAP database and model simulation results. 
Introducing carbon taxes leads to increases in the revenues from export taxes on some energy 
commodities and non-energy intensive commodities. The reasons for this are both increases 
in export supplies and a depreciation of the currency. Domestic producers of energy 
commodities as well as non-energy intensive commodities become more competitive in 
export markets because of decreasing production costs. Carbon taxes are levied only on 
domestic consumption of energy. As a result, there are increases in export supply of coal, 
crude oil, natural gas, petroleum products, agricultural products, transport equipment, 
minerals and paper products, which are associated with increases in revenues from export 
taxes on these commodities. In particular, the increases in revenues from export taxes on 
crude oil and natural gas are strong pronounced due to high increases in export supply as well 
as high export tax rates. In contrast, domestic producers of energy intensive sectors become 
less competitive in export markets because of increased production costs. Therefore, there are 
decreases in export supply of energy intensive commodities, such as wood products, chemical 
products, mineral products, metals, and metal products, which are associated with lower 
revenues from export taxes. Overall, the total revenue from export taxes increases by 499 
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million USD, since the increases in revenues from export taxes on energy commodities as 
well as non-energy intensive commodities overweigh the decreases in revenues from export 
taxes on energy intensive commodities. The increased total revenue from export taxes, to 
certain extent, reduces the cost of carbon taxation since these accumulate higher lump-sum 
transfers to households.   
Import tariffs. As shown in Table 7.5, the largest source of import tariff revenues is the 
import tariff on machinery equipment, which account for 18.0% of the total revenue from 
import tariffs, followed by food products (16.2%), transport equipment (15.4%), and textile 
products (14.9%). 
Table 7.5: Changes in Revenues from Import Tariffs   
 Baseline revenue shares (per cent) 
Changes in revenues 
from import tariffs 
(million USD) 
Changes in import 
demand (per cent) 
Coal 0.01 -0.19 -22.73 
Crude oil 0.00003 -0.0002 -5.23 
Natural gas 0.00001 -0.0002 -25.04 
Petroleum products 0.04 -0.15 -4.28 
Electricity 0.1 0.39 3.50 
Wood products 3.4 7.23 2.12 
Chemical products 12.5 -1.26 -0.18 
Mineral products 2.5 0.68 0.20 
Metals  2.0 0.57 0.22 
Metal products  3.5 -1.87 -0.63 
Electronics equipment 5.6 -0.17 -0.11 
Machinery equipment 18.0 -8.51 -0.56 
Agricultural products 3.2 -3.45 -1.18 
Food products 16.2 -17.37 -1.18 
Transport equipment 15.4 -12.08 -0.89 
Minerals 0.2 -0.65 -4.32 
Textiles 14.9 -14.47 -1.08 
Paper products 2.6 -4.27 -1.80 
Total 100 -55.59 n.a. 
Source: Version 7 of the GTAP database and model simulation results. 
Introducing carbon taxes leads to increases in the revenues from import tariffs on electricity, 
wood products, mineral products, and metals, because of increases in import demand for 
energy intensive commodities as well as a depreciation of the currency. Most domestically 
produced energy intensive commodities become less competitive in domestic markets so that 
domestic consumers increase their demand for relative less expensive imports. In contrast, 
revenues from import tariffs on energy commodities as well as non-energy intensive 
commodities, such as agriculture, food products, and textiles, decrease because of lower 
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household income as well as a lower import demand via a substitution effect in favour of 
domestically produced commodities. Overall, the total revenue from import tariffs is reduced 
by 55.6 million USD since the decreases in revenues from import tariffs on energy and non- 
energy intensive commodities are more pronounced compared to the increases in revenues 
from import tariffs on some energy intensive commodities.   
Carbon taxes and lump-sum transfers. Lump-sum transfers paid by the government to 
households are increased by 6,511 million USD because of an increase in the revenue from 
carbon taxes (7,977 million USD). According to the policy simulation, the revenue from 
carbon taxes is not directly returned to households, yet the rate of lump-sum transfers clears 
the government account in response to changes in all taxes. Therefore, due to various 
macroeconomics effects, the revenue from carbon taxes differs from the increase in lump-sum 
transfers. 
Consumption taxes. The revenue from consumption taxes decreases by 1,307 million USD. 
Consumption taxes include value added taxes and excise taxes, which both are a significant 
part of the Russian government budget. The reduction in the revenue from consumption taxes 
results from decreases in total domestic consumption of all commodities (see Section 7.2.2.2). 
Factor taxes. As mentioned, introducing carbon taxes leads to decreases in the returns to 
capital, natural resources, land and labour. Moreover, supply of unskilled and skilled labour 
as well as land is reduced because of lower factor demand. As a result, there are decreases in 
the revenues from taxes on labour income, social security contributions, the tax on capital 
income as well as taxes on natural resources and land (Table 7.3).  
Production subsidies. The agricultural sector receives a production subsidy only. Decreasing 
domestic demand for agricultural products leads to a reduction in the total production of 
agricultural products by 0.33%. As a result, government expenditures on production subsidies 
decrease by 5.0 million USD. 
7.2.2 Sectoral Effects 
7.2.2.1 Producer and Consumer Prices 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the price system in the modified version of the STAGE model.  
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Figure 7.1: Price System for Non-Energy Producing Sectors  
 
Source: Own compilation based on McDonald (2009). 
Table 7.6 reveals the changes in production costs resulting from the introduction of carbon 
taxes compensated by an increase in lump-sum transfers. Changes in energy costs are 
indicated by the activity prices of energy aggregates (PVE). For example, introducing carbon 
taxes leads to increases in PVE of almost all sectors, whereas PVE of the petroleum product 
sector decreases because of a lower producer price of crude oil (Column 6 of Table 7.6). The 
carbon tax is not levied on usage of crude oil by the petroleum product sector. Capital and the 
energy aggregate build a capital-energy aggregate, whose average cost is indicated by an 
activity price of capital-energy aggregate (PVKE). Due to lower capital costs, PVKE of some 
capital intensive sectors are reduced since the reductions in capital costs overweigh the 
increases in energy costs (Column 5 of Table 7.6). For example, there are decreases in PVKE 
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of crude oil, food products, construction, trade products, transport equipment, private and 
public services, minerals, and paper products. On the next level of the production nest, the 
aggregate of capital-energy is nested with an aggregate of primary factors to form an 
aggregate of value added-energy, whose average cost is defined by an activity price of value 
added-energy aggregate (PVAE). The decreases in wages for unskilled and skilled labour lead 
to lower labour costs for industries. As a result, the activity prices of primary factor aggregate 
(PVLL) are reduced in almost all sectors with the decreases in PVLL of the coal, natural gas, 
and mineral sectors being more pronounced compared to those in other sectors (Column 4 of 
Table 7.6). This is because the primary factor aggregate of these sectors includes natural 
resources, whose prices decrease as well. PVLL for the crude oil sector increases because the 
return to natural resources used by the oil sector becomes higher. Furthermore, decreasing 
PVLL leads to reductions in PVAE of agricultural products and textiles as well as other 
labour intensive sectors (Column 3 of Table 7.6). Finally, an aggregate of intermediates and 
an aggregate of value added-energy are nested to form output. The average production cost is 
a weighted average cost of intermediates and value added-energy aggregates. Activity prices 
of intermediate aggregate (PINT) increase in energy intensive sectors: chemical products, 
metals, metal products, electronic equipment, machinery equipment, and transport equipment 
because of higher consumer prices of some intermediates (Column 2 of Table 7.6). Overall, 
introducing carbon taxes compensated by higher lump-sum transfers leads to increases in 
average production costs (PX) in energy intensive sectors, such as electricity, wood products, 
chemical products, and minerals mainly because of increased energy costs (Column 1 of 
Table 7.6). In contrast, average production costs of labour- and some capital intensive 
commodities, such as agriculture, food products, and trade products, are reduced since the 
decreases in factor costs overweigh the increases in energy costs.         
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Table 7.6 Changes in Activity Prices (per cent)   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  PX PINT PVAE PVLL PVKE PVE 
Coal -4.14 -0.03 -7.76 -12.29 4.99 7.83 
Crude oil -0.48 -0.34 -0.55 0.76 -1.79 8.07 
Natural gas -2.45 -1.37 -3.73 -7.95 1.47 10.12 
Petroleum products -1.06 -0.69 -1.07 -1.08 -1.07 -0.77 
Gas manufacturing -0.36 -0.43 -0.31 -1.06 0.82 6.47 
Electricity* 6.85 -0.88 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Wood products 2.81 -0.15 4.67 -1.09 6.04 6.58 
Chemical products 1.38 0.33 2.20 -1.08 2.96 4.20 
Mineral products 0.94 -0.10 1.94 -1.09 4.03 7.25 
Metals 0.98 0.24 1.79 -1.09 2.53 6.79 
Metal products 0.61 0.61 0.61 -1.09 2.86 6.52 
Electronic equipment 0.77 0.34 1.56 -1.08 2.99 6.41 
Transports 0.40 -0.52 0.88 -1.08 1.70 5.44 
Machinery equipment 0.20 0.32 0.06 -1.08 2.16 7.01 
Water 0.09 -0.48 0.36 -1.06 2.37 6.60 
Agricultural products -0.43 -0.43 -0.44 -0.82 0.78 5.18 
Food products -0.50 -0.48 -0.55 -1.09 -0.30 6.73 
Construction -0.75 0.28 -1.71 -1.09 -2.16 6.00 
Trade products -1.66 -0.15 -2.29 -1.09 -2.44 5.61 
Transport equipment -0.22 0.04 -1.50 -1.08 -2.48 8.79 
Private services -1.16 -0.57 -1.46 -1.03 -1.71 4.97 
Public services -0.70 -0.35 -0.87 -1.01 -0.31 6.90 
Minerals -1.73 -0.55 -2.66 -2.80 -2.55 6.41 
Textiles -0.15 -0.18 -0.10 -1.09 1.28 6.97 
Paper products -0.87 -0.42 -1.83 -1.08 -2.17 11.24 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Changes in production costs determine changes in producer prices. Table 7.7 shows the 
changes in producer and consumer prices. Three commodity (sector) groups are distinguished: 
(1) energy commodities, (2) energy intensive commodities, and (3) non-energy intensive 
commodities. The first group, energy commodities, includes coal, crude oil, natural gas, gas 
manufacture, and petroleum products. The second group, energy intensive commodities, 
includes electricity, wood products, chemical products, mineral products, metals, metal 
products, electronic equipment, transports, machinery equipment, and water. These 
commodities are the most energy intensive compared to other commodities so that 
introducing carbon taxes leads to increases in producer prices because of increased energy 
costs (Column 2 of Table 7.7). The third group, non-energy intensive commodities, includes 
agricultural products, food products, construction, trade products, transport equipment, private 
services, public services, minerals, textiles, and paper products. In comparison to energy 
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intensive commodities, producer prices of non-energy intensive commodities decrease 
because of decreased labour and capital costs. 
Table 7.7: Changes in Producer and Consumer Prices (per cent)   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Consumer 
prices 
Producer 
prices 
Import and 
export prices 
Competitive-
ness indicator 
Coal 22.38 -7.12 0.08 7.75 
Crude oil 5.92 -1.24 0.08 1.33 
Natural gas 13.16 -2.45 (-2.45) 0.08 2.59 
Petroleum products 2.55 -1.37 0.08 1.46 
Gas manufacturing 19.44 -0.47 0.08 0.55 
Electricity 6.84 6.91 0.08 -6.39 
Wood products 2.59 4.59 0.08 -4.32 
Chemical products 1.34 2.42 0.08 -2.28 
Mineral products 0.82 0.99 0.08 -0.91 
Metals 1.65 1.91 0.08 -1.80 
Metal products 0.49 0.73 0.08 -0.65 
Electronic equipment 0.24 0.92 0.08 -0.83 
Transports 0.42 0.46 0.08 -0.39 
Machinery equipment 0.16 0.22 0.08 -0.14 
Water 0.09 0.09 0.08 -0.01 
Agricultural products -0.42 -0.47 0.08 0.55 
Food products -0.41 -0.55 0.08 0.63 
Construction -0.73 -0.76 0.08 0.84 
Trade products -1.65 -1.68 0.08 1.78 
Transport equipment -0.13 -0.32 0.08 0.39 
Private services -1.07 -1.25 0.08 1.34 
Public services -0.68 -0.70 0.08 0.78 
Minerals -2.14 -2.58 0.08 2.72 
Textiles -0.03 -0.20 0.08 0.28 
Paper products -0.76 -1.24 0.08 1.33 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Due to a depreciation of the currency, import prices (PM) as well as export prices (PE) are 
increased (Column 3 of Table 7.7). In contrast, the export price of natural gas is reduced by 
2.45% because of an increase in the export supply of natural gas – Russia is modelled as a 
large economy with respect to the natural gas market. Consumer prices (PQD) are defined as 
the weighted averages of the prices of domestically produced commodities (PD) and the 
prices of imported commodities (PM) plus sales taxes and carbon taxes. Introducing carbon 
taxes results in higher consumer prices of energy commodities (Column 1 of Table 7.7). 
Moreover, the consumer prices of energy intensive commodities, such as electricity, wood 
products, and chemical products, increase because of both higher producer prices and a 
depreciation of the currency. Despite the increases in import prices, consumer prices of non -
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energy intensive commodities, such as food products, textiles, and trade products, are reduced 
because of lower domestic producer prices. 
Following Rivers (2010) and Bruvoll and Faehn (2006), competitiveness of domestic 
producers is defined as a relative change in the ratio of import prices to domestic producer 
prices. Column 4 of Table 7.7 shows the percentage changes in the ratio between import and 
domestic prices. Positive (negative) values indicate increases (decreases) in competitiveness. 
Decreases in production costs as well as a depreciation of the currency makes domestic 
producers of energy commodities as well as non-energy intensive commodities more 
competitive in domestic and export markets compared to foreign firms. In contrast, 
domestically produced energy intensive commodities lose their market shares in domestic and 
export markets. 
7.2.2.2 Production and Consumption  
Table 7.8 shows the sectoral effects of the introduction of carbon taxes.  
Energy commodities. Carbon taxes are imposed on the composite of imported and 
domestically produced coal, crude oil, petroleum products, natural gas, and gas manufacture 
so that higher consumer prices lead to decreases in the demand for imported as well as 
domestically produced energy (Column 5 and 4 of Table 7.8). Because of both a depreciation 
of the currency and lower production costs, domestic producers of energy commodities 
become more competitive in domestic and export markets compared to foreign firms (Column 
4 of Table 7.7).  
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Table 7.8: Sectoral Effects of Carbon Taxation (percentage changes)   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Production  
costs 
Domestic 
production 
Export  
supply  
Domestic 
demand 
Import  
demand 
Domestic 
consumption 
Energy sectors:        
Coal  -4.14 -5.11 7.52 -13.41 -22.73 -14.98 
Crude oil -0.48 0.30 1.93 -1.91 -5.23 -1.95 
Natural gas -2.45 -1.94 24.54 -6.64 -25.04 -7.14 
Petroleum products -1.06 -1.93 1.37 -2.81 -4.28 -2.81 
Gas manufacture -0.36 -13.28 -12.18 -13.55 -14.21 -13.55 
Energy intensive sectors:       
Electricity  6.85 -5.75 -17.32 -5.64 3.50 -5.55 
Wood products 2.81 -8.46 -13.27 -5.26 2.12 -2.10 
Chemical products 1.38 -5.85 -8.26 -3.92 -0.18 -2.23 
Mineral products 0.94 -1.22 -2.90 -1.11 0.20 -0.87 
Metals 0.98 -4.74 -6.43 -2.97 0.22 -2.54 
Metal products 0.61 -2.06 -3.09 -1.83 -0.63 -1.40 
Electronic equipment 0.77 -2.58 -3.91 -2.29 -0.11 -0.54 
Transports 0.40 -1.38 -2.03 -1.26 -0.90 -1.22 
Machinery equipment 0.20 -0.88 -1.13 -0.84 -0.56 -0.73 
Water 0.09 -0.73 -0.75 -0.73 -0.71 -0.73 
Non-energy intensive sectors:       
Agriculture -0.43 -0.33 0.44 -0.39 -1.18 -0.47 
Food products -0.50 -0.18 0.68 -0.26 -1.18 -0.46 
Construction -0.75 -0.13 1.53 -0.17 -2.27 -0.26 
Trade products -1.66 -0.30 3.26 -0.33 -1.99 -0.36 
Transport equipment -0.22 0.004 0.59 -0.19 -0.89 -0.53 
Private services -1.16 -0.24 2.27 -0.42 -1.20 -0.53 
Public services -0.70 -0.01 1.55 -0.01 -0.75 -0.03 
Minerals -1.73 -1.47 2.19 -3.15 -4.32 -3.35 
Textiles -0.15 -0.60 -0.14 -0.70 -1.08 -0.94 
Paper products -0.87 0.90 2.83 0.14 -1.80 -0.57 
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As a result, relative decreases in the consumption of imported energy commodities are more 
pronounced than those of domestically produced commodities. As shown in Table 7.9, in 
absolute terms, reductions in demand for domestically produced energy inputs, however, are 
much higher than imported commodities since the shares of imported energy in domestic 
markets are relatively small (Table 6.1). 
Table 7.9: Changes in Domestic Production, Export Supply, Domestic and Import 
Demand and Domestic Consumption (million tons of oil equivalent)   
 Domestic production 
Domestic 
demand 
Export 
supply 
Import 
demand 
Domestic 
consumption 
Coal -7.65 -11.86 4.21 -3.91 -15.77 
Crude oil 1.27 -3.51 4.78 -0.12 -3.63 
Natural gas -5.31 -15.47 10.16 -1.61 -17.08 
Petroleum products -3.50 -4.02 0.51 -0.02 -4.04 
Gas manufacture -19.55 -15.95 -3.60 -0.02 -15.97 
Electricity -13.11 -12.76 -0.36 0.08 -12.67 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Overall, introducing carbon taxes leads to a reduction in total domestic consumption of all 
energy commodities with the relative reduction in demand for coal and gas manufacture being 
more pronounced compared to those of petroleum products, crude oil and natural gas 
(Column 6 of Table 7.8). The reason for this is that coal is the most carbon-intensive energy 
input. Furthermore, due to declining production costs, introducing carbon taxes leads to 
increases in the export supply of natural gas by 24.5%, coal (7.5%), crude oil (1.9%), 
petroleum products (1.4%), whereas the export supply of gas manufacture is reduced by 
12.2% because of a strong negative output effect. A strong reduction in the domestic demand 
for gas manufacture results in lower profitability of this sector so that production factors leave 
out the gas manufacture sector in favour of other sectors. Moreover, the substitution effect 
between export and domestic supply in the gas manufacture sector is less pronounced 
compared to that in other energy sectors because of a smaller reduction in production costs of 
gas manufacture. Despite the increases in export supplies of energy, there are decreases in 
total domestic production of energy inputs, whereas production of crude oil is slightly 
increased by 0.3% due to higher export supply (Column 2 of Table 7.8). 
Energy intensive commodities. Increases in energy costs lead to higher producer prices of 
energy intensive commodities such as electricity36, wood products, chemical products, and 
                                                 
36 Electricity is an energy input as well as energy intensive good. In this article, electricity is classified as an 
energy intensive good.  
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metals. Consumption of electricity is not subject to carbon taxation, yet the electricity sector 
is greatly impacted from increased energy costs. The electricity sector is the largest domestic 
consumer of coal and gas as well as one of the largest consumers of petroleum products 
(Table 6.3). As a result, electricity-intensive sectors are adversely affected by a high 
electricity price. Hence, there are decreases in domestic demand for all domestically produced 
energy intensive commodities (Column 4 of Table 7.8). In addition, reductions in demand for 
energy intensive commodities are also exacerbated by decreased household income. Since 
domestic producers of energy intensive commodities become less competitive compared to 
foreign firms (Column 4 of Table 7.7), there are increases in import demand for electricity, 
wood products, mineral products and metals (Column 5 of Table 7.8). In contrast, import 
demand for other energy intensive commodities, such as chemical products, metal products, 
electronic equipment, transports, machinery equipment, and water is reduced because of 
lower household income. Furthermore, export supply of all energy intensive commodities is 
decreased due to increased production costs (Column 3 of Table 7.8). Overall, total domestic 
consumption as well as domestic production of all energy intensive commodities is reduced 
(Column 6 and 2 of Table 7.8). 
Non-energy intensive commodities. Introducing carbon taxes compensated by an increase in 
lump-sum transfers leads to reductions in consumption of almost all domestically produced 
non-energy intensive commodities, such as food products, trade products, and textiles 
(Column 4 of Table 7.8). The reason for this is lower household income. Furthermore, there 
are reductions in consumption of imported non-energy intensive commodities, which are 
more pronounced than those of domestically produced commodities. Compared to energy 
intensive commodities, production costs in labour and capital intensive sectors are reduced 
since the reduction in costs for primary factors more than compensates increases in energy 
costs (Column 1 of Table 7.8). Both lower consumer prices and a depreciation of the currency 
make domestically produced non-energy intensive commodities less expensive compared to 
imports, thereby increasing competitiveness of the former. Moreover, domestically produced 
non-energy intensive commodities become more competitive in export markets. Hence, there 
are increases in export supply of almost all non-energy intensive commodities, such as food 
products, trade products, and minerals (Column 3 of Table 7.8). Export supply of textiles, 
however, is reduced because of a strong output effect so that production factors leave out this 
sector. Overall, domestic consumption and production of almost all non-energy intensive 
commodities is reduced, whereas there is an increase in domestic production of paper 
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products and transport equipment due to both higher export and domestic demand (Column 2 
and 6 of Table 7.8). 
7.2.2.3 Final Consumption 
Total domestic demand consists of four demand categories: household demand, intermediate 
demand, government demand, and investment demand. According to the model closure, 
investment and government consumption is fixed so that changes in household consumption 
are considered only. Government consumption consists mainly of consumption of public 
services, whose share accounts for approximately 92% of the total government consumption 
expenditure. Moreover, the government is the largest domestic consumer of public services, 
whose consumption share amounts to 86% of total domestic consumption of public services. 
Furthermore, changes in CO2 emissions by industries are discussed below.   
As shown in Table 7.10, households spend about 23.7% of total income on the consumption 
of trade commodities, followed by food products (18.0%), transports (8.3%), and private 
services (8.2%). Introducing carbon taxes leads to decreases in the household consumption of 
coal, natural gas, gas manufacture, and electricity with the relative reduction in demand for 
coal being more pronounced compared to those of other energy commodities because of high 
carbon intensity of coal. Despite the carbon taxation, the final consumption of petroleum 
products is increased slightly by 0.3% via a substitution effect between energy commodities. 
Since the increase in consumer price of petroleum products is less pronounced compared to 
those of other energy commodities (Table 7.10).   
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Table 7.10: Changes in Final Consumption (per cent)   
 Baseline expenditure 
shares 
Changes in 
consumption 
Coal 0.1 -15.99 
Natural gas 0.1 -9.14 
Petroleum products 3.4 0.26 
Gas manufacture  1.2 -13.92 
Electricity  7.5 -3.76 
Wood products 1.1 -3.41 
Chemical products 2.9 -2.21 
Mineral products 0.4 -1.71 
Metals 0.01 -2.51 
Meta products 0.6 -1.39 
Electronic equipment  0.2 -1.14 
Transports 8.3 -1.32 
Machinery equipment  3.2 -1.06 
Water 0.8 -0.99 
Agriculture 7.7 -0.49 
Food products 18.0 -0.49 
Construction  0.5 -0.18 
Trade products 23.7 0.76 
Transport equipment 3.3 -0.78 
Private services 8.2 0.17 
Public services 4.0 -0.23 
Minerals  0.002 1.27 
Textiles  4.1 -0.87 
Paper products 0.5 -0.14 
Total  100 n.a. 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Both higher consumer prices of energy intensive commodities and lower household income 
result in reductions in the household consumption of energy intensive commodities, such as 
chemical products, wood products, and transports. Moreover, a decline in household income 
leads to decreases in final consumption of non-energy intensive commodities, such as 
agricultural products, food products and textiles. In contrast, there are increases in final 
consumption of trade products, private services and minerals. The reason for this is a strong 
substitution effect since reductions of the consumer prices of these commodities are stronger 
compared to those of many other non-energy intensive commodities (Table 7.7).  
7.2.2.4 Technological Change in the Electricity Sector 
As mentioned, the electricity sector is one of the most adversely affected sectors by the 
introduction of carbon taxation since the electricity sector is highly energy intensive. Figure 
7.2 shows the changes in output and price of electricity from four power generation 
technologies.  
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Figure 7.2: Changes in Output and Price from Electricity Generation Technologies (per 
cent)   
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Source: Model simulation results. 
Introducing carbon taxes leads to a reduction in total production of electricity resulting from 
decreases in output from coal- and gas-fired electricity technologies with the reduction in 
output from coal-fired technologies being more pronounced compared to that from gas-fired 
technologies. This is because coal is the most carbon intensive energy input so that the burden 
of carbon taxation is mainly placed on coal. Coal-fired technologies, however, are assumed to 
be more capital intensive compared to gas-fired technologies (Figure 7.3).  
Figure 7.3: Cost Structure by Electricity Technologies (per cent of total)   
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Source: Own calculation based on the version 7 of the GTAP database; EIA (2011a); APEC 
(2006); Veselov et al. (2010). 
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At the same time, carbon taxation leads to a reduction in capital costs, yet the effect of 
increased energy costs overweighs that of lower capital costs. Therefore, average production 
costs for coal-fired technologies increase more compared to that of gas-fired technologies. 
This leads to a stronger reduction in output from coal-fired technologies as that from gas-fired 
technologies. In contrast, technologies such as nuclear and hydro become more profitable 
compared to thermal technologies so that output from nuclear and hydro technologies 
increases. 
7.2.3 Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
The magnitude of carbon taxation aims at a targeted reduction of overall CO2 emissions by 
10%. Reductions in CO2 emissions are achieved via lower domestic demand for energy 
commodities used by industries and households. Table 7.11 reveals the changes in CO2 
emissions by sources and energy commodities. 
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Table 7.11: Changes in CO2 Emissions (giga gram)   
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Coal -94.5 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.1 -94.6 
Crude oil 0.01 25.4 57.0 4.4 14.4 101.3 
Natural gas -0.001 -51.3 -520.7 -13.3 -1.0 -586.2 
Petroleum products n.a.a) n.a. -400.6 n.a. -51.5 -452.2 
Gas manufacture -3.0 -17.0 n.a. -37.2 -231.9 -289.1 
Electricity  -53,913.5 -210.9 -28,359.8 -3,753.0 -18,457.7 -10,4694.9 
Wood products -5.3 -0.2 0.0 -141.1 -3.4 -150.0 
Chemical products -5.4 -1.4 -102.3 -1,273.3 -1,568.9 -2,951.4 
Mineral products -303.8 -0.4 -667.4 -52.2 -658.0 -1,681.8 
Metals -951.2 -19.3 -2,056.8 -1,008.1 -2,364.0 -6,399.4 
Metal products -4.7 -0.1 -25.7 -37.8 -73.8 -142.2 
Electronic equipment -1.0 -0.03 -0.003 -17.1 -22.7 -40.8 
Transports -36.6 -6.2 -4,847.8 -3,297.1 -4,838.9 -13,026.7 
Machinery equipment  -35.7 -0.3 -106.5 -13.5 -347.6 -503.5 
Water  -43.3 -0.001 -0.6 -27.6 -6.2 -77.8 
Agriculture -70.1 -1.3 -44.9 -167.3 -42.9 -326.5 
Food products -84.9 -0.5 -89.3 -28.0 -201.9 -404.5 
Construction  -17.4 -2.4 -12.0 -20.0 -98.8 -150.5 
Trade products -161.2 -0.002 -61.8 -126.2 -112.5 -461.7 
Transport equipment  -0.9 -0.04 -1.7 0.05 -4.2 -6.7 
Private services -53.9 -5.8 -84.4 -331.9 -258.1 -734.2 
Public services -327.6 -0.001 -44.1 -81.0 -687.7 -1,140.4 
Minerals  -0.3 -0.2 -3.5 -1.6 -2.1 -7.7 
Textiles  -6.8 -0.2 -4.6 -0.9 -22.6 -35.2 
Paper products -1.1 0.0003 -6.0 0.6 -72.2 -78.7 
Households -3,099.7 n.a. -719.5 174.7 -17,267.1 -20,911.6 
Total  -59,221.9 -292.2 -38,103.0 -10,248.5 -47,381.4 -155,247.0 
a) n.a. no CO2 emissions are recorded in the database from usage of coal crude oil, petroleum products by the 
petroleum product sectors as well as from usage of natural gas by the gas manufacture sector.    
Source: Model simulation results. 
The main results are summarized as follows:  
1) The total reduction of CO2 emissions from coal accounts for 59,222 Giga grams, 
which is mainly achieved via reductions in demand for coal used by the electricity 
sector (53,914 Giga grams) and households (3,010 Giga grams). 
2) The total reduction of CO2 emissions from gas manufacture accounts for 47,381 Giga 
grams, which is mainly achieved via reductions in demand for gas manufacture used 
by the electricity sector (18,458 Giga grams) and households (17,267 Giga grams).  
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3) The total reduction of CO2 emissions from natural gas accounts for 38,103 Giga 
grams, which is mainly achieved via reductions in demand for natural gas used by the 
electricity sector (28,360 Giga grams) and transports (4,848 Giga grams). 
4) The total reduction of CO2 emissions from petroleum products accounts for 10,249 
Giga grams, which is mainly achieved via reductions in demand for petroleum 
products used by transports (3,297 Giga grams), the electricity sector (3,753 Giga 
gram), and the chemical products sector (1,273 Giga grams). 
5) The total reduction of CO2 emissions from crude oil accounts 292 Giga grams, which 
is mainly achieved via a reduction in demand for crude oil used by the electricity 
sector (211 Giga grams).   
As shown in Table 7.12, the reduction of CO2 emissions is mainly achieved via decreases in 
energy demand by the largest domestic consumers of energy, such as electricity, transports, 
chemical products, metals, and households.      
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Table 7.12: Shares of Reduction in CO2 Emissions by Sources and Changes in Energy 
Intensity (per cent)   
 Baseline shares of CO2 emission 
Shares of reductions 
in CO2 emissions 
Energy intensity 
Coal 0.1 0.06 -0.67 
Crude oil 1.1 -0.07 0.29 
Natural gas 1.6 0.38 -0.39 
Petroleum products 1.5 0.29 0.01 
Gas manufacture 0.1 0.19 -4.09 
Electricity  55.1 67.44 -3.15 
Wood products 0.1 0.10 -2.75 
Chemical products 2.2 1.90 -1.92 
Mineral products 1.4 1.08 -4.47 
Metals 4.0 4.12 -3.29 
Metal products 0.1 0.09 -4.44 
Electronic equipment 0.04 0.03 -3.72 
Transports 13.2 8.39 -3.26 
Machinery equipment  0.3 0.32 -4.75 
Water  0.1 0.05 -4.55 
Agriculture 1.1 0.21 -2.38 
Food products 0.4 0.26 -3.60 
Construction  0.3 0.10 -2.83 
Trade products 0.6 0.30 -3.33 
Transport equipment  0.004 0.004 -3.50 
Private services 1.5 0.47 -2.77 
Public services 1.0 0.73 -4.02 
Minerals  0.01 0.005 -3.86 
textiles  0.02 0.02 -4.38 
Paper products 0.1 0.05 -5.35 
Households 14.1 13.47 n.a. 
Total  100 100 n.a. 
Source: Model simulation results. 
For example, a reduction in energy demand by the electricity sector is responsible for 67.4% 
of the overall reduction in CO2 emissions, followed by households (13.5%), transports 
(8.4%). In addition, the electricity sector is also a large domestic contributor of non CO2 GHG 
emissions as well as local air pollutions, such as nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulphur dioxide 
(SO2), and carbon monoxide (CO). According to the Fifth National Report of Russian 
Federation (UNFCCC, 2010a), the power generation sector produces about 81% of total 
GHG37 emissions among all industries in Russia. Therefore, introducing carbon taxes will 
also lead to reductions in other emissions. Moreover, about 41% of the total technical energy 
saving potential is concentrated in the Russian power generation sector (electricity and heat) 
since the power generation sector is the largest domestic consumer of energy resources 
                                                 
37 GHG states for greenhouse gas emissions, which include direct greenhouse gases such as CO2 (carbon 
dioxide), CH4 (methane), N2O (nitrous oxide), PFCs (perfluorocarbons), HFCs (hydro fluorocarbons), and SF6 
(sulphur hexafluoride).  
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(Bashmakov, 2009). Hence, the power generation sector is expected to play the crucial role in 
Russian environmental policy. 
Carbon taxation on households and industries allows an avoidance of strong sectoral carbon 
leakages. For example, under carbon taxation on industries only, the domestic price level of 
energy commodities used by households would decrease. This would result in an increase in 
final consumption. A similar effect occurs under carbon taxation on households only. Under 
carbon taxation on households and industries, the decline in domestic production would be 
less pronounced since both households and industries take the burden of carbon taxation. 
Energy intensity. Reductions in demand for energy inputs are mainly associated with lower 
production. Nevertheless, the decreased demand for energy inputs used by industries is also 
achieved via substitution effects. In the presence of inter-fuel as well as factor-fuel 
substitutions, industries substitute energy inputs for less expensive production factors, such as 
capital and labour. Table 7.12 shows the changes in the sectoral energy intensity. The sectoral 
energy intensity is calculated by dividing the amount of total energy consumed by output. 
Negative (positive) values indicate decreases (increases) in energy intensity in per cent. 
According to the results, changes in energy intensity differ by sector, depending on initial 
energy and factor intensity. For example, the energy intensity of the paper products sector 
decreases by 5.35%, which means that the transport sector requires 5.35% less energy to 
produce a unit of output. The maximum reduction of energy intensity among sectors via 
substitution effects does not exceed 5.35%. In contrast, the energy intensity of crude oil and 
petroleum products sectors is slightly increased because of increasing demand for energy 
inputs by these sectors – carbon taxes are not imposed on energy inputs used by the crude oil 
and petroleum product sectors. The key factors in determining the magnitude of a reduction in 
energy intensity are elasticities of inter-fuel and factor-fuel substitutions as well as factor 
endowment. For example, under a Leontief nesting structure, the energy intensity would be 
constant since a Leontief nesting structure does not allow any substitution possibility in 
production. Despite high elasticities of substitution, reductions in energy intensity can also be 
limited by fixed factor supply. Furthermore, a reduction in energy intensity can be achieved 
through an adoption of new more energy efficient technologies. 
7.2.4 Carbon Taxation and Income Equity 
To examine the distributional effects of carbon taxes, a micro-accounting approach is used as 
discussed in Section 6.1.3. Disaggregated factor income and consumption expenditure 
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categories by decile are multiplied by relative changes in factor and commodity prices. Figure 
7.4 illustrates the relative changes in total factor income, total consumption expenditure and 
net income by decile resulting from the introduction of carbon taxes compensated by an 
increase in lump-sum transfers. 
Figure 7.4: Changes in Total Factor Income, Total Consumption Expenditures and Net 
Incomea by Decile (per cent)  
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Source: Model simulation results. 
As shown in Figure 7.4, the uses-side incidence of carbon taxes is definitely regressive. 
Relative increases in consumption expenditures by poor households are larger compared to 
those by rich households as indicated by the green columns. This is because poor households 
spend more on consumption of coal, electricity, and gas relative to rich households, whereas 
the consumption share of petroleum products is larger by rich households. Moreover, the 
relative increase in the price of petroleum products is smaller compared to those of other 
energy inputs.          
On the other hand, the source-side incidence of carbon taxes is quite progressive so that rich 
household groups are more adversely affected by lower factor prices than poor households. 
This is because the income share from capital and natural resources is significantly larger by 
rich households compared to that by poor households. At the same time, reductions in the 
returns to capital and natural resources are more pronounced than reductions in gross wages. 
Overall, the net income of poor households’ decreases stronger compared to that of rich 
households as indicated by the blue columns since the regressive effect of the uses-side 
incidence of carbon taxes is more pronounced compared to the progressive effect of the 
source-side incidence.       
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Increase in lump-sum transfers as well as changes in savings rates are not taken into account 
in this analysis. Nevertheless, the revenue-recycling policy can significantly affect the income 
distribution. A distribution of revenues from carbon taxes in favour of poor households can 
increase progressivity of carbon taxation, thereby alleviating income inequality in Russia.   
7.3 Substituting Carbon Taxes for Labour Taxes under Perfect 
Competition 
7.3.1 Macroeconomic and Fiscal Effects 
7.3.1.1 Macroeconomic Effects 
Table 7.13 shows the macroeconomic effects of two policy simulation experiments: (1) an 
introduction of carbon taxes compensated by an increase in lump-sum transfers (CT_HS) and 
(2) an introduction of carbon taxes compensated by a reduction in tax rates on labour income 
(CT_LT) under perfect competition in output markets. Compared to a CT_HS, substituting 
carbon taxes for labour taxes leads to small welfare gains measured by an EV of 0.23% of 
base household expenditure. 
Table 7.13: Macroeconomic Effects  
 
Changes in million USD  Changes in per cent 
CT_HS CT_LT  CT_HS CT_LT 
Equivalent variation -2,176 668  -0.75 0.23 
Exchange rate n.a. n.a.  0.08 0.11 
Real GDP at value added -2,399 -81  -0.43 -0.01 
Rate of lump-sum transfers n.a. n.a.  10.78 fixed 
Rate of labour taxes n.a. n.a.  fixed -15.97 
Household expenditure: -1,278 1,616  -0.44 0.56 
Household income -7,565 1,375  -2.05 0.37 
Household savings 224 43  0.14 0.03 
Lump-sum transfers 6,511 284  8.51 0.37 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Moreover, CT_LT results in an increase in household expenditures – household income 
minus savings and plus lump-sum transfers – because of both higher household income and a 
reduction in the household savings rate (by 0.34%). According to the model closures, 
government savings and investment are fixed, which implies an investment driven closure. 
Due to a higher household income, the household savings rate decreases to match fixed 
investment. Alternatively, if the household savings rate is fixed, investment in real terms 
would increase because of higher household income, but increase in final consumption would 
be less pronounced than that is under investment driven closure.        
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7.3.1.2 Factor Markets 
Table 7.14 shows the changes in household income as well as factor supply, and factor prices 
under a CT_HS and CT_LT. Household income is defined as income from capital, labour, 
land, and natural resources minus taxes on factor income and a fiscal depreciation of capital. 
Compared to a CT_HS, substituting carbon taxes results in an increase in household income. 
There is an increase in labour income via lower taxes on labour income and higher labour 
supply as well as an increase in income from land via an increase in the supply of land. Both 
tax rates on income from unskilled and skilled labour are reduced each by approximately 
15.97%, which leads to increases in the supply of unskilled and skilled labour. An increase in 
labour supply indicates the occurrence of an employment double dividend, where substituting 
environmental taxes for labour taxes leads to a reduction in unemployment (Bovenberg and 
van der Ploeg, 1994). Moreover, CT_LT results in an increase in domestic production of 
agricultural products, which is associated with increasing demand for land. Given the 
assumption of perfectly elastic supply of land, land income increases because of higher land 
supply.    
Table 7.14: Changes in Factor Income, Factor Prices, and Factor Supply 
 
 
Household income  
(million USD) 
 
 
Factor prices 
(per cent) 
 
 
Factor supply 
(per cent) 
CT_HS CT_LT  CT_HS CT_LT  CT_HS CT_LT 
Land -28 40  fixed fixed  -0.42 0.62 
Unskilled labour -1,343 4,270  -1.11 -2.05  -0.34 1.04 
Skilled labour -527 1,954  -0.94 -2.12  -0.28 1.02 
Capital  -5,157 -4,401  -2.59 -2.21  fixed fixed 
Natural resources -510 -489  -7.41 -5.98  fixed fixed 
Total -7,565 1,375  n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. 
Source: Model simulation results. 
CT_LT leads also to decreases in income from capital and natural resources, yet these are less 
pronounced compared to those under a CT_HS. Reductions in the returns to capital and 
natural resources result from lower demand for these factors. Supply of capital and natural 
resources is fixed. Therefore, the burden of carbon taxes is partially borne by capital and 
natural resources in terms of lower factor income. In other words, increases in energy costs do 
not fully pass on to final consumers, yet these are partially absorbed by lower factor prices. 
As mentioned, this indicates a tax-shifting effect between labour, capital and natural resources 
(de Mooij and Bovenberg, 1998; Bento and Jacobsen, 2007; Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 
1998; Fraser and Waschik, 2010). It should be noted that a strong tax-shifting effect is a 
necessary condition for the occurrence of a strong double dividend (de Mooij, 2000). 
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7.3.1.3 Government Budget 
Table 7.15 shows the changes in government expenditures and revenues from trade and 
domestic taxes under a CT_HS and CT_LT. Compared to a CT_HS, substituting carbon taxes 
for labour taxes leads to higher increases in the revenues from export and carbon taxes, 
whereas reductions in the revenues from taxes on consumption, capital income, imports, 
mineral resources extraction, and social security contributions are less pronounced than those 
under a CT_HS. Furthermore, there is an increase in the total revenue from the land tax 
because of increased supply of land.  
Table 7.15: Changes in Government Revenues and Expenditures from Trade and 
Domestic Taxes (million USD)    
 CT_HS CT_LT 
Government revenues:  5,850.2 -867.1 
Export taxes 499.0 501.9 
Import taxes -55.6 -3.9 
Carbon taxes 7,977.0 8,373.5 
Consumption taxes -1,306.7 -1,050.1 
Taxes on unskilled labour income -478.3 -5,570.3 
Taxes on skilled labour income -187.8 -2,611.8 
Social security contributions from unskilled labour  -46.2 -33.1 
Social security contributions from skilled labour  -18.2 -16.8 
Capital taxes -488.2 -417.7 
Mineral resource extraction taxes -43.1 -41.3 
Land tax -1.8 2.6 
Government expenditures:  6,505.9 285.3 
Lump-sum transfers 6,511.0 284.4 
Production subsidies -5.0 0.8 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Export taxes. Table 7.16 reveals the changes in revenues from export taxes and export supply 
under a CT_HS and CT_LT. Due to a higher depreciation of the currency and lower labour 
costs, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes leads to larger (smaller) increases (decreases) 
in export supplies of most commodities compared to those under a CT_HS. This is because 
domestic producers of energy and non-energy intensive commodities become more 
competitive under a CT_LT compared to that under a CT_HS. Furthermore under a CT_LT, 
there is an increase in the export supply of textiles and machinery equipment, whereas under a 
CT_HS it is reduced. Overall, the increase in the total revenue from export taxes is slightly 
more pronounced under a CT_LT compared to that under a CT_HS.   
 
 
  175 
Table 7.16: Changes in Revenues from Export Taxes  
 Changes in revenues from 
export taxes (million USD)  
Changes in export supply 
(per cent) 
CT_HS CT_LT  CT_HS CT_LT 
Coal 2.07 2.20  7.52 7.96 
Crude oil 357.62 350.14  1.93 1.85 
Natural gas 335.23 330.93  24.54 24.17 
Petroleum products 34.09 31.97  1.37 1.24 
Wood products -70.63 -67.95  -13.27 -12.80 
Chemical products -57.56 -54.51  -8.26 -7.86 
Mineral products -1.21 -1.00  -2.90 -2.45 
Metals -112.58 -110.01  -6.43 -6.32 
Metal products -0.71 -0.46  -3.09 -2.07 
Electronic equipment -0.23 -0.19  -3.91 -3.24 
Machinery equipment -0.78 0.14  -1.13 0.08 
Agricultural products 0.01 0.04  0.44 1.90 
Transport equipment 0.41 1.14  0.59 1.75 
Minerals 3.75 4.34  2.19 2.51 
Textiles -0.08 1.79  -0.14 1.49 
Paper products 9.67 13.32  2.83 3.89 
Total 499.04 501.87  n.a. n.a. 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Import taxes. Table 7.17 shows the changes in revenues from import tariffs and import 
demand under a CT_HS and CT_LT. Compared to a CT_HS, substituting carbon taxes leads 
to smaller (higher) decreases (increases) in import demand for most commodities, despite a 
stronger depreciation of the currency under a CT_LT. This is due to increased household 
income under a CT_LT, while under a CT_HS it decreases. Furthermore, there are increases 
in import demand for chemical products and electronic equipment, whereas under a CT_HS 
import demand for these commodities is reduced. The reason for this is an increase in 
household income under a CT_LT. Overall, the total revenue from import tariffs is decreased 
by 3.88 million USD under a CT_LT, whereas under a CT_HS it is 55.59 million USD.  
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Table 7.17: Changes in Revenues from Import Tariffs    
 Changes in revenues from 
import tariffs (million USD) 
 
 
Changes in import demand 
(per cent) 
CT_HS CT_LT  CT_HS CT_LT 
Coal -0.19 -0.20  -22.73 -23.23 
Crude oil -0.0002 -0.0002  -5.23 -5.03 
Natural gas -0.0002 -0.0002  -25.04 -24.81 
Petroleum products -0.15 -0.14  -4.28 -3.98 
Electricity 0.39 0.47  3.50 4.26 
Wood products 7.23 9.52  2.12 2.78 
Chemical products -1.26 6.30  -0.18 0.41 
Mineral products 0.68 1.03  0.20 0.31 
Metals  0.57 1.69  0.22 0.77 
Metal products  -1.87 -0.91  -0.63 -0.38 
Electronic equipment -0.17 1.94  -0.11 0.25 
Machinery equipment -8.51 -7.99  -0.56 -0.57 
Agricultural products -3.45 -1.36  -1.18 -0.55 
Food products -17.37 -4.10  -1.18 -0.37 
Transport equipment -12.08 -4.65  -0.89 -0.43 
Minerals -0.65 -0.60  -4.32 -4.03 
Textiles -14.47 -2.12  -1.08 -0.26 
Paper products -4.27 -2.76  -1.80 -1.23 
Total -55.59 -3.88  n.a. n.a. 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Domestic taxes. Substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes leads to lower reductions in the 
returns to capital and natural resources compared to when revenues from carbon taxes are 
returned to households in lump-sum form. As a result, decreases in the revenues from taxes 
on capital and mineral resource extraction are less pronounced compared to those under a 
CT_HS. Furthermore, there are smaller reductions in social security contributions from 
unskilled and skilled labour because of increased labour supply. Finally, an increase in 
household income under a CT_LT results in a smaller reduction in the total revenue from 
consumption taxes than that under a CT_HS.  
7.3.2 Sectoral Effects 
7.3.2.1 Producer and Consumer Prices 
Table 7.18 shows the changes in activity prices under a CT_HS and CT_LT.  As mentioned, 
compared to a CT_HS, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes leads to smaller reductions 
in the returns to capital and natural resources. As a result, increases (decreases) in the activity 
prices of capital-energy aggregate (PVKE) are more (less) pronounced than those under a 
CT_HS (Column 3 of Table 7.18). On the other hand, there are stronger reductions in labour 
costs under a CT_LT than those under a CT_HS because of higher reductions in wages. 
Therefore, the key factor is the capital-labour intensive of sectors. Substituting carbon taxes 
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for labour taxes leads to larger (smaller) decreases (increases) in the activity prices of value 
added-energy aggregate (PVAE) of labour intensive sectors, such machinery equipment, 
agricultural products and food products (Column 2 of Table 7.18). As a result, reductions in 
total average production costs (PX) in most labour intensive sectors are more pronounced 
under a CT_LT compared to those under a CT_HS (Column 1 of Table 7.18). Moreover, there 
are reductions in average production costs in the water and machinery equipment sectors, 
whereas under a CT_HS average production costs in these sectors increase.  
Table 7.18: Changes in Activity Prices (per cent)    
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
PX  PVAE  PVKE 
CT_HS CT_LT  CT_HS CT_LT  CT_HS CT_LT 
Coal -4.14 -4.23  -7.76 -7.90  4.99 5.44 
Crude oil -0.48 -0.42  -0.55 -0.46  -1.79 -1.40 
Natural gas -2.45 -2.38  -3.73 -3.69  1.47 1.94 
Petroleum products -1.06 -0.94  -1.07 -0.95  -1.07 -0.91 
Gas manufacturing -0.36 -0.64  -0.31 -0.77  0.82 1.20 
Electricity 6.85 7.27  n.a.a) n.a.  n.a. n.a. 
Wood products 2.81 2.87  4.67 4.80  6.04 6.45 
Chemical products 1.38 1.44  2.20 2.28  2.96 3.31 
Mineral products 0.94 0.88  1.94 1.79  4.03 4.47 
Metals 0.98 1.07  1.79 1.91  2.53 2.94 
Metal products 0.61 0.48  0.61 0.21  2.86 3.27 
Electronic equipment 0.77 0.74  1.56 1.46  2.99 3.39 
Transports 0.40 0.39  0.88 0.87  1.70 2.11 
Machinery equipment 0.20 -0.03  0.06 -0.45  2.16 2.56 
Water 0.09 -0.21  0.36 -0.08  2.37 2.77 
Agricultural products -0.43 -0.65  -0.44 -0.73  0.78 1.17 
Food products -0.50 -0.58  -0.55 -0.61  -0.30 0.09 
Construction -0.75 -0.85  -1.71 -1.90  -2.16 -1.78 
Trade products -1.66 -1.51  -2.29 -2.06  -2.44 -2.06 
Transport equipment -0.22 -0.32  -1.50 -2.08  -2.48 -2.10 
Private services -1.16 -1.29  -1.46 -1.62  -1.71 -1.33 
Public services -0.70 -1.25  -0.87 -1.67  -0.31 0.08 
Minerals -1.73 -1.70  -2.66 -2.61  -2.55 -2.17 
Textiles -0.15 -0.31  -0.10 -0.50  1.28 1.67 
Paper products -0.87 -0.92  -1.83 -1.87  -2.17 -1.78 
a Changes in the activity prices of electricity generation differ by technology.   
Source: Model simulation results. 
Changes in production costs (PX) determine, inter alia, changes in producer prices (PD) 
(Table 7.19). Consumer prices (PQD) are weight average of producer prices (PD) and import 
prices (PM). Substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes results in a larger increase in import 
prices because of a stronger depreciation of the currency compared to that under a CT_HS. 
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Nevertheless under a CT_LT, reductions of production costs of most non-energy intensive 
sectors are more pronounced, which leads to stronger decreases in the consumer prices of 
non-energy intensive commodities as well as lower increases in the consumer prices of some 
energy intensive commodities compared to those under a CT_HS (Column 1 of Table 7.19). 
Table 7.19: Changes in Producer and Consumer Prices (per cent)   
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Consumer price Producer price Competitiveness indicator 
CT_HS CT_LT CT_HS CT_LT CT_HS CT_LT 
Coal 22.38 23.64 -7.12 -7.31 7.75 8.01 
Crude oil 5.92 6.37 -1.24 -1.15 1.33 1.28 
Natural gas 13.16 14.01 -2.45 -2.38 2.59 2.55 
Petroleum products 2.55 2.89 -1.37 -1.22 1.46 1.35 
Gas manufacturing 19.44 20.06 -0.47 -0.83 0.55 0.95 
Electricity 6.84 7.25 6.91 7.33 -6.39 -6.72 
Wood products 2.59 2.65 4.59 4.66 -4.32 -4.35 
Chemical products 1.34 1.40 2.42 2.50 -2.28 -2.33 
Mineral products 0.82 0.78 0.99 0.93 -0.91 -0.81 
Metals 1.65 1.79 1.91 2.06 -1.80 -1.91 
Metal products 0.49 0.40 0.73 0.56 -0.65 -0.44 
Electronic equipment 0.24 0.26 0.92 0.88 -0.83 -0.76 
Transports 0.42 0.40 0.46 0.44 -0.39 -0.33 
Machinery equipment 0.16 0.01 0.22 -0.05 -0.14 0.16 
Water 0.09 -0.21 0.09 -0.21 -0.01 0.32 
Agricultural products -0.42 -0.63 -0.47 -0.71 0.55 0.83 
Food products -0.41 -0.48 -0.55 -0.64 0.63 0.76 
Construction -0.73 -0.82 -0.76 -0.87 0.84 0.99 
Trade products -1.65 -1.50 -1.68 -1.53 1.78 1.66 
Transport equipment -0.13 -0.18 -0.32 -0.46 0.39 0.58 
Private services -1.07 -1.19 -1.25 -1.39 1.34 1.53 
Public services -0.68 -1.22 -0.70 -1.26 0.78 1.39 
Minerals -2.14 -2.11 -2.58 -2.54 2.72 2.73 
Textiles -0.03 -0.08 -0.20 -0.40 0.28 0.52 
Paper products -0.76 -0.81 -1.24 -1.33 1.33 1.46 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Furthermore, most domestically produced energy commodities as well as non-energy 
intensive commodities, such as agricultural products, food products, and textiles, become 
more competitive under a CT_LT compared to that when revenuers from carbon taxes are 
returned to households in lump-sum form. This is demonstrated with higher percentage 
increases in the ratio between import and domestic prices in Colum 3 of Table 7.19.   
7.3.2.2 Production and Consumption 
Table 7.20 and 7.21 reveals the sectoral effects under a CT_HS and CT_LT.  
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Table 7.20: Changes in Domestic Consumption, Domestic and Import Demand (per 
cent) 
 Domestic 
consumption 
Domestic  
demand 
Import  
demand 
CT_HS CT_LT CT_HS CT_LT CT_HS CT_LT 
Energy sectors:        
Coal -14.98 -15.26 -13.41 -13.65 -22.73 -23.23 
Crude oil -1.95 -1.88 -1.91 -1.84 -5.23 -5.03 
Natural gas -7.14 -7.13 -6.64 -6.64 -25.04 -24.81 
Petroleum products -2.81 -2.63 -2.81 -2.62 -4.28 -3.98 
Gas manufacture -13.55 -13.37 -13.55 -13.37 -14.21 -14.52 
Energy intensive sectors: 
Electricity -5.55 -5.32 -5.64 -5.42 3.50 4.26 
Wood products -2.10 -1.50 -5.26 -4.70 2.12 2.78 
Chemical products -2.23 -1.69 -3.92 -3.42 -0.18 0.41 
Mineral products -0.87 -0.65 -1.11 -0.86 0.20 0.31 
Metals -2.54 -2.18 -2.97 -2.64 0.22 0.77 
Metal products -1.40 -0.91 -1.83 -1.20 -0.63 -0.38 
Electronic equipment -0.54 -0.15 -2.29 -1.75 -0.11 0.25 
Transports -1.22 -0.65 -1.26 -0.69 -0.90 -0.38 
Machinery equipment -0.73 -0.38 -0.84 -0.25 -0.56 -0.57 
Water -0.73 -0.07 -0.73 -0.07 -0.71 -0.51 
Non-energy intensive sectors:  
Agricultural products -0.47 0.53 -0.39 0.65 -1.18 -0.55 
Food products -0.46 0.50 -0.26 0.75 -1.18 -0.37 
Construction -0.26 -0.17 -0.17 -0.06 -2.27 -2.52 
Trade products -0.36 0.23 -0.33 0.25 -1.99 -1.31 
Transport equipment -0.53 0.10 -0.19 0.59 -0.89 -0.43 
Private services -0.53 0.04 -0.42 0.16 -1.20 -0.73 
Public services -0.03 0.14 -0.01 0.18 -0.75 -1.13 
Minerals -3.35 -3.06 -3.15 -2.86 -4.32 -4.03 
Textiles -0.94 0.00 -0.70 0.45 -1.08 -0.26 
Paper products -0.57 0.13 0.14 0.92 -1.80 -1.23 
Source: Model simulation results. 
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Table 7.21: Changes in Domestic Production, Domestic and Export Supply (per cent)   
 Domestic 
production 
Domestic  
supply 
Export  
supply 
CT_HS CT_LT CT_HS CT_LT CT_HS CT_LT 
Energy sectors:        
Coal -5.11 -5.07 -13.41 -13.65 7.52 7.96 
Crude oil 0.30 0.28 -1.91 -1.84 1.93 1.85 
Natural gas -1.94 -1.99 -6.64 -6.64 24.54 24.17 
Petroleum products -1.93 -1.81 -2.81 -2.62 1.37 1.24 
Gas manufacture -13.28 -12.88 -13.55 -13.37 -12.18 -10.95 
Energy intensive sectors:  
Electricity -5.75 -5.53 -5.64 -5.42 -17.32 -17.71 
Wood products -8.46 -7.94 -5.26 -4.70 -13.27 -12.80 
Chemical products -5.85 -5.39 -3.92 -3.42 -8.26 -7.86 
Mineral products -1.22 -0.96 -1.11 -0.86 -2.90 -2.45 
Metals -4.74 -4.52 -2.97 -2.64 -6.43 -6.32 
Metal products -2.06 -1.36 -1.83 -1.20 -3.09 -2.07 
Electronic equipment -2.58 -2.02 -2.29 -1.75 -3.91 -3.24 
Transports  -1.38 -0.79 -1.26 -0.69 -2.03 -1.34 
Machinery equipment -0.88 -0.20 -0.84 -0.25 -1.13 0.08 
Water -0.73 -0.06 -0.73 -0.07 -0.75 0.58 
Energy intensive sectors:  
Agricultural products -0.33 0.74 -0.39 0.65 0.44 1.90 
Food products -0.18 0.84 -0.26 0.75 0.68 1.89 
Construction -0.13 -0.02 -0.17 -0.06 1.53 1.92 
Trade products -0.30 0.28 -0.33 0.25 3.26 3.62 
Transport equipment 0.00 0.88 -0.19 0.59 0.59 1.75 
Private services -0.24 0.37 -0.42 0.16 2.27 3.25 
Public services -0.01 0.19 -0.01 0.18 1.55 2.98 
Minerals -1.47 -1.16 -3.15 -2.86 2.19 2.51 
Textiles -0.60 0.64 -0.70 0.45 -0.14 1.49 
Paper products 0.90 1.76 0.14 0.92 2.83 3.89 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Energy commodities. Substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes leads to reductions in 
consumption of domestically produced as well as imported energy inputs with relative 
decreases in demand for imported energy inputs being more pronounced compared to those of 
domestically produced. Moreover, the reduction in demand for coal stronger under a CT_LT 
compared to that under a CT_HS since other energy inputs are more labour intensive than 
coal. Furthermore, there are increases in export supplies of coal, natural gas, crude oil, and 
petroleum products.   
Energy intensive commodities. Substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes leads to decreases 
in the total consumption of energy intensive commodities, such as electricity, wood products, 
and chemical products. Compared to a CT_HS, CT_LT results in smaller reductions in export 
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supply as well as domestic demand for domestically produced energy intensive commodities. 
Under a CT_LT, increases (decreases) in import demand for energy intensive commodities 
are more (less) pronounced compared to those under a CT_HS due to higher household 
income. Moreover, under a CT_LT, there are increases in import demand for chemical 
products and electronic equipment, whereas under a CT_HS import demand for these 
commodities is reduced because of decreased household income.  
Non-energy intensive commodities. Compared to a CT_HS, substituting carbon taxes for 
labour taxes leads to increases in demand for most domestically produced commodities, such 
as agriculture, food products, and trade products because of increased household income as 
well as lower consumer prices. Moreover, decreases in import demand for non-energy 
intensive commodities as well as increases in export supplies of non-energy intensive 
commodities are more pronounced under a CT_LT compared to those under a CT_HS. The 
reason for this is that domestically produced non-energy intensive commodities become more 
competitive in domestic and export markets under a CT_LT compared to that under a CT_HS 
because of decreased production costs.   
7.3.2.3 Final Consumption 
Table 7.22 shows the changes in household consumption under a CT_HS and CT_LT. 
Compared to a CT_HS, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes leads to smaller decreases 
in the household consumption of coal, natural gas, and gas manufacture, where the increase in 
final consumption of petroleum products is more pronounced. As a result of higher household 
income, decreases in final consumption of energy intensive commodities, such as electricity, 
wood products, and chemical products are also less under a CT_LT compared to those under a 
CT_HS. Furthermore, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes leads to increases in 
household consumption of most non-energy intensive commodities, such as agriculture, food 
products, and private services because of higher household income.   
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Table 7.22: Changes in Final Consumption (per cent)    
 CT_HS  CT_LT 
Coal -15.99 -15.85 
Natural gas -9.14 -8.74 
Petroleum products 0.26 1.12 
Gas manufacturing -13.92 -13.34 
Electricity  -3.76 -2.99 
Wood products -3.41 -2.52 
Chemical products -2.21 -1.32 
Mineral products -1.71 -0.71 
Metals -2.51 -1.69 
Metal products -1.39 -0.33 
Electronic equipment -1.14 -0.20 
Transports -1.32 -0.34 
Machinery equipment  -1.06 0.05 
Water -0.99 0.27 
Agricultural products -0.49 0.69 
Food products -0.49 0.54 
Construction -0.18 0.89 
Trade products 0.76 1.59 
Transport equipment -0.78 0.25 
Private services 0.17 1.27 
Public services -0.23 1.30 
Minerals 1.27 2.22 
Textiles -0.87 0.14 
Paper products -0.14 0.88 
Source: Model simulation results. 
7.3.2.4 Technological Change in the Electricity Sector 
Substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes results in a larger increase in the producer price of 
electricity compared to that under a CT_HS, whereas the reduction in output is less 
pronounced (Table 7.23). This is because under a CT_LT the economy is less adversely 
affected by carbon taxes so that the reduction in final consumption of electricity as well as 
reductions in demand for electricity by some electricity-intensive sectors is less compared to 
those under a CT_HS. Furthermore, due to greater decreases in labour costs, increases in 
output from nuclear and hydro are higher under a CT_LT compared to those under a CT_HS.   
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Table 7.23: Changes in Output and Production Costs by Electricity Generation 
Technologies under a CT_HS and CT_LT (per cent)   
 
Output  Prices 
CT_HS CT_LT  CT_HS CT_LT 
Coal-fired  -7.83 -7.79  8.05 8.58 
Gas-fired -7.44 -7.27  7.82 8.27 
Nuclear 9.27 10.38  -0.76 -0.76 
Hydro 9.27 10.38  -0.76 -0.76 
Total -5.75 -5.53  6.85 7.27 
Source: Model simulation results. 
7.3.3 Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
According to the policy simulation, the overall CO2 emissions are reduced by 10%. Table 
7.24 shows the shares of reductions in CO2 by industries and the household under a CT_HS 
and a CT_LT. The results are quite similar. Under both revenue recycling strategies, the 
overall reduction in CO2 is mainly achieved by the electricity sector, households, and 
transports, yet the reduction in CO2 by households is relatively less pronounced under a 
CT_LT compared to that under a CT_HS because of increased household income.     
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Table 7.24: Shares of Reduction in CO2 Emissions by Sources and Changes in Energy 
Intensity (per cent)   
 Shares of reductions in CO2 emissions 
 Energy intensity 
 CT_HS CT_LT  CT_HS CT_LT 
Coal 0.06 0.06  -0.67 -0.75 
Crude oil -0.07 -0.05  0.29 0.21 
Natural gas 0.38 0.40  -0.39 -0.46 
Petroleum products 0.29 0.28  0.01 -0.04 
Gas manufacture 0.19 0.19  -4.09 -5.01 
Electricity  67.44 68.00  -3.15 -3.37 
Wood products 0.10 0.09  -2.75 -3.10 
Chemical products 1.90 1.87  -1.92 -2.24 
Mineral products 1.08 1.15  -4.47 -5.12 
Metals 4.12 4.21  -3.29 -3.65 
Metal products 0.09 0.09  -4.44 -5.26 
Electronic equipment 0.03 0.03  -3.72 -4.27 
Transports 8.39 8.52  -3.26 -3.90 
Machinery equipment  0.32 0.34  -4.75 -5.69 
Water  0.05 0.05  -4.55 -5.47 
Agriculture 0.21 0.11  -2.38 -2.49 
Food products 0.26 0.25  -3.60 -4.09 
Construction  0.10 0.11  -2.83 -3.58 
Trade products 0.30 0.29  -3.33 -3.62 
Transport equipment  0.004 0.004  -3.50 -4.47 
Private services 0.47 0.49  -2.77 -3.43 
Public services 0.73 0.85  -4.02 -5.36 
Minerals  0.005 0.005  -3.86 -3.96 
Textiles  0.02 0.02  -4.38 -5.22 
Paper products 0.05 0.05  -5.35 -5.91 
Household 13.47 12.59  n.a. n.a. 
Total  100 100  n.a. n.a. 
* Gg states for Giga gram 
Source: Model simulation results. 
7.3.4 Carbon Taxes and Income Equity 
Distributional effects of carbon taxation are investigated by using simple micro-accounting 
approach. Distributed factor income and consumption expenditure among ten deciles are 
multiplied by relative changes in factor and commodity prices (Section 6.1.3). Figure 7.5 
shows the relative changes in total factor income, total consumption expenditure and net 
income by decile resulting from carbon taxation. 
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Figure 7.5: Changes in Total Factor Income, Total Consumption Expenditures and Net 
Incomea by Decile (per cent)   
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dec1 represents the poorest ten per cent of the population, dec10 the richest ten per cent.  
a Net income is the aggregated effect of expenditure and factor income changes. 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Introducing carbon taxes leads to increasing total consumption expenditures for all household 
groups with poor households being more affected in relative terms because their expenditure 
shares on energy consumption – gas, electricity, and coal – are larger. Therefore, carbon taxes 
per se have a regressive impact on income distribution. On the other hand, revenues from 
carbon taxes are compensated by a reduction in taxes on labour income. Poor households 
benefit more in relative terms from this tax reduction, since labour income has a larger share 
in total factor income for poor than for rich households. Moreover, the richest household 
groups (from decile 8 to decile 10) face even reductions in factor income because of lower 
returns to capital and natural resources – the main income source of rich households. Overall, 
substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes results in increases in net income of low and middle 
income household groups (from decile 1 to decile 6), with the relative increases in net income 
being especially large for the poorest households. In contrast, net income of rich households 
falls due to falling factor income. In sum, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes tends to 
reduce income inequality in Russia. 
7.4 Sensitivity Analyses 
In general, the results can be quite sensitive to model specifications and parameterisations, 
such as Armington elasticities, elasticities of transformation, nesting structures, and 
elasticities of substitution among primary factors, especially the design of the model is 
important where the policy simulation is implemented. Therefore, the policy simulations are 
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accompanied by series of sensitivity analyses to verify the stability of the results and to 
recognize the following important determinants: 
a) Emission reduction targets (Section 7.4.1). 
b) Substitution between intermediates and the value added-energy aggregate (Section 
7.4.2). 
c) Substitution between labour and the capital-energy aggregate (Section 7.4.3). 
d) Labour supply elasticity (Section 7.4.4). 
e) Substitution between capital and energy (Section 7.4.5). 
f) Capital mobility/immobility (Section 7.4.6). 
g) Substitution among power generation technologies (Section 7.4.7).  
7.4.1 Emission Reduction Targets 
In the central simulation, the magnitude of carbon taxation aims at a targeted reduction of 
CO2 emissions by 10%. To investigate the welfare effects of carbon taxation under different 
targets of emission reduction, the target of reduction in CO2 emissions is gradually increased 
from 5% to 25% under a CT_HS and CT_LT. Figure 7.6 shows the changes in equivalent 
variation under different reductions in CO2 emissions. 
Figure 7.6: Changes in Equivalent Variation under Different Targets of Reduction in 
CO2 Emissions (per cent to base household expenditure)  
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Source: Model simulation results.  
  187 
Larger reductions in CO2 emissions are achieved via higher carbon taxes so that increases in 
energy costs become more pronounced. As a result, the economy is affected more adversely 
under high targets of emission reduction. For example under a 25% reduction in CO2 
emissions, CT_HS leads to welfare losses measured by an EV of 2.71% of base household 
expenditure, whereas under a CT_LT it is 0.22%. Intuitively, at higher levels of carbon 
taxation, the bases of carbon taxes become smaller, thereby reducing the magnitude of 
revenue recycling effect (Parry and Bento, 2000). Under a CT_LT, a strong double dividend 
is feasible until a 21% reduction in CO2. Overall, macroeconomic and sectoral effects are 
more pronounced under targets of CO2 emission reduction higher than 10%, i.e., decreases 
(increases) in total consumption are stronger (less) compared to those under lower reduction 
targets because of higher increases in energy costs. 
7.4.2 Substitution between Intermediates and the Value Added-Energy Aggregate 
The structure of production nesting in energy and non-energy producing sectors is similar to 
that implemented in the GTAP energy model. The only difference is that substitution 
possibilities between intermediates and the value added-energy aggregate are assumed since 
some substitution possibility is expected in the long run. In the central case simulation, the 
elasticity of substitution is assumed to equal 0.5. The central case simulation is compared with 
that where there is no substitution between intermediates and the value added-energy 
aggregate for all sectors. Under a CT_HS (CT_LT) without substitution possibilities between 
intermediates and the value added-energy aggregate, introducing carbon taxes leads to smaller 
(higher) welfare losses (gains) compared to those with substitution possibilities, but the 
differences in the results are not large. For example, under a CT_HS without substitution 
possibilities, welfare losses measured by an EV account for 0.72% of base household 
expenditure, whereas with substitution possibilities it is 0.75%. Under a CT_LT without 
substitution possibilities, welfare gains are 0.30% of base household expenditure, while with 
substitution possibilities it is 0.23%. The reason for smaller welfare losses (gains) under a 
CH_HS (CT_LT) under the assumption of non-substitution possibilities between 
intermediates and the value added-energy aggregate is as follows. The crude oil and trade 
product sectors are large domestic consumers of capital. Introducing carbon taxes leads to 
decreases in capital and labour costs as indicated by decreasing PVAE (Table 7.18). As a 
result, in the presence of substitution possibilities between intermediates and the value added-
energy aggregate, demand for capital is increased in these sectors, diminishing the reduction 
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in the return to capital so that the tax-shifting effect is less pronounced compared to that when 
there is no substitution between intermediates and the value added-energy aggregate.  
7.4.3 Substitution between Labour and the Capital-Energy Aggregate 
According to the theory, a necessary condition for the occurrence of a strong double dividend 
is a tax-shifting effect (de Mooij, 2000). The magnitude of the tax-shifting effect between 
labour and capital depends mainly on elasticities of substitution between these two primary 
factors. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998) using an analytical general equilibrium model 
show that high substitutability between labour and the aggregate of resources and the fixed 
factor increases the possibility for higher employment. Sancho (2010) using a numerical CGE 
model finds that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is the most crucial 
parameter in determination the effects of environmental taxation.  
In the central simulation, elasticities of substitution between labour and the capital-energy 
aggregate for non-energy producing sectors are taken from the Version 7 of the GTAP 
database (2007). The elasticities differ by sector with the average value being approximately 
equal 1.26 (Table 6.4). To investigate the effects of carbon taxation under different values of 
substitution elasticities between labour and the capital-energy aggregate, the elasticities are 
increased from 0.5 to 2.0 for non-energy producing sectors. Table 7.25 shows the changes in 
equivalent variation, labour supply, wages and the return to capital under different elasticities 
of substitution between labour and the capital-energy aggregate. 
Table 7.25: Changes in EV, Labour Supply and Wages with Different Substitution 
Elasticities (percentage change)   
Elasticity of substitution 0.5 1.50 2.00 
Equivalent variation  CT_HS -0.84 -0.67 -0.63 CT_LT 0.02 0.25 0.27 
CT_HS:     
Supply of unskilled labour -0.50 -0.30 -0.25 
Supply of skilled labour -0.42 -0.26 -0.23 
Wage of unskilled labour -1.66 -0.99 -0.83 
Wage of skilled labour  -1.39 -0.86 -0.75 
Return to capital -2.51 -2.46 -2.39 
CT_LT:    
Supply of unskilled labour 0.74 1.00 1.02 
Supply of skilled labour 0.76 0.97 0.98 
Wage of unskilled labour -3.46 -1.78 -1.43 
Wage of skilled labour  -3.40 -1.88 -1.57 
Return to capital -1.73 -2.19 -2.20 
Source: Model simulation results. 
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The sensitivity analysis reveals that elasticities of substitution between labour and the capital-
energy aggregate significantly affect the results since these determine the tax-shifting effect. 
Higher elasticities of substitution result in smaller (higher) welfare losses (gains) under a 
CT_HS (CH_LT). Moreover, under a CT_HS (CT_LT) with higher elasticities of substitution, 
decreases (increases) in labour supply are less (more) pronounced. This confirms the 
conclusion drawn by Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998) that high substitutability between 
labour and the capital-energy aggregate increases the possibility of an employment double 
dividend. Higher elasticities of substitution between labour and the capital-energy aggregate 
encourage the tax-shifting effect between capital and labour, improving the efficiency of the 
tax system. Moreover, high elasticities of substitution between labour and the capital-energy 
aggregate imply elastic demand for labour. Intuitively, the positive welfare effect resulting 
from a reduction in labour taxes is larger under more elastic demand for labour since 
distortions arising from taxation are high in case of elastic demand and supply.   
7.4.4 Labour Supply Elasticities 
In the central simulation, the elasticity of skilled and unskilled labour supply is assumed to 
equal 0.3. To investigate the stability of the results with respect to different labour supply 
elasticities, a range of labour supply elasticities from 0.10 to 0.90 is considered. Table 7.26 
reveals the changes in equivalent variation as well as labour supply and wages under different 
labour supply elasticities. 
Table 7.26: Changes in Equivalent Variation, Labour Supply and Wages under 
Different Labour Supply Elasticities (percentage change)   
Labour supply elasticity 0.10 0.30 0.60 0.90 
Equivalent variation CT_HS -0.61 -0.75 -0.91 -1.03 CT_LT -0.26 0.23 0.88 1.44 
CT_HS:      
Supply of unskilled labour -0.13 -0.34 -0.57 -0.75 
Supply of skilled labour -0.11 -0.28 -0.46 -0.59 
Wage of unskilled labour -1.26 -1.11 -0.95 -0.83 
Wage of skilled labour  -1.09 -0.94 -0.77 -0.66 
CT_LT:     
Supply of unskilled labour 0.36 1.04 1.97 2.80 
Supply of skilled labour 0.37 1.02 1.86 2.56 
Wage of unskilled labour -1.59 -2.05 -2.67 -3.22 
Wage of skilled labour  -1.53 -2.12 -2.86 -3.47 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Different labour supply elasticities have “qualitatively” different impacts on the results under 
both revenue recycling policies. For example, under a CT_HS, welfare losses are more 
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pronounced with higher labour supply elasticities. As mentioned, the introduction of carbon 
taxes compensated by higher lump-sum transfers results in decreases in the supply of 
unskilled and skilled labour as well as wages. The more elastic labour supply is, the stronger 
decreases in labour supply and vice versa. The intuitive explanation behind this is that carbon 
taxes are also implicit taxes on production factors so that the more elastic supply of labour, 
the larger welfare losses arising from carbon taxation are under a CT_HS.         
In contrast, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes leads to larger welfare gains under an 
elasticity of labour supply higher than 0.30. This is because higher labour supply elasticities 
result in larger increases in labour supply as well as larger reductions in wages. As a result, 
higher increases in labour supply imply higher increases in labour income, whereas lower 
wages induce lower labour costs for industries. Hence, increases in domestic consumption of 
some commodities are more pronounced under higher labour supply elasticities. Intuitively, 
the more elastic supply of labour, the larger welfare gains resulting from a reduction in labour 
taxes, since taxation of a good or factor which has high elastic demand or/and supply leads to 
high welfare losses.   
Under a perfectly inelastic supply of labour, CT_LT induces the same macroeconomic and 
sectoral effects as when revenues from carbon taxes would be returned to households in lump-
sum form. This is because one single household is recorded in the databases so that lower 
labour taxes have the same impacts on the consumption patter like higher lump-sum transfers. 
Labour income taxation given the assumption of perfectly inelastic supply of labour is not 
distortionary. Furthermore, due to tax incidence, it does not matter whether taxes on labour 
income or taxes on labour use (social security contributions) are reduced – the 
macroeconomic and sectoral effects are the same. For example, under a perfectly inelastic 
supply of labour, substituting carbon taxes for social security contributions results in higher 
wages, whose increases offset reductions in social security contributions. In other words, a 
proportional reduction in taxes on labour use is fully absorbed by a proportional increases in 
gross wages. Hence, the macroeconomic and sectoral effects are the same as when revenues 
from carbon taxes would be returned to households in lump-sum form. 
7.4.5 Substitution between Capital and Energy 
According the model framework, energy inputs are nested with capital to form a capital-
energy aggregate by using a CES function. In the standard model specification, the elasticity 
of substitution between capital and energy inputs is assumed to equal 0.50 for all non-energy 
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producing sectors, following the GTAP energy model (Burniaux and Truong, 2002). For 
comparison, the elasticity is increased from 0.50 to 2.5. Table 7.27 shows the changes in 
equivalent variation and the return to capital under different elasticities of substitution 
between capital and the energy aggregate. 
Table 7.27: Changes in Equivalent Variation under Different Elasticities of Substitution 
between Capital and the Energy Aggregate (percentage change)   
Elasticity of substitution  0.50 1.50 2.00 2.50 
Equivalent variation CT_HS -0.75 -0.82 -0.84 -0.85 CT_LT 0.23 -0.13 -0.23 -0.31 
Return to capital CT_HS -2.59 -1.49 -1.18 -0.94 CT_LT -2.21 -1.22 -0.94 -0.73 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Under a CT_HS, welfare losses are larger with higher elasticities of substitution between 
capital and the energy aggregate. Furthermore, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes 
under elasticities of substitution higher than 1.00 results also in welfare losses, since the tax-
shifting effect between labour and capital is less pronounced. This confirms the conclusion 
drawn by Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998), who state that substitution between the fixed 
factor and resources should be difficult in order to achieve an increase in employment. 
Intuitively, the burden on carbon taxes passes less on the factor which is easily substitutable 
with energy inputs. This is demonstrated with lower decreases in the return to capital under 
higher elasticities of substitution. In addition, the results are less sensitive to different 
elasticities of substitution under a CT_HS compared to those under a CT_LT.   
7.4.6 Capital Mobility 
In the standard model specification, capital is assumed to be mobile among sectors, yet 
internationally immobile. The results are contrasted with those where capital is assumed to be 
immobile among sectors. Table 7.28 shows the changes in equivalent variation under sectoral 
mobility and immobility. Given the assumption of sectoral capital immobility, the tax-shifting 
effect becomes stronger compared to that under the assumption of sectoral capital mobility. 
As a result, welfare losses are less pronounced in the case where capital is assumed to be 
sectoral immobile, yet the differences in the results are not large.  
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Table 7.28: Changes in Equivalent Variation under Capital Mobility and Immobility 
(percentage change)   
 Sectoral  International 
 Immobile Mobile  Immobile Mobile 
CT_HS -0.80 -0.75  -0.75 -4.87 
CT_LT 0.27 0.23  0.23 -4.01 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Furthermore, in the central case, capital is assumed to be international immobile, which 
implies perfectly inelastic supply of capital. The results are compared with those where 
capital is assumed to be internationally mobile so that supply of capital is perfectly elastic. As 
a result, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes leads to larger welfares losses compared to 
those where capital is assumed to be international immobile (Table 7.28). The intuition 
behind this is that under the assumption of international capital mobility, capital can avoid the 
burden of carbon taxation by flowing abroad so that there is no tax-shifting effect between 
capital and labour. This result confirms the conclusion drawn by de Mooij and Bovenberg 
(1998). In the reality, capital is neither perfectly mobile nor perfectly immobile, yet capital is 
quite mobile especially in the long run (see Obstfeld, 1996). 
7.4.7 Elasticities of Substitution among Technologies 
The electricity sector is greatly impacted from carbon taxes because of its high energy 
intensity. As a result, electricity intensive sectors such as metals, chemical production, and 
wood products are adversely affected via a high electricity price. How strong the electricity 
price would be increased, depends, inter alia, on the substitutability among coal-fired, gas-
fired, nuclear, and hydro technologies. In our standard model specification, the elasticity of 
substitution among power generation technologies is assumed to equal 2.00. To investigate 
the relevance of the technological flexibility within the power generation sector, a range of 
substitution elasticities among the technologies from 0.50 to 2.5 is considered. Table 7.29 
reveals the changes in equivalent variation as well as changes in output and prices under a 
CT_HS and CT_LT with different elasticities of substitution among the technologies.  
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Table 7.29: Changes in Equivalent Variation, Output and Production Costs under 
Different Elasticities of Substitution among the Technologies (percentage change) 
Elasticity of substitution  0.50 1.50 2.00 2.50 
Equivalent variation CT_HS -0.79 -0.76 -0.75 -0.74 CT_LT 0.29 0.25 0.23 0.21 
Electricity under a CT_HS: Output -6.30 -5.93 -5.75 -5.57 Costs 7.59 7.09 6.85 6.62 
Coal-fired Output -6.84 -7.50 -7.83 -8.15 Costs 8.83 8.30 8.05 7.81 
Gas-fired Output -6.75 -7.22 -7.44 -7.65 Costs 8.61 8.08 7.82 7.58 
Hydro Output -2.39 5.50 9.27 12.90 Costs -0.86 -0.79 -0.76 -0.73 
Nuclear Output -2.39 5.50 9.27 12.90 Costs -0.86 -0.79 -0.76 -0.73 
Electricity under a CT_LT: Output -6.10 -5.71 -5.53 -5.35 Costs 8.10 7.53 7.27 7.01 
Coal-fired Output -6.68 -7.43 -7.79 -8.15 Costs 9.46 8.86 8.58 8.30 
Gas-fired Output -6.55 -7.04 -7.27 -7.49 Costs 9.16 8.56 8.27 8.00 
Hydro Output -1.94 6.41 10.38 14.19 Costs -0.87 -0.80 -0.76 -0.73 
Nuclear Output -1.94 6.41 10.38 14.19 Costs -0.87 -0.80 -0.76 -0.73 
Source: Model simulation results. 
Under an elasticity of substitution equals 0.50, introducing carbon taxes under both revenue 
recycling strategies results in reductions in output from all technologies with the decreases 
from coal- and gas-fired technologies being more pronounced because of higher energy costs. 
Under higher elasticities of substitution, output from nuclear and hydro technologies 
increases, whereas reductions in output from coal-technologies become more pronounced. As 
a result, under higher elasticities of substitution, decreases in the total production of electricity 
are smaller because of a lower producer price of electricity.  
With respect to macroeconomic effects, larger substitutability among the technologies is 
responsible for smaller welfare losses under a CT_HS because of smaller increases in the 
consumer price of electricity. In contrast, under a CT_LT, welfare losses are larger under 
higher elasticities of substitution among the technologies. This is because decreases in 
production of energy intensive sectors are less when the power generation technologies are 
more substitutable with each other. Therefore, reductions in demand for capital are less 
pronounced, which leads to smaller decreases in capital costs compared to those under higher 
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elasticities of substitution. As a result, the tax-shifting effect between labour and capital is 
weaker given the assumption of high elasticities of substitution between power generation 
technologies. 
7.5 Substituting Carbon Taxes for Labour Taxes under a Cournot 
Oligopoly  
7.5.1 Macroeconomic and Fiscal Effects 
The existence of a Cournot oligopoly in the markets for natural gas, minerals, petroleum 
products, chemical production, and metals, increases the cost of carbon taxation in Russia. 
Under a Cournot oligopoly, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes results in welfare losses 
with welfare losses being more pronounced in case of Cournot oligopoly with free entry and 
exit compared to those when blocked entry and exit is assumed (Column 2 and 3 of Table 
7.30). Moreover, increases in household income are less pronounced given the assumption of 
a Cournot oligopoly. In contrast, the environmental tax reform leads to welfare gains as well 
as higher household income under perfect competition in output market.  
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Table 7.30: Macroeconomic and Aggregated Effects Compared to Model Base 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Perfect 
competition 
Cournot 
oligopoly a 
Cournot 
oligopoly b 
Equivalent variation (million USD)  667.79 -450.08 -865.56 
Exchange rate (per cent) 0.11 -0.01 0.23 
Tax rates on labour income (per cent) -15.97 -15.83 -15.12 
Household income (million USD): 1375 320 188 
Capital income -4,401 -4,275 -4,731 
Unskilled labour income 4,270 4,148 3,688 
Skilled labour income 1,954 1,903 1,735 
Land income 40 15 16 
Natural resource income -489 -701 -519 
Factor prices (per cent):    
Capital -2.21 -2.15 -2.25 
Unskilled labour -2.05 -2.06 -2.07 
Skilled labour -2.12 -2.14 -2.14 
Natural resource -5.98 -6.19 -8.66 
Factor supply (per cent):    
Unskilled labour 1.04 1.03 0.95 
Skilled labour 1.02 1.00 0.93 
Land 0.62 0.23 0.25 
Government revenues (million USD):  -867 -1100 -1122 
Export taxes 502 433 538 
Import taxes -4 -28 -31 
Carbon taxes 8,373 8,248 7,985 
Consumption taxes -1,050 -1,087 -1,169 
Taxes on unskilled labour income -5,570 -5,547 -5,380 
Taxes on skilled labour income -2,612 -2,599 -2,508 
Social security contrib. from unskilled labour  -33 -36 -43 
Social security contrib. from skilled labour  -17 -18 -20 
Capital taxes -418 -408 -451 
Mineral resource extraction taxes -41 -59 -44 
Land taxes 3 1 1 
Government expenditures (million USD):  285 64 37 
Lump-sum transfers 284 66 39 
Production subsidies 1 -2 -2 
a Cournot oligopoly with blocked entry and exit. 
b Cournot oligopoly with free entry and exit. 
Source: Model simulation results. 
The reasons for welfare losses from carbon taxation in the presence of imperfect competition 
are as follows. First, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes induces reductions in domestic 
demand in imperfectly competitive energy and energy intensive markets because of higher 
consumer prices. Since domestic supply is already sub-optimal under a Cournot oligopoly, 
further decreases lead to higher consumer welfare deadweight losses. Second, introducing 
carbon taxes results in losses in economies of scale.  
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Under a Cournot oligopoly with blocked entry and exit, final consumers are affected by 
changes in mark-ups via changes in perceived elasticities of demand as well as the occurrence 
of economic profit (loss). Under a Cournot oligopoly with free entry and exit, an economic 
profit (loss) leads to entry (exit) of firms so that changes in mark-ups are determined not only 
by changes in perceived elasticities of demand, but also by changes in the number of firms. 
Sectoral effects of carbon taxes are explained in more detail below in Chapter 7.5.2. 
7.5.2 Sectoral Effects 
7.5.2.1 Energy Commodities 
Domestically produced natural gas is assumed to be sold at the average cost price38 in the 
domestic market, whereas the socially desirable price would equal marginal cost. Introducing 
carbon taxes raises the consumer price of natural gas, thereby exacerbating pre-existing 
distortions arising from the inefficient price policy. Moreover, a reduction in the total 
production of natural gas results in losses in economies of scale so that firms operate at a 
lower scale level (Columns 6 of Tables 7.31 and 7.32). Overall, the producer price of natural 
gas declines because of lower production costs, yet losses in economies of scale diminish the 
reduction in the producer price, to certain extent, via higher average fixed costs.     
Carbon taxes are not levied on exports of energy so that Russian natural gas becomes more 
competitive in the export market because of a decrease in production costs. As a result, 
domestic producers of natural gas face less elastic export demand via an increase in their 
market share. Columns 4 of Tables 7.31 and 7.32 show a reduction in the perceived elasticity 
of demand for natural gas which reflect changes in the competitiveness of Russian gas in the 
export market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 The assumption of average cost pricing in the domestic market is based on the fact that domestic prices of 
natural gas in Russia are administratively regulated. Under an average cost pricing, producers of natural gas 
operate at zero profit.  
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Table 7.31: Sectoral Effects of Carbon Taxation under a Cournot Oligopoly with 
Blocked Entry and Exit (percentage changes except for profit: million USD)   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Domestic demand Mark-up Elasticity of demand 
Profit 
(mill. USD) 
Economies 
of scale PCa ICb 
Natural gas -6.64 -6.65 1.47 -1.45 -6.97 -2.36 
Petroleum products -2.62 -2.88 0.00001 -0.00001 10.49 -2.35 
Chemical products -3.42 -3.07 -0.16 0.16 -308.70 -4.80 
Metals -2.64 -2.17 -0.11 0.11 -498.33 -3.74 
Minerals -2.86 -2.30 0.07 -0.07 32.81 -1.33 
a Perfect competition.  
b Cournot oligopoly with blocked entry and exit.  
Source: Model simulation results. 
Table 7.32: Sectoral Effects of Carbon Taxation under a Cournot Oligopoly with Free 
Entry and Exit (percentage changes)   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Domestic demand Mark-up Elasticity of demand 
Number 
of firms 
Economies 
of scale PCa ICb 
Natural gas -6.64 -6.74 1.90 -1.53 -0.34 -1.91 
Petroleum products -2.62 -3.10 -0.23 -0.00001 0.23 -2.67 
Chemical products -3.42 -4.15 4.65 0.22 -4.65 -1.83 
Metals -2.64 -3.00 3.99 0.15 -3.97 -1.20 
Minerals -2.86 -3.32 -1.47 -0.10 1.60 -3.45 
a Perfect competition.  
b Cournot oligopoly with free entry and exit. 
Source: Model simulation results. 
In the model, this effect operates through equations 7.1 and 7.2:  
)1(*expexp −−= cccc elastwSHelastwDEL ,                    (7.1)     
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where DELexpc is the perceived elasticity of export demand, celastw is the elasticity of 
substitution between Russian gas and gas from the rest of the world (ROW), cSH exp is the 
value share of Russian gas exports in global gas exports, cQE  is export supply of gas from 
Russia, cPWE is the export price of Russian gas, cQET  is the global gas export and cPET  is 
the composite price of global gas exports.  Equation 7.1 shows that the higher the market 
share, the lower is the perceived elasticity of export demand.   
According to the first-order condition for profit maximization under a Cournot oligopoly with 
blocked entry and exit (equation 7.3), a reduction in the perceived elasticity of demand 
(DELc) increases the mark-up (MKc) (Column 3 of Table 7.31), implying more market power 
of Russian gas producers in the export market. 
  198 
ca
c DELN
MK
*
Ω
= .                      (7.3) 
Furthermore, introducing carbon taxes leads to the occurrence of economic losses in the 
natural gas sector (Column 5 of Table 7.31). Generally, the occurrence of economic profit 
(losses) is determined by different factors, such as economies of scale, initial elasticities of 
export and domestic demand, changes in elasticities of export and domestic demand, and 
changes in production costs. For instance, losses in economies of scale tend to generate 
economic losses via increasing average fixed costs. While export supply of natural gas is 
increased and there is a reduction the perceived elasticity of demand, domestic producers of 
natural gas experience economic losses, driven by a strong reduction in domestic demand as 
well as losses in economies of scale. The economic loss establishes an incentive for firms to 
leave the sector. Given the assumption of a Cournot oligopoly with free entry and exit, the 
increase in the mark-up on gas exports is larger compared to that with blocked entry and exit 
because of a smaller number of firms (cf. Column 3 of Table 7.31 and 7.32).     
Introducing carbon taxes leads to a decline in the domestic demand for petroleum products 
because of higher consumer prices. This exacerbates pre-existing distortions arising from 
imperfect competition. Because of lower production costs, domestic producers of petroleum 
products become more competitive compared to foreign firms. Column 4 of Tables 7.31 and 
7.32 shows a small reduction in the perceived elasticity of demand, which results from a 
higher market share of domestically produced petroleum products in the domestic market. 
Under a Cournot oligopoly with blocked entry and exit, less elastic domestic demand for 
petroleum products induces a small increase in the mark-up on domestically sold petroleum 
products (Column 3 of Table 7.31). While there are losses in economies of scale, substituting 
carbon taxes for labour taxes leads to an economic profit (Column 5 of Table 7.31). In 
comparison to natural gas, the reduction in domestic demand petroleum products is less 
pronounced. Moreover, there is an increase in the export price of petroleum products and a 
small reduction in the perceived elasticity of demand. In the presence of an economic profit, 
firms are expected to entry the market (Column 5 of Table 7.32). Hence, under the 
assumption of free exit, domestic consumers of petroleum products experience a reduction the 
mark-up (Column 3 of Table 7.32). As a result, the decline the mark-up on domestically sold 
petroleum products alleviates partially the consumer deadweight loss arising from imperfect 
competition.  
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7.5.2.2 Energy Intensive Commodities 
Declining domestic demand for chemical products and metals resulting from higher producer 
prices exacerbates consumer deadweight losses arising from imperfect competition. 
Furthermore, introducing carbon taxes exacerbates the pre-existing distortions via higher 
mark-ups under a Cournot oligopoly with free entry and exit. Due to increases in production 
costs, domestic producers of chemical products and metals become less competitive compared 
to foreign rivals so that there are decreases in the export and domestic demand for chemical 
products and metals. As a result, domestic demand becomes more elastic via lower market 
shares. Columns 4 of Tables 7.31 and 7.32 show increases in the perceived elasticities of 
demand for chemical products and metals. On the one hand, increasing perceived elasticities 
of demand reduce the mark-ups under a Cournot oligopoly with blocked entry and exit, 
thereby improving consumer welfare to certain extent. On the other hand, there are economic 
losses (Column 5 of Table 7.31) because of strong reductions in domestic and export demand 
for chemical products and metals and losses in economies of scale as well as increasing 
perceived elasticities of domestic demand. In the presence of economic losses, the equilibrium 
is not stable since some firms want to leave the unprofitable markets. Given the assumption of 
free entry and exit, the economic losses pass on to final consumers in terms of increasing 
mark-ups (Column 3 of Table 7.31), driven by less competition in the domestic chemical 
products and metals markets. As a result, as shown in Column 2 of Table 7.31, decreases in 
domestic demand for chemical products and metals under a Cournot oligopoly with free entry 
and exit are more pronounced compared to those under perfect competition.     
7.5.2.3 Non-Energy Intensive Commodities 
Substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes alleviates consumer deadweight losses arising from 
imperfect competition in the mineral market since there is a reduction in the producer price of 
minerals resulting from lower production costs. As a result of lower production costs as well 
as a depreciation of the currency, domestic producers of minerals become more competitive in 
the domestic market compared to foreign rivals. Therefore, the perceived elasticity of demand 
falls due to a higher market share of domestically produced minerals in the domestic market. 
Under a Cournot oligopoly with blocked entry and exit, the declining perceived elasticity of 
demand for minerals results in a higher mark-up (Column 3 of Table 7.31). Moreover, there 
are losses in economies of scale resulting from a decline in the total production of minerals 
due to lower domestic demand. Since the energy intensive metal sector is the largest domestic 
consumer of minerals, a decreasing demand for metals induces lower domestic demand for 
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minerals. Exports of minerals, however, increase due to declining production costs. Despite 
losses in economies of scale resulting in higher average fixed costs, introducing carbon taxes 
leads to an economic profit (Column 5 of Table 7.31) in the mineral sector because of a 
decrease in production costs and an increasing export price as well as a declining perceived 
elasticity of demand. The economic profit attracts new firms to entry the market, which 
reduces the mark-up on domestically sold minerals, given the assumption of free entry and 
exit (Column 3 of Table 7.32). The reduction in the mark-up, furthermore, alleviates 
consumer deadweight losses arising from imperfect competition.     
7.5.3 Carbon Taxation and Income Inequity 
Carbon taxes under a Cournot oligopoly have qualitatively similar implications on the income 
distribution as discussed in Section 7.3.4. Figure 7.7 shows the changes in total factor income, 
consumption expenditures and net income by decile.  
Figure 7.7: Changes in Total Factor Income, Total Consumption Expenditures and Net 
Incomea by Decile (per cent)   
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dec1 represents the poorest ten per cent of the population, dec10 the richest ten per cent.  
a Net income is the aggregated effect of expenditure and factor income changes. 
Source: Model simulation results. 
 
Introducing carbon taxes induces a quite regressive impact on the income distribution, yet the 
environmental tax reform is still progressive. The main difference in the results between 
substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes under perfect competition and a Cournot oligopoly 
is that increases in net income are less pronounced in the presence of a Cournot oligopoly.   
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7.5.4 Sensitivity Analyses  
Cost disadvantage ratio. According to our results, the cost of the environmental tax reform 
in the presence of a Cournot oligopoly in commodity markets is higher compared to that 
under perfect competition. How strong this effect would be, depends on the magnitude of pre-
existing distortions. In the central case, a mark-up of 15% is assumed for all imperfectly 
competitive markets. Under lower mark-ups, the economy is less adversely affected by carbon 
taxes and vice versa. For example, under a mark-up of 5%, substituting carbon taxes for 
labour taxes results in welfare gains as measured by an EV of 0.11% of base household 
expenditure, whereas under a mark-up of 15% those are welfare losses: 0.30%. Given the 
assumption of free entry and exit, the mark-up is related to a cost disadvantage ratio (CDR), 
which defines the share of fixed costs in total production costs (Francoise, 1998; Harrison et 
al., 1994). Losses in economies of scale pass on to consumers in terms of a higher mark-up. 
Losses in economies of scale can significantly increase the cost of the environmental tax 
reform. This confirms the conclusion drawn by Böhringer et al. (2008), who analysed the 
structural change induced by environmental taxation for Germany under an imperfectly 
competitive market structure. 
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8 Conclusions 
8.1 Summary of Simulation Results and Discussion   
Based on simulation results, the main conclusions are summarized as follows. Introducing 
carbon taxes compensated by an increase in lump-sum transfers leads to welfare losses 
measured by an equivalent variation of 0.75% of base household expenditure. The economy is 
adversely affected by carbon taxes via increased energy costs so that there are reductions in 
domestic consumption as well as production in almost all sectors. In comparison, substituting 
carbon taxes for labour taxes is a more desirable revenue recycling policy since this leads 
even to welfare gains measured by equivalent variation of 0.23% of base household 
expenditure. In other words, there is a strong double divided in terms of welfare when 
revenues from carbon taxes are refunded through a reduction in labour taxes. Other 
macroeconomic and sectoral effects resulting from substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes 
are summarized as follows:       
1) There are increases in the supply of unskilled and skilled labour by 1.04% and 1.02%, 
respectively. This indicates the occurrence of an employment double dividend 
(Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1998).  High labour supply leads to reductions in 
wages, implying lower labour costs for industries. Moreover, supply of land is 
increased by 0.62% associated with higher production of agricultural products. 
2) Returns to capital and natural resources are reduced because of lower demand for 
these factors so that the burden of carbon taxes is not fully passed on to final 
consumers, yet is partially absorbed by lower factor prices. This indicates the tax-
shifting effect between labour, capital and natural resources (de Mooij and Bovenberg, 
1998; Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1998; Bento and Jacobsen, 2007). 
3) Substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes results in higher revenues from export taxes 
because of both a depreciation of the currency and higher export supplies of energy 
commodities as well as non-energy intensive commodities. In particular, the increase 
in revenues from export taxes on crude oil, natural gas, and petroleum products is 
strongly pronounced. Export taxes lower the domestic price level of energy so that 
there is oversupply of energy in the domestic market. Therefore, introducing carbon 
taxes has also a corrective effect since this leads to an increase in export supply and a 
reduction in domestic demand for energy. Increases in export supply of energy are 
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associated with higher revenues from export taxes, which reduce the cost of the 
environmental tax reform. Moreover, there is an increase in the revenue from land 
taxes. Intuitively, high revenues from other taxes allow a larger reduction in labour 
taxes, furthermore alleviating the tax distortion in the labour market.   
4) In contrast, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes leads to reductions in the 
revenues from labour taxes because of both lower tax rates and wages. Revenues from 
capital taxes and mineral resource extraction taxes are also reduced due to lower 
returns to these factors. Furthermore, revenues from consumption taxes decrease due 
to a lower value of total consumption.      
5) Total domestic production of energy commodities is reduced, driven by lower 
domestic demand. Nevertheless, domestic producers of energy become more 
competitive in domestic and export markets because of lower production costs and a 
depreciation of the currency. As a result, there are increases in the export supply of 
crude oil, coal, petroleum products, and natural gas. 
6) Energy intensive commodities such as electricity, wood products, chemical products, 
and metals are affected most adversely by the introduction of carbon taxes. Due to 
high energy costs, domestic producers of energy intensive commodities become less 
competitive compared to foreign firms. As a result, there are increases in import 
demand for some energy intensive commodities, whereas export and domestic demand 
for all domestically produced energy intensive commodities is reduced.  
7) In contrast, domestic producers of non-energy intensive commodities such as textiles, 
agriculture, and food products become more competitive in domestic and export 
markets compared to foreign rivals. As a result, substituting carbon taxes for labour 
taxes leads to increases in export supplies of all non-energy intensive commodities. 
Moreover, domestic demand for most domestically produced non-energy intensive 
commodities is also increased because of increased household income, while import 
demand for non-energy intensive commodities is reduced via a substitution effect. 
8) Carbon taxes have a strong regressive impact on income distribution since the 
expenditure shares on coal, gas and electricity are especially high by poor households 
compared to those by rich households, while the expenditure share on petroleum 
products is larger by rich households. Despite a regressive impact of carbon taxes, the 
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environmental tax reform tends to be quite progressive if revenues from carbon taxes 
are refunded via a reduction in labour taxes or as lump-sum transfers in favour of poor 
household groups. Hence, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes cannot only 
improve national welfare, but reduce also income inequality in Russia. Furthermore, a 
lower labour tax rate may alleviate income tax evasion, which is a prominent problem 
in Russia and has been shown to strongly correlate with the tax rate level 
(Gorodnichenko et al., 2009).  
To examine the stability of the results under different model parameterizations, several 
sensitivity analyses were carried out. The sensitivity analyses indicate that the 
macroeconomic and sectoral effects of carbon taxes strongly depend on i) the labour supply 
elasticity, ii) elasticities of substitution between labour and the capital-energy aggregate, iii) 
elasticities of substitution between capital and energy, and iv) international capital mobility. 
For instance, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes results in higher welfare gains under a 
high labour supply elasticity as well as high elasticities of substitution between labour and the 
capital-energy aggregate and low elasticities of substitution between capital and energy. 
Intuitively, the more elastic demand and supply of labour, the larger welfare losses arising 
from labour taxation. Therefore, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes tends to be a more 
preferable revenue recycling strategy under elastic demand and supply of labour. Another 
crucial aspect is the tax-shifting effect between labour and capital. Under the assumption of 
international capital immobility, capital bears some burden of carbon taxation. The higher 
elasticities of substitution between labour and the capital-energy aggregate as well as the 
lower elasticities of substitution between capital and energy, the more pronounced the tax-
shifting effect. The magnitude of the tax-shifting effect between capital and labour is 
indicated by reductions in the return to capital. In contrast, given the assumption of perfect 
capital mobility across borders, introducing carbon taxes under both revenue recycling 
schemes – an increase in lump-sum transfers to households and a reduction in tax rates on 
labour income – leads to substantial welfare losses compared to those in the central case 
simulation. Nevertheless, in reality capital is neither perfectly mobile nor perfectly immobile 
(Obstfeld, 1996) so that some tax-shifting effect between capital and labour is expected to 
occur, yet this effect will be rather moderate in the long run.  
In the central policy simulation, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes improves national 
welfare. Nevertheless, non-tax distortions such as imperfect competition should not be 
neglected. In the presence of a Cournot oligopoly in the market for natural gas, petroleum 
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products, chemical products, metals, and minerals, the cost of carbon taxation in terms of 
welfare is higher compared to perfect competition being assumed. The reason for this is that 
carbon taxes exacerbate pre-existing distortions arising from imperfect competition and leads 
to losses in economies of scale. As a result, substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes under a 
Cournot oligopoly in output markets can lead to welfare losses. 
An occurrence (failure) of a strong double dividend is not the primary reason why an 
environmental tax reform should (not) be carried out. The purpose of environmental taxes is 
to internalize negative environmental externalities. Introducing carbon taxes in Russia aims at 
a reduction in CO2 emissions to combat climate change. The results show that an 
environmental tax reform can lead to non-environmental welfare gains under perfect 
competitive markets structure. Furthermore, Russia could benefit from selling non-utilized 
emission permits in international carbon markets. Such carbon sales have been reported for 
several Central European countries at prices from 6-12 USD/ton of CO2, but not yet for 
Russia (Aldrich and Koerner, 2012). The 10% emission reduction simulated for Russia in this 
analysis would be equivalent to 158.61 million metric tons of CO2 equivalents. At a price of 
about 12 USD/ton of CO2, this would more than compensate for the welfare losses simulated 
under imperfect competition. Most market observers expect that there will be a global carbon 
reference price by 2020 and expect this price to be around 35 USD/ton of CO2 (Point Carbon, 
2011). Under such a price scenario, the benefits from carbon sales would exceed our 
simulated welfare losses under imperfect competition by a factor 6-12, depending on the 
assumption made on entry and exit of firms. It should be noted that Russia may have some 
market power in the global carbon trading market. Hence, an intergovernmental emission 
trading may be more rational from Russian perspective compared to trading among firms 
according to the Joint Implementation mechanism (Böhringer and Löschel, 2004; Böhringer 
et al., 2007).     
A carbon tax can be considered as an indirect tax on other emissions stemming from usage of 
energy inputs so that introducing carbon taxes will also lead to reductions in non-CO2 GHGs 
such as CH4, N2O, and F-gases as well as local air pollution such as sulphur dioxide (SO2), 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) and carbon monoxide (CO). At present, there are emission payments in 
Russia, yet these are substantially lower compared to those levied in developed countries.  
Improvement in energy efficiency associated with the introduction of carbon taxes is another 
important aspect. Energy efficiency may improve due to the optimization of existing plants, 
the substitution of lower emission energy sources for higher emission sources and the 
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adoption of passive energy saving technologies, e.g., improved insulation. In the longer term 
the increased cost of primary energy products should both accelerate the rate of technological 
replacement and induce technological progress (Ruttan, 1997; Newell et al., 1999). Recent 
evidence (Popp, 2002) indicates that there is a significant relationship between energy prices 
and innovation in energy-saving technologies. In the presence of large technical potential for 
energy efficiency improvement, the marginal cost of energy efficiency improvement in Russia 
is lower compared to many developed countries which are quite close to their production 
possibility frontier. Hence, the welfare gains resulting from the simulated introduction of 
carbon taxes in Russia may be higher if positive dynamic welfare effects are captured. In 
addition, increasing environmental taxes on usage energy tends to encourage a sustainable use 
of energy resources.   
Furthermore, the cost of the introduction of carbon taxes under a Cournot oligopoly may be 
overestimated. An oligopoly with homogenous products and symmetric firms is assumed in 
this analysis, while product heterogeneity and asymmetry of firms with respect to production 
costs and emission intensity may be more realistic for some sectors. Introducing carbon taxes 
can shift production from less efficient to more efficient firms (Simpson, 1995), which may 
reduce the negative welfare effects found.  
An important lesson emerging from this analysis is that the current energy policy can, inter 
alia, determine the design of an environmental tax policy. For example, domestic prices of 
electricity and gas are administratively regulated in Russia and there are high export taxes on 
natural gas, crude oil and petroleum products. Hence, taxation of energy inputs according to 
their carbon intensity is not necessarily the most cost effective policy to achieve certain 
emission abatement so that a differentiation of carbon tax rates among energy inputs can 
come into consideration. In other words, the introduction of carbon taxes can also correct the 
inefficiencies of the current energy policy. Probably, the superior policy would be to directly 
correct inefficiencies arising from government intervention. For example, high export taxes 
on energy in Russia can be justified on grounds of economic efficiency and income equity 
since Russia may have some market power in world energy markets and energy resources are 
mainly owned by rich households. Nevertheless, concerns are that export taxes on energy are 
“too high”, especially on crude oil and petroleum products, which may lead to welfare losses. 
Administrative price regulation of natural gas and electricity is desirable for poor households 
and this can prevent domestic producers from exercising their market power in domestic 
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markets. Nevertheless, administrative price regulation is not the optimal policy to deal with 
these issues.    
Regarding the sectoral effects of carbon taxation, it is found that domestic producers of 
energy intensive commodities would lose market shares in domestic and export markets in 
case of carbon taxation. Apart from a regressive distributional effect of carbon taxation, the 
concern to lose competitiveness in some energy intensive sectors can be another important 
source of political opposition (Fullerton et al., 2008). A tax exemption of such sectors is 
therefore often discussed and sometimes implemented (OECD, 1995 and 2006). Nevertheless, 
exemptions due to competitiveness concerns are hard to justify on both economic and 
environmental grounds (Böhringer and Rutherford, 1997; Ekins and Speck, 1999).  The 
intuitive explanation behind this is that tax exemptions imply narrowing tax bases, thereby 
resulting in higher welfare costs of an abatement tax policy. When looking at the effects of 
carbon taxes in Russia, one should not neglect that domestically produced energy 
commodities as well as labour intensive commodities become more competitive compared to 
foreign rivals. For the economy as a whole, what matters is the overall welfare effect which is 
found to be positive for Russia under perfect competition as well as a Cournot oligopoly in 
some output markets, if the opportunity for carbon trading is given. In addition, changes in 
competitiveness are moderate according to our simulation results, depending mainly on the 
magnitude of carbon taxation. The magnitude of changes mainly depends on emission 
reduction targets as well as revenue refunding schemes. 
8.2 Model Limitations and Further Research  
There are some limitations to this analysis related to the model features. Such model 
limitations as well as the policy simulation results of policy simulations provide scope for 
further research. A comparative static single country CGE model is used. Hence, 
technological change, which would result from investment in energy efficiency, is not 
captured in this analysis. Introducing carbon taxes is expected to accelerate the diffusion of 
new energy-efficient and less carbon-intensive technologies and encourage innovation 
processes in the long-run. For example, Goulder and Schneider (1999) assert that the 
existence of price-induced technological change can result in lower costs of environmental 
policy. A dynamic CGE model with endogenous technological change is obvious an 
appropriate tool to account for dynamic welfare effects resulting from an environmental tax 
reform.  
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The analysis is based on the assumption of perfectly elastic demand and supply of the ROW. 
A multi-country CGE model can be employed to provide more realistic model design with 
respect to trade flows between Russia and the ROW. In particular, this is important for 
addressing the carbon leakage issue, a prominent problem of abatement policies (Babiker, 
2005). Hence, a potential research question could be an estimation of carbon leakage resulting 
from the introduction taxes in Russia. On one hand, Russia exports its energy resources 
mainly to less energy- and carbon-intensive economies so that introducing carbon taxes will 
shift the supply of energy towards more energy efficient countries. On the other hand, Russia 
is one of the largest exporters of energy so that an increase in export supply of energy can 
lower the world price level. As a result, demand for energy in other countries – more energy 
intensive than Russia – could also increase. Without a quantitative estimation it is difficult to 
draw any conclusion about the magnitude of the carbon leakage rate. A multi-country CGE 
model would be required to address the issue of carbon leakage explicitly. In particular, the 
measure of carbon leakage becomes of high relevance, if different revenue recycling policies 
are compared.   
The results show that welfare costs of the introduction of carbon taxes in Russia become 
higher if a Cournot oligopoly for output markets is assumed so that welfare costs arising from 
imperfect competition should not be neglected. This raises the issue of alternative revenue 
recycling policies. The analysis could be extended by a comparison of other revenue recycling 
strategies. For example, in the presence of imperfect competition, carbon leakage and losses 
in competitiveness, an output-based refunding could be considered. Under such an output-
based refunding, revenues from carbon taxes are recycled through output subsidies to 
imperfectly competitive sectors (Sterner and Höglund, 2000; Fischer, 2011; Fischer and Fox, 
2009). Output-based refunding instead of a reduction in labour taxes could, however, 
diminish the inequity reducing effect of the policy package. Therefore, some combination of 
these two revenue allocation schemes could be considered. Furthermore, the analysis can be 
further extended by comparison of other possible revenue refunding policies, such as 
reductions in capital taxes or reductions in consumption taxes, or some combination of them 
can also come into consideration. For example, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) by employing 
a dynamic general equilibrium model find that substituting carbon taxes for capital taxes can 
lead to an increase in GNP. It is also important to recognize that such revenue recycling 
schemes could raise trade-off between income equity and economic efficiency. For example, 
given the assumption of international capital mobility, a reduction in capital taxes is likely 
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more rational on grounds of economic efficiency compared to a reduction in labour taxes, yet 
this can exacerbate income inequality in Russia.  
Another important limitation is the empirical foundation of the analysis. The analysis is based 
on Version 7 of GTAP database, which represents the global economy in 2004. Recently, 
some structural changes as well as changes in the Russian tax system took place. Hence, using 
an updated database would increase the credibility of the simulation results. Furthermore, 
parameterization of the model is a key determinant of the results. To our best knowledge, 
there are no estimations on the most crucial parameters, such as the labour supply elasticity as 
well as elasticities of substitution between labour, capital and energy for Russia. Almost all 
elasticities used the model are mainly taken from the GTAP database. Hence, the analysis 
could benefit from the estimation of such parameters to provide more confidence in the 
results. The results of policy simulations suggest that the most important parameters for an 
econometrical estimation are i) labour supply elasticities, ii) elasticities of substitution 
between capital and labour, iii) elasticities of substitution between energy, labour and capital. 
The analysis could also benefit from the investigation of international capital mobility since 
this determines, inter alia, the tax-shifting effect between capital and labour. Another relevant 
aspect associated with parameterization is the nesting structure. The nesting structure used in 
the model is similar with that implemented in the GTAP energy model, but this slightly 
differs between energy producing, non-energy producing sectors and the electricity sector. 
One of the main features of the nesting structure used for non-energy producing sectors is that 
labour is substitutable with the capital-energy aggregate. Such a nesting specification is used 
in the GTAP energy model (Burniaux and Truong, 2002) as well as the GREEN model 
(Burniaux et al., 1992). An alternative nesting structure could be a value added-energy 
aggregate with the energy aggregate being substitutable with the capital-labour aggregate (e.g. 
Paltsev et al., 1995; Manne et al., 1995). Empirical studies are controversial with respect to 
which nesting structure would be more appropriate. This may differ by economy and by 
sector.   
The analysis is focused on CO2 emissions, whereas the effects of the introduction of carbon 
taxes on non CO2 GHGs are not captured. At the same time, CH4, N2O and F-gases are large 
sources of GHGs emissions: for example, approximately 21.7% of total GHGs in Russia 
come from CH4. In addition, according to estimates by Reilly et al.  (2004), a reduction in non 
CO2 GHGs can be often achieved at relatively low costs. Hence, taxation of non CO2 GHGs 
can also come into consideration. According to OECD (2001), non CO2 GHGs which may be 
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suitable for taxation are i) CH4 from landfills, ii) CH4 emissions from natural gas and oil 
production, and iii) N2O from use of fertilizers. On one hand, the theoretical literature on 
optimal taxation suggests that a targeted taxation typically is a more efficient policy 
instrument to correct externalities compared to some “proxy” taxes. This is because targeted 
instruments provide the “right” behaviour incentives, especially this becomes relevant if there 
many substitution possibilities such as substitution among energy inputs. On the other hand, a 
more complicated tax system is associated with high compliance costs resulting from taxation 
(Alm, 1996). An evaluation of the design of environmental taxation in the presence of multi-
externalities is also a potential field for further research.  
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Appendixes   
Appendix A: Derivation of Equation (4.4.12) 
The tax-interaction effect ( IW∂ ) is defined as the following: 
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Substituting (a2) into (a1), we obtain: 
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Making use of the Slutsky equation:
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where c states for compensated and I is the disposable household income.    
Making use of the Slutsky equation, the term 
L
H
τ∂
∂  can be defined as the following: 
  224 
 
I
HHTHH
L
C
L ∂
∂
−−
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ )(
ττ
.           (a6) 
Differentiating the time endowment constraint (4.4.8) with respect to Lτ , we obtain: 
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Differentiating (4.4.2) and (4.4.3) with respect to Lτ , we obtain: 
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Substituting (a9) and (a10) into (a8), we obtain: 
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Substituting (a5) and (a11) into (a4) gives: 
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Equation (a12) can be rewritten as the following: 
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Multiplying equation (a13) by ( )Lτ−1  gives: 
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Dividing by )( 21 CC + , we obtain: 
  225 
 
LIHC
C
HC
LI
C
HCI
n
CC
C
n
CC
C
n
nnMC
W
+
+
+
+
+
=∂
21
2
2
21
1
1
22 )( ,       (a16) 
or 
 2MCW C
I φ=∂ ,            (a17) 
where 
 
LI
C
HC
C
HC
LI
C
HC
C
n
CC
C
n
CC
C
n
nn
+
+
+
+
+
=
21
2
2
21
1
1
2 )(φ .      (a18) 
 
Appendix B: Corresponding Macro Functions 
Macros for Non-Energy Producing Sectors 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*        Top Level 
(6.2.8) $macro   px_ces(a)        (1/ADX(a))*(deltaqx(a)**elx(a)*PVAE(a)**(1-elx(a)) + (1-deltaqx(a))**elx(a)*PINT(a)**(1-elx(a)))**(1/(1-elx(a)))  
(6.2.9) $macro   qvae_ces(a)   (QX(a)/ADX(a))*(ADX(a)*deltaqx(a)*PX(a)*(1-TX(a))/PVAE(a))**elx(a) 
(6.2.10) $macro   qint_ces(a)     (QX(a)/ADX(a))*(ADX(a)*(1-deltaqx(a))*PX(a)*(1-TX(a))/PINT(a))**elx(a) 
*        Second Level: two argument CES formulation  
(6.2.11) $macro   pvae_ces(a)    (1/ADVAE(a))*(deltavae(a)**elvae(a)*PVKE(a)**(1-elvae(a))  + (1-deltavae(a))**elvae(a)*PVLL(a)**(1-elvae(a)))**(1/(1-elvae(a))) 
(6.2.12) $macro   qvke_ces(a)    (QVAE(a)/ADVAE(a))*(ADVAE(a)*deltavae(a)*PVAE(a)/PVKE(a))**elvae(a) 
(6.2.13) $macro   qvll_ces(a)      (QVAE(a)/ADVAE(a))*(ADVAE(a)*(1-deltavae(a))*PVAE(a)/PVLL(a))**elvae(a) 
*        Third Level 
(6.2.14) $macro   pvll_ces(a)       (1/ADVLL(a))*SUM(f$deltavll(f,a), deltavll(f,a)**elvll(a)*(WF(f)*WFDIST(f,a)*(1+TF(f,a)))**(1-elvll(a)))**(1/(1-elvll(a))) 
(6.2.15) $macro   fdvll_ces(f,a)   (QVLL(a)/ADVLL(a))*(ADVLL(a)*deltavll(f,a)*PVLL(a)/(WF(f)*WFDIST(f,a)*(1+TF(f,a))))**elvll(a) 
*        Third Level 
(6.2.16) $macro   pvke_ces(a)      (1/ADVKE(a))*(deltavke(a)**elvke(a)*PVE(a)**(1-elvke(a))  + (1-deltavke(a))**elvke(a)*(WF("fCap")*WFDIST("fCap",a)*(1 +      
TF("fCap",a)))**(1-elvke(a)))**(1/(1-elvke(a))) 
(6.2.17) $macro   qve_ces(a)        (QVKE(a)/ADVKE(a))*(ADVKE(a)*deltavke(a)*PVKE(a)/PVE(a))**elvke(a) 
(6.2.18) $macro   fdcap_ces(a)     (QVKE(a)/ADVKE(a))*(ADVKE(a)*(1-deltavke(a))*PVKE(a)/(WF("fCap")*WFDIST("fCap",a)*(1+TF("fCap",a))))**elvke(a) 
* Fourth Level 
(6.2.19) $macro   pve_cd(a)        (1/adve(a))*(PVEL(a)/rhocel(a))**rhocel(a)*(PVNEL(a)/rhocnel(a))**rhocnel(a) 
(6.2.20) $macro   qvel_cd(a)        rhocel(a)*QVE(a)*PVE(a)/PVEL(a) 
(6.2.21) $macro   qvnel_cd(a)      rhocnel(a)*PVE(a)*QVE(a)/PVNEL(a) 
* Fifth Level 
(6.2.24) $macro   pvnel_ces(a)     (1/adnel(a))*(deltanel(a)**elnel(a)*PVCO(a)**(1-elnel(a)) + (1-deltanel(a))**elnel(a)*PVNCO(a)**(1-elnel(a)))**(1/(1-elnel(a))) 
(6.2.25) $macro   qvco_ces(a)      (QVNEL(a)/adnel(a))*(adnel(a)*deltanel(a)*PVNEL(a)/PVCO(a))**elnel(a) 
(6.2.26) $macro   qvnco_ces(a)     (QVNEL(a)/adnel(a))*(adnel(a)*(1-deltanel(a))*PVNEL(a)/PVNCO(a))**elnel(a) 
* Sixth Level 
(6.2.29) $macro   pvnco_cd(a)       (1/adnco(a))*prod(c$coaln(c), ((PQD(c)*(1+TEG(c,a))*PQDDIST(c,a) + TCARB(c,a))/rhocnco(c,a))**rhocnco(c,a)) 
(6.2.30) $macro   qintd_cd(c,a)      rhocnco(c,a)*QVNCO(a)*PVNCO(a)/(PQD(c)*(1+TEG(c,a))*PQDDIST(c,a) + TCARB(c,a)) 
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______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Macros for Energy Producing Sectors 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*        Third Level 
(6.2.31) $macro   pvke_leon(a)      (QVE(a)*PVE(a)+ FD("fCap",a)*WF("fCap")*WFDIST("fCap",a)*(1+TF("fCap",a)))/QVKE(a) 
(6.2.32) $macro   qve_leon(a)        ioqve(a)*QVKE(a) 
(6.2.33) $macro   fdcap_leon(a)     ioqcap(a)*QVKE(a) 
*        Fourth Level 
(6.2.34) $macro   pve_leon(a)       SUM(c$ceg(c), ((PQD(c) + TCARB(c,a))*(QINTD(c,a)))/QVE(a) 
(6.2.35) $macro   qintd_leon(c,a)   ioqenergy(c,a)*QVE(a) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Macros for the Electricity Sector 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*        Power Generation Technologies 
(6.2.36) $macro   pxe_ces(a)       (1/adtb(a))*sum(tb, deltatb(a,tb)**eltb*PXtb(a,tb)**(1-eltb))**(1/(1-eltb)) 
(6.2.37) $macro   qxtb_ces(a,tb)  (QX(a)/adtb(a))*(adtb(a)*deltatb(a,tb)*(PX(a)*(1-TX(a)))/PXtb(a,tb))**eltb 
*        Top Level 
(6.2.38) $macro   pxtb_ces(a,tb)      (1/atbx(a,tb))*(dtbx(a,tb)**eltbx*PVAEtb(a,tb)**(1-eltbx) + (1-dtbx(a,tb))**eltbx*PINTtb(a,tb)**(1-eltbx))**(1/(1-eltbx)) 
(6.2.39) $macro   qvaetb_ces(a,tb)  (QXtb(a,tb)/atbx(a,tb))*(atbx(a,tb)*dtbx(a,tb)*PXtb(a,tb)/PVAEtb(a,tb))**eltbx 
(6.2.40) $macro   qinttb_ces(a,tb)   (QXtb(a,tb)/atbx(a,tb))*(atbx(a,tb)*(1-dtbx(a,tb))*PXtb(a,tb)/PINTtb(a,tb))**eltbx 
*        Second Level 
(6.2.42) $macro   pvaetb_ces(a,tb)  (1/atbvae(a,tb))*(dtbvae(a,tb)**eltbvae*PVLLtb(a,tb)**(1-eltbvae) + (1-dtbvae(a,tb))**eltbvae*PVKEtb(a,tb)**(1-eltbvae))**(1/(1-eltbvae)) 
(6.2.43) $macro   qvlltb_ces(a,tb)   (QVAEtb(a,tb)/atbvae(a,tb))*(atbvae(a,tb)*dtbvae(a,tb)*PVAEtb(a,tb)/PVLLtb(a,tb))**eltbvae 
(6.2.44) $macro   qvketb_ces(a,tb)  (QVAEtb(a,tb)/atbvae(a,tb))*(atbvae(a,tb)*(1-dtbvae(a,tb))*PVAEtb(a,tb)/PVKEtb(a,tb))**eltbvae 
*        Third Level 
(6.2.45) $macro   pvlltb_ces(a,tb)   (1/atbvll(a,tb))*sum(f$(capn(f) and dtbvll(f,a,tb)), dtbvll(f,a,tb)**eltbvll*(WF(f)*WFDIST(f,a)*(1+TF(f,a)))**(1-eltbvll))**(1/(1-eltbvll)) 
(6.2.46) $macro   fdtb_ces(f,a,tb)   (QVLLtb(a,tb)/atbvll(a,tb))*(atbvll(a,tb)*dtbvll(f,a,tb)*PVLLtb(a,tb)/(WF(f)*WFDIST(f,a)*(1+TF(f,a))))**eltbvll 
*        Third Level 
(6.2.47) $macro   pvketb_ces(a,tb)    (1/atbvke(a,tb))*(dtbvke(a,tb)**eltbke*(WF("fCap")*WFDIST("fCap",a)*(1+TF("fCap",a)))**(1-eltbke) + (1-
dtbvke(a,tb))**eltbke*PVEtb(a,tb)**(1-eltbke))**(1/(1-eltbke)) 
(6.2.48) $macro   fdtbke_ces(f,a,tb)  (QVKEtb(a,tb)/atbvke(a,tb))*(atbvke(a,tb)*dtbvke(a,tb)*PVKEtb(a,tb)/(WF("fCap")*WFDIST("fCap",a)*(1+TF("fCap",a))))**eltbke 
(6.2.49) $macro   qvetb_ces(a,tb)      (QVKEtb(a,tb)/atbvke(a,tb))*(atbvke(a,tb)*(1-dtbvke(a,tb))*PVKEtb(a,tb)/PVEtb(a,tb))**eltbke 
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*        Fourth Level for gas- and coal-fired technologies 
(6.2.52) $macro   pvetb_ces(a,tb)          (1/atbve(a,tb))*sum(c$ceg(c), dtbve(c,a,tb)**eltbve*((PQD(c) + TCARB(c,a))**(1-eltbve))**(1/(1-eltbve)) 
(6.2.53) $macro   qintdtb_ces(c,a,tb)  (QVEtb(a,tb)/atbve(a,tb))*(atbve(a,tb)*dtbve(c,a,tb)*PVEtb(a,tb)/((PQD(c)  + TCARB(c,a)))**eltbve 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Household Demand  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*        Top level                                                                                                               
(6.2.57) $macro   phexp_ces(h)   (1/ach(h))*(deltah(h)**elasth(h)*PEH(h)**(1-elasth(h)) + (1-deltah(h))**elasth(h)*PNEH(h)**(1-elasth(h)))**(1/(1-elasth(h)))      
(6.2.58) $macro   qeh_ces(h)       (QHEXP(h)/ach(h))*(ach(h)*deltah(h)*PHEXP(h)/PEH(h))**(1/(1+rhoch(h)))                                                    
(6.2.59) $macro   qneh_ces(h)     (QHEXP(h)/ach(h))*(ach(h)*(1-deltah(h))*PHEXP(h)/PNEH(h))**(1/(1+rhoch(h)))                                               
*        Second level 
(6.2.60) $macro   peh_ces(h)         (1/aceh2(h))*sum(c$he(c), deltaeh(c,h)**elasteh(h)*(PQD(c) + TCARBH(c,h))**(1-elasteh(h)))**(1/(1-elasteh(h))) 
(6.2.61) $macro   qcdhe_ces(c,h)  (QEH(h)/aceh2(h))*(aceh2(h)*deltaeh(c,h)*PEH(h)/(PQD(c) + TCARBH(c,h)))**(1/(1+rhoceh(h))) 
*        Second level 
(6.2.62) $macro   pneh_cd(h)       (1/acneh(h))*prod(c$hne(c),((PQD(c) + TCARBH(c,h))/comhav(c,h))**comhav(c,h)) 
(6.2.63) $macro   qcdhne_cd(h)    comhav(c,h)*QNEH(h)*PNEH(h)/(PQD(c) + TCARBH(c,h)) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix C: Derivation of Perceived Elasticities of Demand 
Demand function for domestically produced commodities (QDc): 
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Price index for the composite of commodities (PQDc):  
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Derive the demand function for domestically produced commodities (QDc) with respect to the 
price of domestically produced commodities (PDc):  
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Derive the price index for the composite of commodities (PQSc) with respect to the price of 
domestically produced commodities (PDc): 
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where DELdomc  is the perceived elasticity of demand. Rearrange and multiply by (-1): 
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